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View Diary: Morning feature: Plurality voting and better methods (124 comments)

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  •  Maybe not in Bush v Gore (3+ / 0-)
    Recommended by:
    plf515, NCrissieB, kktlaw

    ...but let's pick a less polarized example. Call it Smith v Jones. Assume Smith is well liked by everyone, Jones is a love-him-or-hate-him kinda guy. IF people are being honest about their opinions of both candidates, and not delibrerately trying to game the system, then this scenario is quite possible: 40% prefer Smith and can't stand Jones, so on average they rate Smith at a 9 and Jones at a 1. 60% prefer Jones but also find Smith acceptable. On average they give Jones a 9 and Smith a 5. In plurality, IRV, or Bordat, Jones wins. In range voting, Smith wins handily. In approval voting, Smith may also win, since almost nobody who voted for Smith can stand Jones, and if 17% or more of Jones's voters also approve Smith then that's enough to swing the election.

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