Senator Feingold, Wisconsin Democratic Senator, has just offered sensible and much needed corrective amendments to the Patriot Act.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/s316-318.html
Secret searches on booksellers, computer usage, sneak and peek provisions are amongst the many categories Feingold seeks to amend to pre-Patriot Act standards.
Time to rally support for it amongst your representatives!
The text of the submitted Amendment is below the fold:
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Congressional Record: February 8, 2005 (Senate)
Page S1130-S1134
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. FEINGOLD:
S. 316. A bill to limit authority to delay notice of search warrants;
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I will reintroduce in the Senate
the Reasonable Notice and Search Act. This bill is nearly identical to
a bill I introduced in the 108th Congress, S. 1701. It addresses
Section 213 of the USA-PATRIOT Act, the provision of that important
statute passed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks that has caused perhaps
the most concern among Members of Congress and the public. Section 213,
sometimes referred to as the ``delayed notice search provision'' or the
``sneak and peek provision,'' authorizes the government in limited
circumstances to conduct a search without immediately serving a search
warrant on the owner or occupant of the premises that have been
searched.
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, secret searches for physical evidence were
performed in some jurisdictions under the authority of Court of Appeals
decisions, but the Supreme Court never definitively ruled whether they
were constitutional. Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act authorized delayed
notice warrants in any case in which an ``adverse result'' would occur
if the warrant were served before the search was executed. Adverse
result was defined as including: 1. endangering the life or physical
safety of an individual; 2. flight from prosecution; 3. destruction of
or tampering with evidence; 4. intimidation of potential witnesses; or
5. otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying
a trial. This last catch-all category could apply in virtually any
criminal case. In addition, while some courts had required the service
of the warrant within a specified period of time, the PATRIOT Act
simply required that the warrant specify that it would be served within
a ``reasonable'' period of time after the search.
It is interesting to note that this provision of the PATRIOT Act was
not limited to terrorism cases. In fact, before the PATRIOT Act passed,
the FBI already had the authority to conduct secret searches of foreign
terrorists and spies with no notice at all under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. Furthermore, the PATRIOT Act ``sneak and
peek'' authority was not made subject to the sunset provision that will
cause many of the new surveillance provisions of the act to expire at
the end of this year unless Congress reenacts them. So Section 213 was
pretty clearly a provision that the Department of Justice wanted
regardless of the terrorism threat after 9/11.
Perhaps that is why this provision has caused such controversy since
it was passed. In 2003, by a wide bipartisan margin, the House passed
an amendment to the Commerce-Justice-
[[Page S1131]]
State appropriations bill offered by Representative Otter from Idaho, a
Republican, to stop funding for delayed notice searches authorized
under section 213. The size of the vote took the Department by
surprise, and it immediately set out to defend the provision
aggressively. Clearly, this is a power that the Department does not
want to lose.
I raised concerns about the sneak and peek provision when it was
included in the PATRIOT Act. I did not, and still do not, believe there
had been adequate study and analysis of the justifications for these
searches and the potential safeguards that might be included. I did not
argue then, however, and I am not arguing now that there should be no
delayed notice searches at all and that the provision should be
repealed. I simply believe that this provision should be modified to
protect against abuse. My bill will do four things to accomplish this.
First, my bill would narrow the circumstances in which a delayed
notice warrant can be granted to the following: potential loss of life,
flight from prosecution, destruction or tampering with evidence, or
intimidation of potential witnesses. The ``catch-all provision'' in
section 213, allowing a secret search when serving the warrant would
``seriously jeopardize an investigation or unduly delay a trial'' can
too easily be turned into permission to do these searches whenever the
government wants.
Second, I believe that any delayed notice warrant should provide for
a specific and limited time period within which notice must be given--7
days. This is consistent with some of the pre-PATRIOT Act court
decisions and will help to bring this provision in closer accord with
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Under my bill, prosecutors
will be permitted to seek 7-day extensions if circumstances continue to
warrant that the subject not be made aware of the search. But the
default should be a week, unless a court is convinced that more time
should be permitted.
