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The following image from the KSTP site and video clearly shows an orange label marked "1.1 D"

While the label does not show it is RDX (the type of explsoves that are missing) that is one of the types that would have this classification (see ->

Originally posted to KenD on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 08:21 AM PDT.

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Comment Preferences

  •  Good job! Well done!! (none)
    Good job! Well done!!... Recommended.
  •  recommend (none)
    yeah, this is starting to spread.

    recommend, recommend, recommend.

    Imagine, a local news station breaking this.

    This could be the last nail in the coffin.

    I might be Cheney'd up, but I'm not that Georgie!

    by circuithead on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 08:24:15 AM PDT

  •  local story link is here.... (3.00)

    I might be Cheney'd up, but I'm not that Georgie!

    by circuithead on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 08:24:47 AM PDT

  •  This is unbelievable! (none)
    Why isn't the mainstream media picking this up!
  •  Chiming in (3.92)
    UN numbers for all class 1 (explosive) goods


    Ribbands Explosives Ltd

    Class 1 Material: UN Numbers and Hazard Categories

    UN No.    Generic description    HazCat

    0004    Ammonium picrate, dry or wetted with less than 10% water, by mass    1.1D
    0027    Black Powder (Gunpowder) granular or as a meal    1.1D
    0028    Black Powder (Gunpowder), Compressed or Black Powder (Gunpowder), in pellets    1.1D
    0034    Bombs with bursting charge    1.1D
    0035    Bombs with bursting charge    1.2D
    0038    Bombs, Photo-flash    1.1D
    0042    Boosters without detonator    1.1D
    0043    Bursters, explosive    1.1D
    0048    Charges, demolition    1.1D
    0056    Charges, Depth    1.1D
    0059    Charges, Shaped, Commercial without detonator    1.1D
    0060    Charges, Supplementary, explosive    1.1D
    0065    Cord, Detonating, flexible    1.1D
    0072    Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; Hexogen; RDX), wetted with not less than
        15% water, by mass    1.1D

    0075    Diethyleneglycol dinitrate, desensitised with not less than 25% non-volatile, water-insoluble
        phlegmatiser by mass    1.1D
    0076    Dinitrophenol, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass    1.1D
    0078    Dinitroresorcinol, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass    1.1D
    0079    Hexanitrodiphenylamine (Dipicrylamine; Hexyl)    1.1D
    0081    Explosive, Blasting, Type A    1.1D
    0082    Explosive, Blasting, Type B    1.1D
    0083    Explosive, Blasting, Type C    1.1D
    0084    Explosive, Blasting, Type D    1.1D
    0099    Fracturing devices, Explosive, without detonator, for oil wells    1.1D
    0102    Cord (Fuse), Detonating, metal clad    1.2D
    0104    Cord (Fuse), Detonating, mild effect, metal clad    1.4D
    0118    Hexolite, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass    1.1D
    0124    Jet Perforating Guns, Charged, Oil well, without detonator    1.1D
    0133    Mannitol Hexanitrate (Nitromannite), wetted with not less than 40% water, or mixture of alcohol and water, by mass    1.1D
    0137    Mines with bursting charge    1.1D
    0143    Nitroglycerine, desensitised with not less than 40% non-volatile water-insoluble    1.1D
        phlegmatiser, by mass
    0144    Nitroglycerine solution in Alcohol with more than 1% but not more than 10% nitroglycerine    1.1D
    0146    Nitrostarch, dry or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass    1.1D
    0147    Nitro urea    1.1D
    0150    Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (Pentaerythritol tetranitrate; PETN)  wetted with not less than
        25% water, by mass, or Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate; PETN),
        desensitised with not less than 15% phlegmatiser, by mass    1.1D

