From the beginning, events in Andar had a surrealistic air.
The Battle for Schools in Ghazni – or, Schools as a Battlefield, Afghanistan Analysts Network
“Now it’s a bit of a mess,” said one Western diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “It started as an anti-Taliban type thing, then Hezb-i-Islami moved in, then the government and the N.D.S. got involved and there are lots of different players, and that makes the people who started the whole thing suspicious.”
Ragtag Revolts in Parts of Afghanistan Repel Taliban, New York Times
The question, then, is whether this uprising started as an organic rebellion, remains one, or was never one to begin with.
An 'Afghan Summer' of Revolt, AfPak Channel
The United States-led military campaign that began on Oct. 7 has succeeded in eradicating most of the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, but it has returned to power nearly all of the same warlords who had misruled the country in the days before the Taliban.During the Soviet occupation, Qari Baba, a religious scholar, is an early prototype for the idea of religious leadership of the insurgency. From the start, his rule in Ghazni is brutal.
Afghan Warlords and Bandits Are Back in Business, New York Times, December 28, 2001
Najibullah keeps him on. He is governor during the Mujahideen period. The Taliban keep him on. Hamid Karzai, in 2001, keeps him on. Early on, the warlord is vitally important to United States military presence in Ghazni. So Karzai sacks him.
Later, the U.S. arrests him. After he gets out, the U.S. and the Ghazni governor scheme what to do with him. The powerful former governor ends up leading a small private militia, guarding roads.
In 2006, the Taliban assassinate him.
Khial Mohammad Hussaini is Qari Baba's right-hand man. He is historically important in the maneuverings leading to the Taliban taking Ghazni, which leads to the Taliban taking Kabul.
In June 2012, he gets pissed off about factional maneuverings in the Andar Uprising. He has not been given his share. So he emails journalists, ratting out Assadullah Khalid as being behind it. For pointing to the nasty political maneuverings behind the uprising, singling out Assadullah Khalid is highly effective.
Asadullah Khalid is the second governor of Ghazni, and a Karzai loyalist. Where Asadullah Khalid goes, stories of torture surely follow. Taliban starts making inroads in the province.
He is a major player in the Ghazni land-stealing mafia.
In 2012, he gets behind the Andar Uprising. At about the time he gets involved, both U.S. and Afghan media start portraying the Andar Uprising as a local affair, hiding the presence of major players.
Shortly later in 2012, Karzai appoints him as head of the National Directorate of Security. By this point, the history of abuse and torture in his prisons is very well known.
Sher Alam Ibrahimi is the third governor of Ghazni.
He is Asadullah Khalid's brother in law. He too is a major player in the Ghazni land-stealing mafia.
The U.S. is pushing the idea of private militias as a way to provide security. Sher Alam is able to come up with all sorts of proposals, including a plan involving Qari Baba, some guns, and some motorbikes.
Karzai sacks Sher Alam when details of a land stealing plot become public. The U.S. had wanted to retain him.
Merajuddin Patan is the fourth governor of Ghazni. He is corrupt and ineffective.
Faizanullah Faizan is the fifth governor of Ghazni, and a shift in strategy. Ghazni has Harakat/Hezb-i Islami rivalries. Faizan is with Hezb-i Islami. Karzai is hoping to draw the faction into the peace process.
He lasts five months, for being too outward with the corruption.
He ends up as a proclaimed spokesman for the uprising.
Shir Khosti is the sixth governor of Ghazni. He is Merajuddin Patan's lieutenant. He had lived in the U.S. for 30 years. Americans like him, and are hoping he will last. He lasts two months.
Usman Usmani is the seventh governor of Ghazni. His schemes include land theft, chromite smuggling, sale of government office, theft of emergency food aid, and plots involving private militias.
Dawlat Khan is chief of police in Nawa district of Ghazni. American military likes him. He leads dramatic charges on his enemies in his pickup truck, with Americans pulling up the rear.
Dawlat Khan likes to borrow money from shopkeepers. But somehow, the chief of police with the ability to lead charges, from his pickup truck, with the American military behind him, all roaring in on local houses, often forgets to pay the money back.
From humble bandit beginnings, he is made chief of police for all Paktika province. ISAF selects him
a surrealistic airto give a lecture on how local policing should be done.
Dawlat Khan also ends up as head of Watan Risk Management, a Karzai-family security venture.
On the day of the speech, Karzai gets news of the assassination of the Deputy Governor. The battle in Ghazni is about schools. Karzai goes off the American positive script.
"Our sons cannot go to school because of bombs and suicide attacks. Our teachers cannot go to school because of clashes and threats of assassination. Schools are closed," he said.For weeping, in public, about the state of his country, American and British newspapers make fun of him for being crazy.
Referring to his three-year-old son, he added: "I want him to go to school here, I swear to God I'm worried, I'm worried, oh people, I'm worried."
Rahmatullah and Abdul Malek are brothers in Andar district, from a Hezb-i Islami family. They take up with the Taliban, then are kicked out for too much independence. Rahmatullah spends time imprisoned at Bagram.
Taliban are assassinating police chiefs using motorbikes. The government bans motorbikes. The Taliban responds by forcing closing of schools. Rahmatullah and Abdul Malek begin an anti-Taliban/anti-U.S. insurgency: the Uprising in Andar.
The Taliban kidnaps Abdul Malek, and wounds Rahmatullah in a gunfight. Rahmatullah goes to Kabul, and never returns home.
Corrupt former-governor Faizanullah Faizan takes up as proclaimed spokesman for the uprising. Corrupt and ruthless former-governor Asadullah Khalid gets behind it. U.S. Special Forces try to extend it.
Involvement of corrupt U.S.-associated warlords and powerbrokers in the uprising is very unlikely to work.
"Anti-Taliban movements cannot have a sponsor and be identified with this government," he says. "As soon as this government touches anything it turns into evil."And yet, despite a very long history of failure of our warlord schemes, the U.S., in 2012, still tries it.
Afghan Villagers Hit Back Against Taliban, Radio Free Europe