Third, Section 213 should include a sunset provision so that it
expires along with the other expanded surveillance provisions in Title
II of the PATRIOT Act, at the end of 2005. This will allow Congress to
determine if the balance between civil liberties and law enforcement
has been correctly struck.
Finally, the bill requires a public report on the number of times
that section 213 is used, the number of times that extensions are
sought beyond the 7-day notice period, and the type of crimes being
investigated with this power. This information will help the public and
Congress evaluate the need for this authority and determine whether it
should be retained or modified after the sunset.
These are reasonable and moderate changes to the law. They do not gut
the provision. Rather, they recognize the growing and legitimate
concern from across the political spectrum that this provision was
passed in haste and presents the potential for abuse. They also send a
message that Fourth Amendment rights have meaning and potential
violations of those rights should be minimized if at all possible. I
urge my colleagues to support this bill.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 316
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Reasonable Notice and Search
Act''.
SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON AUTHORITY TO DELAY NOTICE OF SEARCH
WARRANTS.
Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may have an adverse
result (as defined in section 2705)'' and inserting ``will
endanger the life or physical safety of an individual, result
in flight from prosecution, result in the destruction of or
tampering with the evidence sought under the warrant, or
result in intimidation of potential witnesses''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``a reasonable period''
and all that follows and inserting ``7 calendar days, which
period, upon application of the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or an Associate Attorney General, may
thereafter be extended by the court for additional periods of
up to 7 calendar days each if the court finds, for each
application, reasonable cause to believe that notice of the
execution of the warrant will endanger the life or physical
safety of an individual, result in flight from prosecution,
result in the destruction of or tampering with the evidence
sought under the warrant, or result in intimidation of
potential witnesses.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Reports.--
``(1) In general.--On a semiannual basis, the Attorney
General shall transmit to Congress and make public a report
concerning all requests for delays of notice, and for
extensions of delays of notice, with respect to warrants
under subsection (b).
``(2) Contents.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period--
``(A) the total number of requests for delays of notice
with respect to warrants under subsection (b);
``(B) the total number of such requests granted or denied;
``(C) for each request for delayed notice that was granted,
the total number of applications for extensions of the delay
of notice and the total number of such extensions granted or
denied; and
``(D) on an aggregate basis, the nature of the crime being
investigated for each request for delay of notice that was
granted or denied.''.
SEC. 3. SUNSET ON DELAYED NOTICE AUTHORITY.
(a) PATRIOT Act.--Section 224(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Stat. 295) is amended by
striking ``213,''.
(b) Amendments.--The amendments made by this Act shall
sunset as provided in section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001.
__
By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Bingaman, Ms.
Cantwell, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Jeffords,
Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Wyden):
S. 317. A bill to protect privacy by limiting the access of the
Government to library, bookseller, and other personal records for
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes; to the Committee
on the Judiciary.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I will reintroduce the Library,
Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act. The bill is identical to
the bill I introduced in the 108th Congress, S. 1507.
This bill would amend Sections 215 and 505 of the USA-PATRIOT Act to
protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans. It would set reasonable
limits on the Federal Government's access to library, bookseller,
medical, and other sensitive, personal information under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (``FISA'') and related foreign
intelligence authority.
I am pleased that several of my distinguished colleagues have joined
me as original cosponsors of this important legislation.
Millions of Patriotic Americans love our country and support our
military men and women in their difficult missions abroad, but worry
about the fate of our Constitution here at home.
Much of our Nation's strength comes from our constitutional liberties
and respect for the rule of law. That is what has kept us free for our
two and a quarter century history. Our constitutional freedoms, our
American values, are what make our country worth fighting for as we
strive to win the war on terror.
Here at home, there is no question that the FBI needs ample resources
and legal authority to prevent future acts of terrorism. But the
PATRIOT Act went too far when it comes to the government's access to
personal information about law abiding Americans.
