At least on post war planning failures -
Drum has this -
....Phil Carter, former operational planner in the 4th Infantry Division, isn't very impressed with Tommy Franks. In his new book, American Soldier, Franks describes a prewar review meeting with the top brass in the Bush administration in which it's clear that there was little interest in hearing about plans for "Phase IV" -- post hostility operations:
You have to have sat through a few OPLAN briefings to understand why this is significant. Here, Gen. Franks briefed the President and the NSC principals that Phase IV entailed significant strategic and operational risk, and that there was no good solution yet for Phase IV. Yet, the discussion afterwards focused entirely on WMD, Scuds, issues with allies, and other issues focused on Phase III.
No one asked Gen. Franks about Phase IV; it seemed like an afterthought. That makes sense because the White House and Pentagon leaders saw Operation Iraqi Freedom as Desert Storm II in many ways -- where we dodged the post-war issue by limiting our objectives and pulling out rapidly. This passage implies that Gen. Franks was aware of the problem, but his bosses weren't -- and he didn't pop a starcluster to let them know of the problem. . . .
Drum
Monday morning quarterbacking you say? Well how about this in August 2002 -
SEN. AKAKA: In the Persian Gulf War, we did not go all the way to Baghdad and replace Saddam Hussein. If we are planning to do so this time, most of you suggest that we should be planning also for what we will do in Iraq afterwards.
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: One of my colleagues mentioned that perhaps a more difficult and perhaps equally important part of our thinking should be devoted to what will happen after we go in, as it is, about how we get in and so on. And I fully agree with that. And yet this is the most difficult thing to do, and it's most difficult to pin the tail on the donkey as to who it is that is responsible for it.
Surprisingly enough, in the open press, in the open discussion -- that's all that I have access to -- there's been very little of that discussion. There's been very little about what opposition forces there are, what political elements there are to tie together these disparate groups, between the North and the center and the South. And we've already talked about the potential of them splintering, and none of us are really sure whether that will happen or not. But there needs to be someone worrying about it, and a blueprint needs to exist as to who will do what.
. . . And so I wish I could tell you that I have heard somewhere on the West Coast, where I now live, that this is all under control. I do not have that confidence at all. But that doesn't mean that something isn't ongoing.
. . . But to establish a government, to ensure that the government has the political support, that the security structures are there, that the police forces are there, all of the things that we saw as very negative aspects of our previous operations during the previous administration, someone needs to be taking care of, and it must not be put on the hands of the Defense Department.
SEN. AKAKA: General Clark?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I just want to underscore everything General Shali had to say on that. I think that it's a very, very difficult task. I think it's really the critical task in terms of winning. I think it's the most difficult part of this operation. It has not received adequate attention in public discussion. Whether there have been decisions made on this or not, I don't know.
The track record in Afghanistan is that we're more lucky than we are good there. There are still enormous problems to be dealt with, particularly on the reconstruction side. We know the military is not the right institution to do this. We know from our experience in Bosnia and in Haiti that you can't -- and Kosovo, that you can't just dump this on the United Nations; that there has to be a support organization established. . . . So it's the United States government that has to take the lead in planning this. In the mid-1990s, we created an organization, a framework for this, Presidential Decision Directive -- I think it was 55 or -- PDD-56 I think it was, in which there was a mechanism for tasking each of the agencies of government. Whether that's in place or not, I don't know. But it is the most challenging part of this operation, and the United States government needs to take the lead before it hands it off to the United Nations.
SEN. AKAKA: General Hoar?
GEN. HOAR: Yes, sir. I think, as my colleagues have said, this is the part of this operation that has received very little attention. And given the failure in 1991 to have a war termination plan that would allow us to have a set of circumstances exist in Iraq that would be favorable to us, it seems to me that we should not go down this road again.
What to do after we get to Baghdad seems to me a little bit like what happens to the dog when he finally catches the car. What are we going to do now? And I would suggest to you that it's a National Security Council issue, and it needs to be developed. And I sure hope that this committee and other committees would ask the administration what their plans are after they get to Baghdad and "catch the car."
Generals Testify
This is a bunch of 4 and 5 star Generals telling you that you are fucking up bad on everything, but especially on post-war planning. WTF? Is this acceptable? Can Kerry not say listen to Shali, Clark, Hoar. They said this shit BEFORE the war, BEFORE they became Dems - Hell they became Dems because of this!
Why can we not say that? Why can't Kerry say that? I know, he does, just you wait.
Look Kerry is gonna win, but let's crush these bastards - these incompetent, horrible imbeciles.