I was comforted reading through the comment section of Mark’s latest Ukraine update “It was the worst of times ... but only in one place” as many people didn’t seem to be buying the pessimism being doled out by some news outlets (and Mark was doing a good job rebutting that pessimism). But it did make me think about bringing a little perspective to where this war currently is.
I won’t rehash the very start of the war’s doom and gloom about Ukraine’s chances as that’s been done plenty before. On March 5th of 2022 Kos did write an article entitled “Let's talk about mud, the greatest friend Ukraine ever had”. Just a reminder that we were praising the defensive quality of mud and what a boon it was for the defender. I’ll come back to that point.
I did find the March 10th map of the war as posted at the top of this article. Russia had yet to consolidate much of the area in the south and East, but it had taken Kupyansk and Izyum. It was about the maximum of expansion near Kyiv and also around the time of the fabled 40 km convoy that would win the war for the Russians.
Then 7 days later on March 17th, 2022 (a year from this Friday) Kos would publish Ukraine update: Ukraine retakes 75 miles of Russian-held territory, pushes toward Kherson. It was the first largish pushing back of Russian forces during the war. By the end of March Russia was retreating from the entire Northern part of Ukraine. To be clear, these were not huge Ukrainian offensives pushing the Russians back. Rather it was Russia realizing it was getting picked apart in overly exposed positions with incredibly poor logistics and had to withdraw what it could or lose it all. It was a Ukrainian win engineered by the Ukrainians, but it wasn’t an “offensive” in terms of the combined arms offensive we’ve been hoping for once the ground firms up.
On March 16th of 2022, I think any supporter of Ukraine would have been ecstatic to know the war would end up to where it was today. Ukraine hadn’t begun receiving western artillery or HIMARS. Kos hadn’t even begun to write articles tamping down expectations of western tanks and planes. Now we have a situation of 3 successful Ukrainian campaigns (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson) and Leopards IN COUNTRY.
The extended mud season with no hard winter freeze has definitely shut things down. But given the weather Ukraine has had and the starting situation in October of 2022, the best possible reasonable outcome (other than a Russian surrender or similar unlikely occurrences) would be Ukraine saving its strength in a defensive posture while Russia pisses away its strength on an offensive in mud for almost no gains. Within reason and given the weather, we really couldn’t have hoped for a better winter for Ukraine!
What Russia should have done is sat back in its own defensive posture to train and build up forces. It could have trained on combined arms in the safety of Russia, preserved what armor it had, and built up a supply of artillery (out of HIMARS range) for a fresh overwhelming artillery barrage to attack Ukraine when the ground dried up. Instead it lost roughly 40,000 soldiers on Bakhmut alone. In the south at Vuhledar Russia has lost well over a hundred armored vehicles of various sorts to no gain at all.
So all last summer, when the ground was dry with little mud, Russia refused to call up new troops while it was whittled down in manpower. The mobilization didn’t begin until the fall, just before the mud started becoming an issue again. Rather than waiting for better weather and training those troops, Russia decided to attack at the WORST possible time and has spent 5 months and thousands of lives gaining very little territory.
I’ll tell you right now Bakhmut WILL fall and you shouldn’t get pessimistic when it does. The recent gains north in the city indicates to me Ukraine has been drawing down troops inside the city to prevent a large number from being surrounded. But drawing down means the Russians will gain ground which is what we are seeing. Bakhmut has been an amazing success for Ukraine. It has been a fortress for Russia to dash its strength against buying time for forces in the rear. But that service is coming to an end.
I drew the picture below partly in jest the other day, but it does serve a purpose.
The more Russia pushes up the M03 highway without pushing elsewhere, the more the Bakhmut area turns into a salient. Ukraine is holding near Kreminna and Siversk and Russia isn’t gaining anything in the south. Russia has a strategy of reinforcing success and so will most likely continue to channel resources into the Bakhmut salient. So long as Ukraine can keep drawing them out without risking Russian artillery getting too close to Sloviansk or Kramatorsk the Russian position will continue to weaken as it stretches out exposing its flanks.
The recent Ukrainian PUSH to take the T-05-13 south of Bakhmut (closer to Horlivka) is in part to cut at least one potential supply line to Bakhmut and also prevent the rail line there from connecting in. Ukraine has the resources to take certain actions if they wish to. That they haven’t is both a sign of a plan and good restraint.
We all want that massive combined arms offensive that rolls up the Russian forces and compels most of them to surrender. But that time is not now. All things considered, this has been a really good winter for Ukraine. And because of what has happened this winter, Ukraine will have a far better summer.
Slava Ukraini!