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View Diary: Smoking Bullet in the Smoking Gun? (190 comments)

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  •  Some context: (4.00)
    The War Before the War
    Michael Smith
    Monday, May 30th, 2005
    New Statesman  (subscription)

    Britain and the US carried out a secret bombing campaign against Iraq months before the tanks went over the border in March 2003. Michael Smith pieces together the evidence

    Page by relentless page, evidence has been stacking up for many months to show that - despite Tony Blair's denials - the British government signed up for war in Iraq almost a year before the invasion. What most people will not have realised until now, however, was that Britain and the US waged a secret war against Iraq for months before the tanks rolled over the border in March 2003. Documentary evidence and ministerial answers in parliament reveal the existence of a clandestine bombing campaign designed largely to provoke Iraq into taking action that could be used to justify the start of the war.

    In the absence of solid legal grounds for war, in other words, the allies tried to bomb Saddam Hussein into providing their casus belli. And when that didn't work they just stepped up the bombing rate, in effect starting the conflict without telling anyone.

    The main evidence lies in leaked documents relating to a crucial meeting chaired by the Prime Minister in July 2002 - the documents which supported the Sunday Times story, published during this past election campaign, about how Blair promised George W Bush in April that year that Britain would back regime change.

    A briefing paper for the ministers and officials at the meeting - this was in effect a British war cabinet - laid out two alternative US war plans. The first, a "generated start", involved a slow build-up of roughly 250,000 troops in Kuwait. Allied aircraft would then mount an air war, which would be followed by a full-scale invasion. The second option was a "running start", in which a continuous air campaign, "initiated by an Iraqi casus belli", would be mounted without any overt military build-up. Allied special forces giving support to Iraqi opposition groups on the ground would be joined by further troops as and when they arrived in theatre, until the regime collapsed. A few days after the meeting, the Americans opted for a hybrid of the two in which the air war would begin, as for a running start, as soon as the Iraqis provided the justification for war, while at the same time an invasion force would be built up, as for a generated start.

    The record of the July meeting in London, however, contains a revealing passage in which Geoff Hoon, then defence secretary, tells his colleagues in plain terms that "the US had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime". What is meant by "spikes of activity" becomes clear in the light of information elicited from the government by the Liberal Democrat Sir Menzies Campbell, who asked the Ministry of Defence about British and American air activity in 2002 in the southern no-fly zone of Iraq - the zone created to protect southern Shias after Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed their 1991 uprising against him.

    The MoD response shows that in March 2002 no bombs were dropped, and in April only 0.3 tonnes of ordnance used. The figure rose to 7.3 tonnes in May, however, then to 10.4 in June, dipping to 9.5 in July before rising again to 14.1 in August. Suddenly, in other words, US and British air forces were in action over Iraq.

    What was going on? There were very strict rules of engagement in the no-fly zones. The allied pilots were authorised to fire missiles at any Iraqi air defence weapon or radar that fired at them or locked on to their aircraft. As was noted in Foreign Office legal advice appended to the July 2002 briefing paper, they were only "entitled to use force in self-defence where such a use of force is a necessary and proportionate response to actual or imminent attack from Iraqi ground systems".

    That May, however, Donald Rumsfeld had ordered a more aggressive approach, authorising allied aircraft to attack Iraqi command and control centres as well as actual air defences. The US defence secretary later said this was simply to prevent the Iraqis attacking allied aircraft, but Hoon's remark gives the game away. In reality, as he explained, the "spikes of activity" were designed "to put pressure on the regime".

    What happened next was dramatic. In September, the amount of ordnance used in the southern no-fly zone increased sharply to 54.6 tonnes. It declined in October to 17.7 tonnes before rising again to 33.6 tonnes in November and 53.2 tonnes in December. The spikes were getting taller and taller.

    In fact, as it became clear that Saddam Hussein would not provide them with the justification they needed to launch the air war, we can see that the allies simply launched it anyway, beneath the cloak of the no-fly zone.

    In the early hours of 5 September, for example, more than a hundred allied aircraft attacked the H-3 airfield, the main air defence site in western Iraq. Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias, it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected.

    It would be another nine weeks before Blair and Bush went to the UN to try to persuade it to authorise military action, but the air war had begun anyway. The number of raids shot up, from four a month to 30, with allied aircraft repeatedly returning to sites they had already hit to finish them off. Senior British officials insist that no RAF aircraft opened fire until it was at least locked on to by an Iraqi radar, but it is difficult to see how the systematic targeting of Iraqi installations could have constituted "a necessary and proportionate response". The story of the secret air war dovetails neatly with the other evidence from the leaked documents, further demonstrating why, even after the general election, Blair's efforts to dispel the allegations about the background to war and get the country to "move on" seem doomed to fail.

    It was the briefing paper for the July meeting which stated categorically that "when the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April [2002], he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change".

    The same document also stated bluntly that "regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law" and it was therefore "necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally support military action".

    America had none of these problems. It was Washington's view that it could decide for itself whether Saddam was in breach of his obligations to let in weapons inspectors. With British officials holding Blair back, insisting that without UN backing an invasion would be illegal, it would have been extremely convenient for Bush and Rumsfeld if Saddam had retaliated against the bombing offensive, thus giving London and Washington the chance to cry, "He started it!"

    The leaked British documents have now found their way into the US political debate. The White House has declined to respond to a letter from 89 US congressmen asking Bush when he and Blair agreed to invade Iraq. The congressmen are now talking about sending a delegation to Britain to try to find out the truth, although heaven alone knows why they think they will get any more change from Blair than they did from Bush. Their concerns are none the less grave ones, for the leaked documents are as damaging to Bush as they are to Blair.