Even though in the end I opposed the PATRIOT Act, there were many
provisions that I did support. And even in those provisions I sought to
amend when the bill was debated, there was often some change that I
supported. For example, Congress was right to expand the category of
business records that the FBI could obtain pursuant to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could
seek a court order to obtain only travel records--such as airline,
hotel, and car rental records--and records maintained by storage
facilities. The PATRIOT Act allows any business records to be
subpoenaed. I don't quibble with that change.
But what my colleagues and I do find problematic--and an increasing
number of Americans who value their privacy and First Amendment rights
agree with us--is that the current law allows the FBI broad, almost
unfettered access to personal information
[[Page S1132]]
about law-abiding Americans who have no connection to terrorism or
spying.
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act requires the FBI to show in an
application to the court that the documents are ``sought for'' an
international terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation. There is
no requirement that the FBI make a showing of individualized suspicion
that the documents relate to a suspected terrorist or spy.
In other words, under current law, the FBI could serve a subpoena on
a library for all the borrowing records of its patrons or on a
bookseller for the purchasing records of its customers simply by
asserting that they want the records for a terrorism investigation.
Since the passage of the PATRIOT Act, librarians and booksellers have
become increasingly concerned by the potential for abuse of this law. I
was pleased to stand with the American Booksellers Association and the
Free Expression Network over 2 years ago when we first started to raise
these concerns.
Librarians and booksellers are concerned that under the PATRIOT Act,
the FBI could seize records from libraries and booksellers in order to
monitor what books Americans have purchased or borrowed, or who has
used a library's or bookstore's internet computer stations, even if
there is no evidence that the person is a terrorist or spy, or has any
connection to a terrorist or spy.
These concerns are so strong that some librarians across the country
have taken the unusual step of destroying records of patrons' book and
computer use, as well as posting signs on computer stations warning
patrons that whatever they read or access on the internet could be
monitored by the federal government.
As a librarian in California said, ``We felt strongly that this had
to be done. . . . The government has never had this kind of power
before. It feels like Big Brother.''
And as the executive director of the American Library Association
said, ``This law is dangerous. . . . I read murder mysteries--does that
make me a murderer? I read spy stories--does that mean I'm a spy?
There's no clear link between a person's intellectual pursuits and
their actions.''
The American people do not know how many or what kind of requests
Federal agents have made for library records under the PATRIOT Act. The
Justice Department refuses to release that information to the public.
But in a survey released by the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, about 550 libraries around the Nation reported having
received requests from Federal or local law enforcement during the past
year. About half of the libraries said they complied with the law
enforcement request, and another half indicated that they had not.
Americans don't know much about these incidents, because the law also
contains a provision that prohibits anyone who receives a subpoena from
disclosing that fact to anyone.
In testimony before the Judiciary Committee, Attorney General
Ashcroft stated that as of September 18, 2003, the Department of
Justice had never used Section 215. The Department has not made that
claim in public testimony since then, leading many to speculate that
the provision has now been used. Whether it has been used once, or
dozens of times, the problem with the section remains--it is too broad
and does not permit adequate judicial supervision. There is a potential
for overreaching that Congress must address.
David Schwartz, president of Harry W. Schwartz Bookshops, the oldest
and largest independent bookseller in Milwaukee, summed up well the
American values at stake when he said: ``The FBI already has
significant subpoena powers to obtain records. There is no need for the
government to invade a person's privacy in this way. This is a uniquely
un-American tool, and it should be rejected. The books we read are a
very private part of our lives. People could stop buying books, and
they could be terrified into silence.''
I would not claim that we have reached the point where people in this
country are afraid to buy books, but section 215 is a tool that is
unnecessarily broad. And it raises the specter of indiscriminate
government snooping into the private lives of innocent citizens, which
is an unnecessary distraction from the serious law enforcement work
that is needed to fight terrorism.
It is time to reconsider those provisions of the PATRIOT Act that are
un-American and, frankly, unpatriotic.