    0151    Pentolite, dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass    1.1D
    0153    Trinitroaniline (Picramide)    1.1D
    0154    Trinitrophenol (picric acid), dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass    1.1D
    0155    Trinitrochlorobenzene (Picryl chloride)    1.1D
    0168    Projectiles, with bursting charge    1.1D
    0207    Tetranitroaniline    1.1D
    0208    Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine    1.1D
    0209    Trinitrotoluene (TNT), dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass    1.1D
    0213    Trinitroanisole    1.1D
    0214    Trinitrobenzene, dry, or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass    1.1D
    0215    Trinitrobenzoic acid, dry or wetted with less than 30% water, by mass    1.1D
    0216    Trinitro-m-cresol    1.1D
    0217    Trinitronapthalene    1.1D
    0218    Trinitrophenetole    1.1D
    0219    Trinitroresorcinol (Styphnic acid), dry, or wetted with less than 20% water, or mixture of
        alcohol and water, by mass    1.1D
    0220    Urea nitrate, dry, or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass    1.1D
    0221    Warheads, Torpedo, with bursting charge    1.1D
    0222    Ammonium nitrate, with more than 0.2% combustible substances, including any organic
        substance calculated as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance    1.1D
    0223    Ammonium nitrate fertiliser, which is more liable to explode than ammonium nitrate
        with more than 0.2% combustible substances, including any organic substance calculated
        as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance    1.1D
    0226    Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX, Octogen), wetted with not
        less than 15% water, by mass    1.1D

    0237    Charges, shaped, flexible, linear    1.4D
    0241    Explosive, blasting, type E    1.1D
    0266    Octolite (Octol), dry or wetted with less than 15% water, by mass    1.1D
    0282    Nitroguanidine (Picrite), dry or wetted with less than 20% water, by mass    1.1D
    0284    Grenades, hand or rifle, with bursting charge    1.1D
    0286    Warheads, Rocket, with bursting charge    1.1D
    0288    Charges, shaped, flexible, linear    1.1D
    0290    Cord (fuse), detonating, metal clad    1.1D
    0340    Nitrocellulose, dry or wetted with less than 25% water (or alcohol), by mass    1.1D
    0341    Nitrocellulose, unmodified, or plasticised with less than 18% plasticising substance,
        by mass    1.1D
    0344    Projectiles, with bursting charge    1.4D
    0374    Sounding Devices, Explosive    1.1D
    0385    5-Nitrobenzotriazol    1.1D
    0386    Trinitrobenzenesulphonic Acid    1.1D
    0387    Trinitrofluorenone    1.1D
    0388    Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and Trinitrobenzene mixtures or Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and    1.1D
        Hexanitrostilbene mixture
    0389    Trinitrotoluene (TNT) mixtures containing Trinitrobenzene and Hexanitrostilbene    1.1D
    0390    Tritonal    1.1D
    0391    Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; hexogen; RDX) and
        Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen) mixtures, wetted with not less than
        15% water, by mass or Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; Hexogen; RDX) and
        Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen) mixtures desensitised with not less
        than 10% phlegmatiser, by mass    1.1D

    0392    Hexanitrostilbene    1.1D
    0393    Hexatonal, cast    1.1D
    0394    Trinitroresorcinol (Styphnic Acid) wetted with not less than 20% water, or mixture of
        alcohol and water, by mass    1.1D
    0401    Dipicryl sulphide, dry or wetted with less than 10% water, by mass    1.1D
    0402    Ammonium perchlorate    1.1D
    0411    Pentaerythrite tetranitrate (pentaerythritol tetranitrate; PETN) with not less than
        7% wax, by mass    1.1D

    0442    Charges, explosive, commercial, without detonator    1.1D
    0451    Torpedoes, with bursting charge    1.1D
    0463    Articles, explosive, NOS    1.1D
    0483    Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (Cyclonite; hexogen; RDX), desensitised    1.1D
    0484    Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX; Octogen), desensitised    1.1D

    0489    Dinitroglycoluril, (Dingu)    1.1D
    0490    Dinitrotriazolone (NTO)    1.1D

    Provided with the compliments of RIBBANDS EXPLOSIVES... the explosive solution(tm)

    Last updated 17 September 2001.
    Primary source: UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. 'Model Regulations'. Tenth revised edition.

    •  LOL - jinx (none)
      Near simultaneous posts.  What nerds we are.

      I never lie. I willfully engage in a campaign of misinformation. -- Fox Mulder

      by Page van der Linden on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 08:35:58 AM PDT

      [ Parent ]

    •  Can you say "smoking gun?" (none)

      Bushism repeats itself; the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.

      by litho on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 09:02:14 AM PDT

      [ Parent ]

    •  But it doesn't prove they were RDX, etc. (none)
      .. Look at the list -- there are a lot of things in the 1.1D category.
    •  Hate to be a fly in the ointment (none)
      but common black powder ("gun powder") is also listed as a 1.1D explosive material.

