I believe I've identified the tiny political miscalculation responsible for the apparently imminent demise of immigration reform in the GOP-controlled House. Just in case there are any GOP strategists lurking around here, let me clarify one thing:
Contrary to what you may have heard, not all us white voters are totally selfish, xenophobic racists. Some of us are - gasp - occasionally a little concerned about other people, even if they don't look exactly like us..
Now, lest some of you doubt that this misconception does not exist, allow me to quote liberally - below the fold - from today's Plum Line.
the argument that Republicans don’t really need to improve their standing much among Latinos to be competitive in national elections is gaining real ground among Republicans — posing a serious threat to immigration reform. The emerging case is that Republicans mainly need to do even better among whites — by doing a better job energizing white supporters and by bringing in more “missing” white voters who might be inclined to vote Republican — thus relieving them of the inconvenient need to alienate their base with anything that might persuade Latinos to give their party a second look.Summarizing a post by Nate Cohn, Greg elaborates why the GOP can't just reject immigration reform with the plan of winning more white votes:
Nate Cohn published what may be the most comprehensive piece yet attempting to debunk this notion, which was perhaps best laid out by Sean Trende the other day. Cohn’s piece is well worth reading in full, but here is the summary version:I would put it more simply. The GOP is failing to appreciate that alienating the brown people does not necessarily translate into more white votes.
1) If Republicans are going to increase their performance among white voters even further, they will have to moderate on social issues in ways that will be discomfiting to the base in any case; Republicans will have to “pick their poison.”
2) The whites-only theory of the case depends on the GOP continuing to improve its standing among whites going forward. While this is currently happening, GOP gains among them are largely regional — focused in the south and in Appalachia. At the same time, Democrats may be gaining among whites outside these regions, which, if it continues, could “cement the Democratic edge in the Electoral College.” This is being exacerbated by the aforementioned refusal to moderate on cultural issues — particularly in key suburban areas.
3) The notion that the GOP’s future hopes turn largely on boosting turnout among “missing white voters” who didn’t turn out in 2012 is complicated by the fact that many of these voters might vote Democratic. This could be made even worse by the fact that many missing whites were young voters. Over time, if the next generation of young voters is as liberal as this one, it could push the national white voter further leftward. Cohn concludes:
Conservatives take solace in the possibility that they could win with gains through whites, presumably on the assumption that the changes needed for gains among non-southern white voters will be less painful than embracing immigration reform. To the extent that this assumption is informed by the view that the GOP is making broad, steady gains among white voters, it is wrong. The GOP has a tough road ahead.
Or to put it differently, even setting aside all of the economic arguments for immigration reform, there are a lot of white voters out there who like to consider themselves somewhat compassionate and truly want to help families who are being torn apart by the current immigration policies.
In other words, steadfastly opposing a path to citizenship may well cost the GOP not just with minority voters, but with white voters too.
Thus endeth today's help-the-GOP-strategist-moment.