It is becoming clear that the serious mistakes the Bush Administration made before and after 9/11 were based on its ideological predispositions and inability to recognize that transnational terrorists such as Al Qaeda were more of a threat to the U.S. than state sponsored terrorism or the actions of rogue states. See, for example, Josh Marshall's posts, particularly this one:
Josh Marshall
and this Op-Ed in the NY Times today:
Why Nobody Saw 9/11 Coming
The Bush Administration's view really was, and is, a myopic view. It is true that during the cold war it was difficult to impose significant enough costs on state sponsors of terrorism and rogue states to change their behavior or even to contain them.
That is no longer the case. The cost/benefit analysis involved in state sponsorship of terrorism and the high risk of getting caught (and the cost of even being suspected of it) is too high for almost all state actors. This trend became very evident in the 1990s, when the neoconservative veterans of the Reagan-Bush Administrations were not paying attention. During this period, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Iran, North Korean and Cuba all pulled back in the extent of their support of terrorism directed at American and Western interests (though this may be less true in terms of Arab support of terrorist activities directed at Israel).
Today, states contribute to transnational terrorism less through their direct actions than through their failure and reluctance to take decisive actions against transnational terrorists and those supporting them (usually for domestic political reasons). We see this in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Muslim countries.
Our frustration with these countries can be analogized to some extent with British frustration with the unwillingness of successive American governments to crack down sufficiently on alleged American financiers and sponsors of IRA terrorism.
Military action against these states will rarely afford a solution to this problem, which must be dealt with firmness and diplomacy. Fortunately, the U.S. has more than sufficient carrots and sticks, which if applied wisely and judiciously, should be able to ameliorate this problem and gain additional cooperation. It will be a long, hard slog, however, and this Administration has greatly complicated the task.