      Hopefully we can get more solid evidence, this is looking like it is confirmation, but there are still "outs" that the Fright-WingersTM will double back on... that 1.1D itself doesn't mean anything since common firecrackers we by for the 4th of July would be classified 1.1D


      Mitch Gore

      No one will change America for you. You must work to make it happen.

      by Lestatdelc on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 09:31:50 AM PDT

      [ Parent ]

      •  Ugh (none)
        "Buy" not "by"

        Preview is your friend...
        Preview is your friend...
        Preview is your friend...
        Preview is your friend...


        Mitch Gore

        No one will change America for you. You must work to make it happen.

        by Lestatdelc on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 09:35:58 AM PDT

        [ Parent ]

      •  Would gunpowder (none)
        be stored in that kind of container?
        •  Not likely.. (none)
          but that isn't what I am cautioning agains,t but rather overextneding the arguemtns form the facts as we learn them.

          We can't lose sight of the larger point, which goes directly to the abject failure and incompetence of the "leadership" of this mis-administration, for not planning for the securing of all such sites (this one in particular which was a suspected WMD site).

          This isn't a failure of the troops on the ground, but of the war planners to not plan for securing the ground as the military operations proceeded (of course the invasion never should have been started IMNSHO).

          I point out this cautionary post above so we don't overextend the arguments from the facts, but rather marshall the facts and not let them get away from us as well as frame it on the real issues this deadly failure indicates... that being the total lack of competence and planning by this administration, from the top down.


          Mitch Gore

          No one will change America for you. You must work to make it happen.

          by Lestatdelc on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 02:42:19 PM PDT

          [ Parent ]

        •  We won't know (none)
          exactly what was in those containers because we didn't secure them.  The list proves these very well could have been some of the looted materials.  The video shows the IAEA seals.  I think we'll know by this weekend what the inspectors know about this particular cache.

          Proud member of the reality-based community.

          by Unstable Isotope on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 05:05:49 PM PDT

          [ Parent ]

  •  Great find! (4.00)
    Random nerd moment.  This is RDX:


    All chemicals have DOT numbers (there are UN ones).  The DOT numbers for RDX are UN 0072 and UN 0391.  So, look for those numbers on containers in this video.

    I never lie. I willfully engage in a campaign of misinformation. -- Fox Mulder

    by Page van der Linden on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 08:33:59 AM PDT

  •  HOWTO: Spam this story (none)
    A collection of links to scream at the media with. This story needs to break on the national news tonight. Here are direct links to comment forms:






    Sample text:

    The 377 tons of explosives have been found by a news crew in Minneapolis, and video is available. Independent experts have verified that the markings on the crates are consistent with the missing explosive. Here is the URL to the scoop:

    This is a key find in the primary issue of campaign 2004.

  •  Another question about labels (none)

    Can you tell anything about the country of origin by the label?

    Seems to me that the labelling also kills the Moonie Times story about the Russians coming in and moving the Russian-made ammo to Syria.

    Not that it was believable in the first place...

    But I don't see any evidence of Cyrillic lettering on any of the cases or cylinders.

    •  Here's the quote (none)
      From the DC Moonie Times:

      Most of Saddam's most powerful arms were systematically separated from other arms like mortars, bombs and rockets, and sent to Syria and Lebanon, and possibly to Iran, he said.
          The Russian involvement in helping disperse Saddam's weapons, including some 380 tons of RDX and HMX, is still being investigated, Mr. Shaw said.
          The RDX and HMX, which are used to manufacture high-explosive and nuclear weapons, are probably of Russian origin, he said.

  •  Story is gaining legs (none)
    It's been on Air America all morning (Franken just referenced the KSTP piece).

    Also top story on StarTrib site here

    Bad headline, but they posted a link directly to the KSTP story. Direct links are rarely posted for a StarTrib story.

    Way to go, Minni!

