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View Diary: Honduras: Diplomatic Fail (83 comments)

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  •  I really hope so, and while I don't (7+ / 0-)

    want to contradict you, the key player here is the US and the historical record isn't comforting:

    As foreign affairs expert Abraham F. Lowenthal notes:

    In the past, one U.S. administration after another has trumpeted a new policy, but more often than not, these new approaches have faded away: resisted by career bureaucrats, special interests, or both, and overwhelmed by regional realities or by other concerns. That is what happened, for example, in 1963 when elected President Ramón Villeda Morales was overthrown in Honduras, testing the resolve of the Kennedy administration to implement its announced policy that it would not recognize governments established by force. Washington suspended diplomatic relations immediately after the coup, but restored them less than two months later, recognized and accommodated itself to the anti-Communist military regime. This sequence contributed to the so-called Mann Doctrine of 1964, dropping the U.S. insistence on democracy.

    "Do not judge your neighbor until you walk two moons in his moccasins." Cheyenne

    by maracatu on Sat Jul 04, 2009 at 05:41:14 PM PDT

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    •  US policy towards the illegal regime has been (5+ / 0-)

      unequivocal - no recognition, no dealings.

      Historical records can be telling but are not always conclusive.

      The Shane Life - Chock full o' juicy Shane-bits!

      by Shane Hensinger on Sat Jul 04, 2009 at 05:57:19 PM PDT

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    •  I wanted to do a diary on this, (9+ / 0-)

      but just haven't the time.

      It is worth going back in history to examine the context (ie. Johnson Administration) out of which emerged the Mann Doctrine of 1964.  As an economist myself, I wanted to zero in on a person by the name of Walt Whitman Rostow:

      By measuring the ratio of investment to national income, (Walt) Rostow could calculate when a nation would reach takeoff and how much aid it could usefully absorb. Within a few years the National Security Council used "absorptive capacity" as its principle criterion for aid.  
      The United States own level of development provided another imperative for action. Rostow concluded that the United States had reached the terminal stage of the modernization process, the stage of high mass consumption, but its position there was insecure. High population growth, a deficit of social overhead capital, and the cost of the arms race created drags that might cause it to lose altitude. A steady flow of raw materials was essential.  
      Rostow assigned an important role to soldiers during the transitional period. Assembling the preconditions for takeoff, he believed, required the efforts of an elite coalition of landowners, merchants, and politicians who favored centralization and were "prepared to deal with the enemies of this objective." Military men were the natural leaders of this movement, and throughout his career Rostow argued that military regimes could supply the stability and administrative competence needed for development. The Mann Doctrine of 1964, which made stability rather than democracy the prime goal of U.S. policy in Latin America during the Johnson administration, would later echo Rostow's reasoning.

      Actually, it is worth going even further back in order to really give a proper historical context...  

      That's what often happens to me -- I begin something small and then it evolves into a dissertation.

      ...And then I never finish it, like this series.

      "Do not judge your neighbor until you walk two moons in his moccasins." Cheyenne

      by maracatu on Sat Jul 04, 2009 at 06:23:43 PM PDT

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