But my concerns with the PATRIOT Act go beyond library and bookseller
records. Under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the FBI could seek any
records maintained by a business. These business records could contain
sensitive, personal information--for example, medical records
maintained by a doctor or hospital or credit records maintained by a
credit agency. All the FBI would have to do is simply assert that the
records are ``sought for'' its terrorism or foreign intelligence
investigation.
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act goes too far. Americans rightfully
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their library, bookstore,
medical, financial, or other records containing personal information.
Prudent safeguards are needed to protect these legitimate privacy
interests.
The Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act is a
reasonable solution. It would restore a pre-PATRIOT Act requirement
that the FBI make a factual, individualized showing that the records
sought pertain to a suspected terrorist or spy while leaving in place
other PATRIOT Act expansions of this business records power.
My bill will not prevent the FBI from doing its job. It recognizes
that the post-September 11 world is a different world. There are
circumstances when the FBI should legitimately have access to library,
bookseller, or other personal information.
I'd like to take a moment to explain how the safeguard in my bill
would be applied. Suppose the FBI is conducting an investigation of an
international terrorist organization. It has information that suspected
members of the group live in a particular neighborhood. The FBI would
like to obtain records from the library in the suspects' neighborhood.
Under current law, the FBI could decide to ask the library for all
records concerning anyone who has ever borrowed a book or used a
computer, and what books were borrowed, simply by asserting that the
documents are sought for a terrorism investigation. But under my bill,
the FBI could not do so. The FBI would have to set forth specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the
records pertain is a suspected terrorist. The FBI could obtain only
those library records--such as borrowing records or computer sign-in
logs--that pertain to the suspected terrorists. The FBI could not
obtain library records concerning individuals who are not suspected
terrorists.
So, under my bill, the FBI can still obtain documents that it
legitimately needs, but my bill would also protect the privacy of law-
abiding Americans. I might add that if, as the Justice Department says,
the FBI is using its PATRIOT Act powers in a responsible manner, does
not seek the records of law-abiding Americans, and only seeks the
records of suspected terrorists or suspected spies, then there is no
reason for the Department to object to my bill.
The second part of my bill would address privacy concerns with
another Federal law enforcement power expanded by the PATRIOT Act--the
FBI's national security letter authority. The FBI does not need court
approval to use this power.
My bill would amend section 505 of the PATRIOT Act. Part of this
section relates to the production of records maintained by electronic
communications providers. Libraries or bookstores with internet access
for customers could be deemed ``electronic communication providers''
and therefore be subject to a request by the FBI under its NSL
authority.
As I mentioned earlier, some librarians are so concerned about the
potential for abuse by the FBI that they have taken matters into their
own hands before the FBI knocks on their door. Some librarians have
begun shredding on a daily basis sign-in logs and other documents
relating to the public's use of library computer terminals to access
the internet.
Again, safeguards are needed to ensure that any individual who
accesses the internet at a library or bookstore does not automatically
give up all expectations of privacy. Like the section
[[Page S1133]]
215 fix I've discussed, my bill would require an individualized showing
by the FBI of how the records of internet usage maintained by a library
or bookseller pertain to a suspected terrorist or spy.
Yes, the American people want the FBI to be focused on preventing
terrorism. And, yes, it may make sense to make some changes to the law
to allow the FBI access to the information that it needs to prevent
terrorism. But we do not need to change the values that constitute who
we are as a Nation in order to protect ourselves from terrorism. We can
protect both our Nation and our privacy and civil liberties.
An increasing number of Americans are beginning to understand that
the PATRIOT Act went too far. Four States and over 350 cities and
counties across the country have now passed resolutions expressing
opposition to the PATRIOT Act. And it's not just the Berkeleys and
Madisons of this Nation, but other States and communities with strong
conservative and libertarian values, such as Alaska and cities in
Montana, that have passed such resolutions.
I have many concerns with the PATRIOT Act. I am not seeking to repeal
it, in whole or in part. In this bill, my colleagues and I are only
seeking to modify two provisions that pose serious potential for abuse.