  •  Isn't this threatening to devolve (none)
    Into the kind of hyper-detailed, battle of the factoids that plagued CBS's Bush TANG documents?  I mean the minutiae about molecular structures and UN classifications is starting to remind me of the vintage typewriter arcana that we were getting back then.  

    It's not that this stuff isn't true or important.  But when TV news gets involved, this level of detail tends to bog the discussion down more than it illuminates things.  Because the Bush camp will just hit them with a blizzard of counter-details and the general public will be totally bewildered, but as always, willing to give Bush benefit of the doubt.

    Is that really where we want to go with this?  Just asking.

    •  Yeah...but... (none)
      Yeah but the video of soldiers bolt cutting into an identical looking ammo dump, followed by the comment that there was no attempt to secure it at that time...this stuff is classic stuff...


      by TexasDemocrat on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 09:32:47 AM PDT

      [ Parent ]

    •  I agree - push should be the "metastory" (none)
      1. More evidence of FUBAR in general in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.

      2. It does pretty well debunk that the groups in on the 3rd & 9th searched thoroughly.

      3. If the details confirm it is the same stuff - great - but don't hinge the whole thing on that. Don't lose the 1st tow valuable points on the details.

      Trust the advice of the Big Dog - don't count on a "smoking gun" - keep up intense prssure on all fronts.
      •  That's exactly right (4.00)
        The point here should not be the one that the Bush camp is pushing:  that everything hinges on that April 9 date, and whether the explosives disappeared before or after.

        The key point is that the materials were secure and under IAEA lock and key up to the invasion.  They were not in the hands of terrorists.

        Now they are. It does not matter if they were taken out by truckload or in pockets, on April 5th or April 15th.  They are now under the control of people who are using them to kill our men in uniform and who will, if they can, use them to murder our civilians as well.  And Bush is the man who set events in motion to bring that about.  

    •  The issue is the video not the details (none)
      Look, the video shows Army personel going into a an ammo depo that was likely Al QaQaa, they saw there were explosives, they didn't know what it was, they didn't secure it. It's obviously not their fault, they didn't know what they were looking at.

      This video just proves the substance of the claims Bush is trying to muddy the waters about and deny.

      The only random arcana is to prove that this video is indeed RDX, even if its not it still shows the Administrations lack of planning.

    •  Limbaugh today (none)
      was running with a bunch of different explanations that can't possibly all be true, and then criticizing Kerry for jumping to the conclusion that the U.S. is at fault, when that isn't certain.  Maybe that argument would work if Limbaugh could settle on one story.  But he won't do that, I assume because he's not confident that any of the administration's different explainations is true.
    •  In this case (none)
      the details are being used to help the story, not refute it.  Let them be on the offensive, trying to come up with minutae to refute it.

      Proud member of the reality-based community.

      by Unstable Isotope on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 05:17:25 PM PDT

      [ Parent ]

  •  Just to add a little more info (none)
    From this site:

    Explosive Safety Quantity-Distance (ESQD) Requirements

    Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) requirements apply to the concentration of ammunition, explosives, and other hazardous materials at Naval Shore Establishments for development; manufacturing; test and maintenance; storage, loading and off-loading of vehicles, railcars and aircraft; disposal; and all related handling incidents. Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) requirements are based on records of actual fires and explosions involving ammunition and explosives. ESQD requirements safeguard personnel against possible serious injury or equipment destruction from possible fires or explosions. These requirements also protect the inhabitants of nearby communities, private and public property, and the Naval Shore Establishment personnel. These requirements keep the loss of valuable ammunition stores (including inert ordnance items) to a minimum if there were a fire or explosion. The Department of Defense (DOD) ESQD hazard classification system is based on a system recommended for international use by the United Nations Organization (UNO). The UNO system has nine classes of hazardous material; but, DOD only uses  three of the nine classes--Class 1, explosives; Class 2, Division 3, poison A; and Class 6, poisonous (toxic) and infectious substances. The table identifies each of the nine classes. In reviewing the table, you can see that some items are placed in classes other than Class 1. Since DOD uses only Class 1 items for explosives, Class 1 assignments have been made. However, to maintain identity, DOD places these items in Class 1 for storage only until DOD implements other classes. As an AO, you are involved with the storage of Class 1 material; therefore, the information contained in this section only deal with Class 1 classifications. DOD Hazard Class 1 is subdivided into divisions 1 through 5, based on the character and predominance of the associated hazards and the potential for causing personnel casualties or property damage. These subdivision are not based upon compatibility groups or intended use. The division within Class 1 and the expected hazard for each division is listed in the table.