    Under the US constitution, only Congress has the power to authorise war, and it did not do so until 11 October. Any military ac-tion to oust Saddam before that point would constitute a serious abuse of power by the president. But there is no reason to suppose that bothered Mr Bush.


     

    here boo, here boo, want a cookie? good girl.

    by tepster on Sun May 29, 2005 at 10:24:08 AM PDT

    •  Hmmm... (none)
      2002

      March-      no bombs
      April-       .3 tons
      May-        7.3 tons
      June-      10.4 tons
      July-       9.5 tons
      August-    14.1 tons
      Septeber-  54.6 tons  
      October-   17.7 tons
      November-  33.6 tons
      December-  53.2 tons

      here boo, here boo, want a cookie? good girl.

      by tepster on Sun May 29, 2005 at 10:33:09 AM PDT

      [ Parent ]

      •  One more dated wanted (4.00)
        Diaried yesterday about the performance awards for the so-called military analysts who worked on the aluminum tubes (http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2005/5/28/184452/747).

        When were those awards requested?  July 2002?

        Who requested those awards?  Who approved them?

        Want to bet the timing coordinates with this timeline for bombing campaign, as well as the Downing Street dossier?

        •  Rayne... run with this! (none)
          Excellent points, and would be great fuel to keep the fire going. Hope to see you and other Kossacks research this... (I have my hands full with our part alas).
          •  I did a google-run (none)
            on George Norris and Robert Campos- absolutely NOTHING came up.  It's like these guys are completely off the grid.

            I went in search of the date of these awards and there's nothing posted.

            Any ideas?

            here boo, here boo, want a cookie? good girl.

            by tepster on Sun May 29, 2005 at 11:57:04 AM PDT

            [ Parent ]

            •  I myself don't have any... (none)
              ... I am hoping you, Rayne, and others will dig into this... it looks promising and would be another devastating punch in our effort. Go for it.
              •  Hands full already (none)
                Been working on ePluribus Media story, can't take the time to do this one.

                But I think I'd be hampered anyhow; this might be a request that Rep. Conyers' office could initiate with the Pentagon.  

                Rep. Conyers?

            •  Pure speculation here but... (none)
              remember how one of the NSA intercepts John Bolton requested and that was seen by Roberts and Rockerfeller (with the analysts names redacted) was allegedly used by Bolton in order that he could congratulate and thank the analyst? Wonder if the WaPo story naming these analysts "rewards" connects to Bolton at all? Hmmmmmmm anyway, interesting timing of both stories, but might just be a coincidence.
              •  can you post a link to that story? (none)

                I'd be interested to read it for myself.
                •  here ya go... (none)
                  link to WaPo article:
                  Two Army analysts whose work has been connected to a major intelligence shortcoming on Iraq have received awards for job performance over the last few years, according to officials.
                  ...
                  The commission deemed their agency's assessment of the aluminum tubes as a "gross failure." The agency was "completely wrong," the panel said, when it judged in September 2002 that the tubes Iraq was purchasing were "highly unlikely" to be used for rocket motor cases because of their "material and tolerances."

                  The panel found that aluminum tubes with similar tolerances were used in a previous Iraqi rocket, the Nasser 81, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency had published details about the system in 1996, as did the Energy Department in 2001.

                  The panel's report said "the two primary NGIC rocket analysts said they did not know the dimensions" of the older Nasser 81 rocket and were unaware of the IAEA and Energy Department reports. The report did not name the analysts, but officials told The Post that the panel was referring to George Norris and Robert Campos.


                  Article doesn't mention Bolton, but hey, with these clowns, anything is possible.

                  There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics. --Benjamin Disraeli, cited by Mark Twain

                  by sheba on Sun May 29, 2005 at 07:29:35 PM PDT

                  [ Parent ]

        •  $20,000 bonus to official who agreed on nuke claim (none)
          Energy Dept. honcho ordered dissenters at Iraq pre-briefing to 'shut up, sit down'
          Posted: August 12, 2003
          1:00 a.m. Eastern

          By Paul Sperry
          © 2003 WorldNetDaily.com

          WASHINGTON - A former Energy Department intelligence chief who agreed with the White House claim that Iraq had reconstituted its defunct nuclear-arms program was awarded a total of $20,500 in bonuses during the build-up to the war, WorldNetDaily has learned.

          Thomas Ryder, as acting director of Energy's intelligence office, overruled senior intelligence officers on his staff in voting for the position at a National Foreign Intelligence Board meeting at CIA headquarters last September.

          His officers argued at a pre-briefing at Energy headquarters that there was no hard evidence to support the alarming Iraq nuclear charge, and asked to join State Department's dissenting opinion, Energy officials say.

          Ryder ordered them to "shut up and sit down," according to sources familiar with the meeting.

          As a result, State was the intelligence community's lone dissenter in the key National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, something the Bush administration is quick to remind critics of its prewar intelligence. So far no banned weapons have been found in Iraq to confirm its charges.

          The secret 90-page report, prepared Oct. 1, was rushed to sway members of Congress ahead of a key vote on granting the White House war-making authority. It also formed the underlying evidence for the White House's decision to go to war.

          Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham gave Ryder a $13,000 performance bonus after the NIE report was released and just before the war, department sources say. He had received an additional $7,500 before the report.

          "That's a hell of a lot of money for an intelligence director who had no experience or background in intelligence, and who'd only been running the office for nine months," said one source who requested anonymity. "Something's fishy."

          Ryder declined to talk about the payments.

          [...]

      •  Where? (none)
        Where did you get these numbers?

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