The privacy of law-abiding Americans is at stake, along with their
confidence in their government. Congress should act to protect our
privacy and reassure our citizens. The Library, Bookseller, and
Personal Records Privacy Act bill is a reasonable approach to do just
that. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 317
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Library, Bookseller, and
Personal Records Privacy Act''.
SEC. 2. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO LIBRARY,
BOOKSELLER, AND OTHER PERSONAL RECORDS UNDER
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Applications for Orders.--Subsection (b) of section 501
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1861) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) shall specify that there are specific and articulable
facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the
records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.''.
(b) Orders.--Subsection (c)(1) of that section is amended
by striking ``finds'' and all that follows and inserting
``finds that--
``(A) there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; and
``(B) the application meets the other requirements of this
section.''.
(c) Oversight of Requests for Production of Records.--
Section 502 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1862) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``the Permanent'' and
all that follows through ``the Senate'' and inserting ``the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``On a semiannual
basis,'' and all that follows through ``a report setting
forth'' and inserting ``The report of the Attorney General to
the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate under subsection (a) shall set
forth''.
SEC. 3. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO
INFORMATION ON COMPUTER USERS AT BOOKSELLERS
AND LIBRARIES UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY
AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Section 2709 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection (e):
``(e) Records of Booksellers and Libraries.--(1) When a
request under this section is made to a bookseller or
library, the certification required by subsection (b) shall
also specify that there are specific and articulable facts
giving reason to believe that the person or entity to whom
the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power.
``(2) In this subsection:
``(A) The term `bookseller' means a person or entity
engaged in the sale, rental, or delivery of books, journals,
magazines, or other similar forms of communication in print
or digitally.
``(B) The term `library' means a library (as that term is
defined in section 213(2) of the Library Services and
Technology Act (20 U.S.C. 9122(2))) whose services include
access to the Internet, books, journals, magazines,
newspapers, or other similar forms of communication in print
or digitally to patrons for their use, review, examination,
or circulation.
``(C) The terms `foreign power' and `agent of a foreign
power' have the meaning given such terms in section 101 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801).''.
(b) Sunset of Certain Modifications on Access.--Section
224(a) of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115
Stat. 295) is amended by inserting ``and section 505'' after
``by those sections)''.
__
By Mr. FEINGOLD:
S. 318. A bill to clarify conditions for the interceptions of
computer trespass communications under the USA-PATRIOT Act; to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce the Computer
Trespass Clarification Act of 2005, which would amend and clarify
section 217 of the USA-PATRIOT Act. This bill is virtually identical to
a bill I introduced in the 108th Congress, S. 2783.
Section 217 of the PATRIOT Act addresses the interception of computer
trespass communications. This bill would modify existing law to more
accurately reflect the intent of the provision, and also protect
against invasions of privacy.
Section 217 was designed to permit law enforcement to assist computer
owners who are subject to denial of service attacks or other episodes
of hacking. The original Department of Justice draft of the bill that
later became the PATRIOT Act included this provision. A section by
section analysis provided by the Department on September 19, 2001,
stated the following: ``Current law may not allow victims of computer
trespassing to request law enforcement assistance in monitoring
unauthorized attacks as they occur. Because service providers often
lack the expertise, equipment, or financial resources required to
monitor attacks themselves as permitted under current law, they often
have no way to exercise their rights to protect themselves from
unauthorized attackers. Moreover, such attackers can target critical
infrastructures and engage in cyberterrorism. To correct this problem,
and help to protect national security, the proposed amendments to the
wiretap statute would allow victims of computer attacks to authorize
persons `acting under color of law' to monitor trespassers on their
computer systems in a narrow class of cases.''