    This apparently is what is indicated by the label:

    (CLASS 1, DIVISION 1).--Damage from mass-detonating hazard materials is caused by concussion or blast or by sympathetic detonation. Prescribed distances between piles of these materials and between magazines containing these materials must be maintained to minimize the possibility of sympathetic detonation or propagation. Ammunition and explosives that are considered mass-detonating hazards are Hazard Class 1, Division 1.

    With the "D" "in 1.1.D" designating storage compatibility code:

    GROUP D - Group D items are secondary detonating explosive substances or black powder or articles containing a secondary detonating explosive substance, in each case without means of initiation and without a propelling charge, or articles containing a primary explosive substance and containing two or more effective protective features. Examples of these items are explosive switches or valves, and other ammunition items packaged to meet the criteria established for this group.

    Whereas "A" would indicate perhaps the following:

    GROUP A - Group A items are initiating explosives. These are bulk initiating explosives that have the necessary sensitivity to heat, friction, or percussion to make them suitable for use as initiating elements in an explosive train.Wet lead oxide, wet lead styphnate, wet mercury fulminate, wet tetracene, dry RDX, and dry PETN are examples of initiating explosives.

    This would suggest the stuff in the picture is less likely to have been even dry RDX or PETN.  But given that stuff like black powder may have just been sitting about, one has to ask what other goodies were as well.

    •  Don't think you are reading it right (4.00)
      According to Global Security Org:

      SCG D--High explosives (HE) and devices containing HE without their own means of initiation and without a propelling charge. This group includes explosives and ammunition that can be expected to explode or detonate when any given item or component thereof is initiated. This group does not include devices containing initiating explosives with independent safety features. Examples are wet HMX, plastic-bonded explosives (explosives formulated with a desensitizing plastic binder), trinitrotoluene (TNT), and black powder.

      Note: For storage and onsite operations only, Group D includes EBW and slapper detonators as well as assemblies, candle pads, and mirror pads with either EBW or slapper detonators attached.

      (scroll down)

      Group D--High explosives and devices containing explosives without their own means of initiation

      Ammonium picrate
      Black Powder
      Chemical lenses
      CL-20 (Hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane; wet)
      Compositions A, B, and C (all types)
      Cyclotols (< 85% RDX)
      DATB (Diaminotrinitrobenzene)
      Detonating cord (primacord or mild detonating fuze)
      bis-Dinitropropyl adipate
      bis-Dinitropropyl glutarate
      bis-Dinitropropyl maleate
      Dinitropropyl acrylate monomer (DNPA)
      Dinitroproply acrylate polymer (PDNPA)
      EBW and slapper detonators
      Elastomeric plastic bonded explosives
      Explosive D
      GAP (Glyceryl azide polymer)
      HMX (Cyclotetramethylene tetranitramine; wet)
      HMX/wax (formulated with at least 1% wax)
      HNS (Hexanitrostilbene; wet or dry)
      Linear-shaped charge
      Methyl dinitropentanoate
      Mild detonating fuze (MDF)
      NG/TA (Nitroglycerine-triacetine)
      Nitrocellulose (wet)
      Nitroguanidine (NQ)
      Octol (< 75% HMX)
      PETN (Pentaerythritol tetranitrate; wet)
      PETN/extrudable binder
      PGN (Polyglycidyl nitrate)
      Plane wave lenses (composed of SC/HC Group D explosives)
      Plastic-bonded explosive, PBX (a SC/HC Group D formulated with a desensitizing binder)
      Potassium picrate
      RDX (Cyclotrimethylene trinitramine; wet)
      Shaped charges (composed of SC/HC Group D explosives)
      TATB (Triamino trinitrobenzene)
      TATB/DATB mixtures
      TEGDN (Triethylene glycol dinitrate)
      TMETN (Trimethylolethane trinitrate)
      TNAZ (Trinitoazetidine)
      TNT (Trinitrotoluene)

      Now we don't know that the labels indicating 1.1D are RDX or HMX, and not simple black powder (same shit in firecrackers) but 1.1D designation certainly is a classification hurdled that IS cleared by the video that this could very well be the high-explosives in question.


      Mitch Gore

      No one will change America for you. You must work to make it happen.

      by Lestatdelc on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 09:50:39 AM PDT

      [ Parent ]

      •  Agreed. (none)
        Thanks for the extra info.  And whatever the case, it is true, isn't it, that "1.1.x" will always designate a high explosive?  I'm sure no soldier cares whether his leg is blown off by a HMX or some other high explosive.  
  •  Explanation, please. I appreciate this story (none)
    but it would be more helpful to those of us not in on the minutiae of the story to explain what this evidence is.  

    Apparently this is evidence that the weapons dump was intact long after the U.S. invaded Iraq, contrary to what Bush is saying.


    If so, a little explanation in your introduction would be helpful.

    Not being a fan of TV news or a regular viewer of KSTP, I would never have guessed that they had sent a crew to Iraq.

    BTW, this channel covers a great deal of western Wisconsin.  Great!

    "Juntos pedemos" --George W. Bush gubernatorial theme, as interpreted by the Houston Chronicle

    by rhubarb on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 10:16:41 AM PDT

    •  The explosives are labeled 1.1D in the video . . . (none)
      And that code applies to the missing HMX and RDX so while not conlcusive (1.1D applies to a lot of things) it's a little more evdience.
    •  Because (none)
      an embedded crew, who came along with our troops to the site took this video, than that means that these weapons were there at the time that we showed up. Bush's defense is that the Russians(?) smuggled them out before we came, and that the fact that they're missing does not show that Bush fucked up. Clearly, because of this video, it shows that the admin failed to take the proper precautions to secure weapons that could get in the hands of terrorrists.
  •  Things EXCLUDED by the label in question.... (none)
    As indicated by the label in question. Just in case the Wingers try to say this could have been something else like grenades, bombs, etc.

    Group B--Detonators and similar initiating devices

    Blasting caps

    Detonators (excluding EBW and slapper)

    Explosive bolts

    Fragmenting actuators


    Low-energy initiators (LEIs)

    MDF (mild detonating fuze) detonator assemblies

    Pressure cartridges



    Group C--Bulk propellant, propellant charges, and devices containing propellants with or without their own means of initiation

    Smokeless powder

    Pistol and rifle powder

    Rocket-motor solid propellants

    Group E--Explosives devices without their own means of initiation and with propelling charge

    Artillery ammunition

    Rockets (e.g., M66 LAW)

    Group F--Explosives devices with detonators and detonating trains assembled to the devices and with propelling charge


    Sounding devices

    Group G--Pyrotechnic material and devices that produce an incendiary, illumination, lachrymatory, smoke, or sound effect

    Smoke pots/grenades


    Incendiary ammunition

    Group H--Ammunition containing both explosives and white phosphorus (WP) or other pyrophoric material

    White phosphorus

    Plasticized white phosphorus

    Group J--Ammunition containing both explosives and flammable liquids or gels.

    Liquid- or gel-filled incendiary ammunition

    Fuel-air explosive (FAE) devices

    Flammable liquid-fueled missiles


    Group K--Ammunition containing both explosives and toxic chemicals

    Artillery or mortar ammunition (fuzed or unfuzed), grenades, rockets, or bombs filled with a lethal or incapacitating agent

    Group L--Explosives or other ammunition not included in other storage compatibility groups

    Damaged or suspect explosives devices or containers

    Explosives that have undergone severe testing

    Experimental explosives, explosives of temporary interest, newly synthesized compounds, new mixtures, and some salvaged explosives

    Group N--Hazard Class/Division 1.6 ammunition containing only extremely insensitive detonating substances (EIDS)



    Group S--Explosives, explosives devices, or ammunition presenting no significant hazard

    Propellant cartridge-actuated devices (which yield a nonfragmenting, nonflame-producing controlled reaction). Examples include cable cutters, cartridge-actuated valves, and linear actuators (e.g., dimple, piston, or bellows motors)

    Safety fuse

    Most small arms ammunition below 50 caliber

    Thermal batteries

  •  Think Bushfeld is happy about those embeds now? (none)
    Next time they'll have to make sure only soldiers take pictures, and no pesky reporters.