I strongly supported the goal of giving computer system owners the
ability to call in law enforcement to help defend themselves against
hacking. Including such a provision in the PATRIOT Act made a lot of
sense. Unfortunately, the drafters of the provision made it much
broader than necessary, and refused to amend it at the time we debated
the bill in 2001. As a result, the law now gives the government the
authority to intercept communications by people using computers owned
by others as long as they have engaged in some unauthorized activity on
the computer, and the owner gives permission for the computer to be
monitored--all without judicial approval.
Only people who have a ``contractual relationship'' with the owner
allowing the use of a computer are exempt from the definition of a
computer trespasser under section 217 of the PATRIOT Act. Many people--
for example, college students, patrons of libraries, Internet cafes or
airport business lounges, and guests at hotels--use computers owned by
others with permission, but without a contractual relationship. They
could end up being the subject of government snooping if the owner of
the computer gives permission to law enforcement.
My bill would clarify that a computer trespasser is not someone who
has permission to use a computer by the owner or operator of that
computer. It would bring the existing computer trespass provision in
line with the purpose of section 217 as expressed in the Department of
Justice's initial explanation of the provision. Section 217 was
intended to target only a narrow class of people: Unauthorized
[[Page S1134]]
cyberhackers. It was not intended to give the government the
opportunity to engage in widespread surveillance of computer users
without a warrant.
I should note that there is no specific evidence that the provision
is being abused. But, of course, unless criminal charges are brought
against someone as a result of such surveillance, there would never be
any notice at all that the surveillance has taken place. The computer
owner authorizes the surveillance, and the FBI carries it out. There is
no warrant, no court proceeding, no opportunity even for the subject of
the surveillance to challenge the assertion of the owner that some
unauthorized use of the computer has occurred.
My bill would modify the computer trespass provision in the following
ways to protect against abuse, while still maintaining its usefulness
in cases of denial of service attacks and other forms of hacking.
First, it would require that the owner or operator of the protected
computer authorizing the interception has been subject to ``an ongoing
pattern of communications activity that threatens the integrity or
operation of such computer.'' In other words, the owner has to be the
target of some kind of hacking.
Second, the bill limits the length of warrantless surveillance to 96
hours. This is twice as long as is allowed for an emergency wiretap.
With four days of surveillance, it should not be difficult for the
government to gather sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to obtain a
warrant if continued surveillance is necessary.
Finally, the bill would require the Attorney General to annually
report on the use of Section 217 to the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees. Section 217 is one of the provisions that is subject to the
sunset provision in the PATRIOT Act and will expire at the end of 2005.
We in the Congress need to do more oversight of the use of this and
other provisions of PATRIOT Act in order to evaluate their
effectiveness.
The computer trespass provision now in the law as a result of section
217 of the PATRIOT Act leaves open the possibility for significant and
unnecessary invasions of privacy. The reasonable and modest changes to
the provision contained in this bill preserve the usefulness of the
provision for investigations of cyberhacking, but reduce the
possibility of government abuse. We must continually seek to balance
the need for effective tools to fight crime and terrorism against the
civil liberties of our citizens. The Computer Trespass Clarification
Act strikes the right balance, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 318
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Computer Trespass
Clarification Act of 2005''.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 18.
(a) Definitions.--Section 2510(21)(B) of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by--
(1) inserting ``or other'' after ``contractual''; and
(2) striking ``for access'' and inserting ``permitting
access''.
(b) Interception and Disclosure.--Section 2511(2)(i) of
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in clause (I), by inserting after ``the owner or
operator of the protected computer'' the following: ``is
attempting to respond to communications activity that
threatens the integrity or operation of such computer and
requests assistance to protect rights and property of the
owner or operator, and''; and
(2) in clause (IV), by inserting after ``interception'' the
following: ``ceases as soon as the communications sought are
obtained or after 96 hours, whichever is earlier, unless an
interception order is obtained under this chapter, and''.
(c) Report.--The Attorney General shall, within 60 days of
enactment and annually thereafter, report to the Committees
on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the use during the previous year of
section 2511 of title 18, United States Code, relating to
computer trespass provisions as amended by subsection (b).
__