    Clinton may have liked Big Macs, but Bush can't stop serving up Whoppers

    by WisforWhopper on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 11:11:34 AM PDT

  •  Take nothing but pictures (4.00)
    Leave nothing but FUBAR
  •  This is HUGE (4.00)
    Case closed.  This proves the weapons were there after we invaded. Bush's defense has fallen long as the big networks run with this.

    Even if the explosives were taken out DURING the war, that would bring up a big question:  why didn't the Bush team follow those trucks with their satellite images? Those trucks could have been carrying chemical weapons -- did they not care to follow them?

    Either Bush fucked up during the war by failing to monitor this site, or he fucked up afterwards by failing to secure it. Based on this new evidence, it looks like the latter is the case.

    •  Major tin foil moment - (none)
      If the weapons are floating around rogue nations, that's just another excuse to invade them...

      "hmmm..Unka Dick, whaddya think? Iran? Syria? You pick, it's time for my nap."

      Vice harms the doer ~ Socrates

      by kdub on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 08:00:28 PM PDT

      [ Parent ]

  •  Damn..... (none)
    You know, if it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck...

    The sickest part about this is that no one is paying attention to this any more.  Of course Bush's refutations get front page coverage, when this shit is gonna be back page material. Disgusting.  When are people gonna take their heads out of their asses and realize the extent of this calamity.

  •  IAEA Weighs In (4.00)
    Original poster and post here.

    Careful. The RDX was off site at Al Mahaweel. Authority for its storage was invested to al Qaqaa.  This article indicates "The bulk of the RDX was stored at another site that was under Al Qaqaa's jurisdiction," IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said. The second site, Al Mahaweel, is roughly 45 kilometres from Al Qaqaa.

    I changed the emphasis slightly.  And here's my response.

    The citation above uses the words the bulk.  This means most, but not all of the RDX was stored at another site (Al Mahaweel).

    This actually dovetails in perfectly with the ABC report.  The IAEA document they "unearthed" stated 3 tons of RDX at Al Qa Qaa, but the full amount of HDX.

    If the bulk of the RDX was at Al Mahaweel (covered under the jurisdiction of Al Qa Qaa), this fits in perfectly.

    It also brings us closer to explaining what the soldiers found - it is far more likely that those vials of white powder explosive they found at Al Qa Qaa (or the drums pictured in the KTSP footage) were HDX (if that is indeed what they are) as the RDX was some distance away.  It's still a valid finding and still very very dangerous and still should have been guarded.

    In summary:

    1. Bulk of RDX at Al Mahaweel
    2. Bulk of HDX at Al Qa Qaa

    Both totally consistent with camera crew findings, ABC documents, etc, etc.
    •  Good work (none)
      I noticed in the video that the containers had in them cylinders that looked like wax.

      If that is the case, then what we have is:

      HMX/wax (formulated with at least 1% wax)

      Can someone else take another look at the video and see if you agree.

      I distrust those people who know so well what God wants them to do, because I notice it always coincides with their own desires. - Susan B. Anthony

      by BuckMulligan on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 12:39:45 PM PDT

      [ Parent ]

  •  Who moved my WMD? (none)
    OK, I hate to sound conspiratorial, but I see another possible scenario that doesn't include recklessness:

    1. This clearly shows that the location was controlled
    2. The materiel was in the facilities when it was under control
    3. The admin has a history of "eliminating" and denying damaging information (securing the oil ministry where records of Haliburton business was conducted)
    4. The US once upon a time supported Saddam in his efforts against Iran
    5. Could the Pentagon/CIA/etc have been the orginal source of these stockpiles
    6. And therefore we removed it intentionally?

    I know, there are lots of holes here... considering that we've been destroying stockpiles across Iraq. But was there something about this stockpile that the admin didnt' want to get out to the public so it conveniently disappeared into unknown hands?

    Could it be possible that something of this magnitude was truly a result of carelessness?

    These are only two answers available to us: recklessness that amounts to another impeachable offense, or intentional deceit.

    Pick one -- or both -- and let's meet at The Hague.   :-)

    Chaos. It's not just a theory.

    by PBnJ on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 12:41:57 PM PDT

  •  May be additional labels in the out takes as well (none)
    Don't forget that a 2 minute news story probably uses at least an hour's worth of tape. There are probably a lot of other clues on the raw video that can solve this.
  •  May be additional labels in the out takes as well (none)
    Don't forget that a 2 minute news story probably uses at least an hour's worth of tape. There are probably a lot of other clues on the raw video that can solve this.
  •  missing weapons on olbermann (none)
    Look for this story on Olbermann at 8pm.
  •  Correct! (none)
    Bruce R., a Canadian Reserve Army officer has an excellent blog on military affairs called Flit

    Today he posted the Following

    That single photo of the soldier leaning over the crates shows roughly 60 stacked crates, each shown in another photo as "40 kg net weight." If that's how the missing explosives were packed (you can see the explosives stickers on them, so they're certainly something), that would be 2.5 tonnes of HE in that one photo alone... and that's not even getting into the other "barrels as far as the eye can see" photo. By the way, the "1.1D" on those dangerous goods placards on both the crates and barrels stands for "secondary (non-volatile) high explosive." PETN, RDX, or HMX would all normally be labelled with a 1.1D placard. (However, so would gunpowder, and some makes of artillery proximity fuzs, so that's not definitive by itself.)
  •  Some more things I'm noting (none)
    1. First, that first "Eksplosiv" looks to me like Dutch -- quick Google turns up a lot of Norway and Denmark pages.  Any reason the Iraqis would be using that sticker? Could be imported, but I'd say that inspectors probably put it there -- the "23" is probably part of a lot number.

    2. The KSTP article seems to suggest that the stuff in the crates was blasting cord.

    3. We've heard that there was a small amount of PETN, a large (LARGE) amount of HMX, and a medium amount of RDX (which turns out to have been mostly off-site. Could this maybe be:

    a. PETN = "thousands of small boxes containing white powder" ... which turns out to be explosives.

    b. HMX = shitloads of barrels designated with an HMX-appropriate warning label just sitting around in bunkers

    c. RDX = laying around in various places and also off site?

    Just sayin'.

  •  Video Footage of unbroken IAEA seal (none)
    The Minneapolis boys did not know what they were shooting,but they got the smoking gun, smoking.  Atrios has a link to the picture.  Confirmed by IAEA source that "it appears to be one of our seals"
  •  Lou Dobbs ignored this story (none)
    and spent much time putting the fake repug/Russia-Syria spin on it.

    But, he does have Minnesotan Al Franken to bring this up later.

  •  What worries me is... (none)
    these weapons might now carry a new label, in Korean: "property of Kim Jung Il."
  •  The AP just picked it up... (none)
    But, unfortunately the Kerry senior campaign advisor hasn't seen it yet, and hasn't mentioned it. Paula just pulled out the Pentagon photo, and he wasn't able to rebut it with the AP imbed story.
  •  More KSTP video (none)
    There's more!

    New finding in the footage: Unbroken IAEA seal on a bunker door at the Al QaQaa facility.

    The video was shot on April 18, 2003, and...

    "A spokesperson for the International Atomic Energy Agency told 5 Eyewitness News that seal appears to be one used by their inspectors."

    Put a fork in it.

    "Words and excuses meet incompetence, chaos and death. That's what this election is about."
    ~~ Josh Marshall

    by Ddeele on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 05:09:05 PM PDT

  •  Just covered on Hardball (2.50)
    The overall scoop on Hardball was that Kerry was grasping for anything he could find to help his floundering campaign.  Matthews asked "what would Kerry be talking about without this story?"  

    Pentagon correspondent said the IAEA inspected in Janurary, then nobody saw the weapons ever again.  Could have been moved any time, but after invasion US troops were at Al Qa Qaa all the time.  When they first found the site, they didn't find any weapons, according to the pentagon correspondent.  

    In other words, in corporate media land this video of the explosives does not exist.  


    "You go to your TV to turn your brain off. You go to your computer to turn your brain on." - Steve Jobs

    by Subterranean on Thu Oct 28, 2004 at 06:57:38 PM PDT

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