Welcome to the second installment of Supreme Court Roundup! In case you missed last week's Roundup, you can check it out
here.
So - another week, another three decisions by the Supreme Court. Crudely put in basic terms of lasting importance, one was of high (no pun intended) importance, one medium, and the other low. I'll start with the big one first, and work my way down.
Gonzalez v. Raich
(6-3, with Rehnquist, Thomas, and O'Connor dissenting). [Topic: Commerce Clause]
Background and Opinion:
Here's the big boy for the week. This case essentially held that the federal government, under its Commerce Clause authority (which allows the feds to regulate "interstate commerce"), may prohibit the production and use of marijuana for medical purposes even if both the production and use is entirely local. Raich generated a lot of interest among Kossacks, with several diary entries - including this one by profmatt, which breaks down previous important Commerce Clause cases succinctly and quite well.
This case arose after federal agents seized and destroyed six marijuana plants cultivated and used by two women who have a number of serious ailments. The pot was entirely locally grown (it did not cross state lines), and the women did not sell the drug - they used it to prevent their own pain. Under California law, this activity was perfectly legal. The federal Controlled Substances Act, however, does not exempt medical pot from federal drug enforcement. The federal agents acted in accordance with this Act. The women sued, alleging (among other things) that the federal government did not have the authority to regulate the use of medical marijuana because it could not qualify as "interstate commerce." The 9th Circuit agreed, and the case shot up to the Supreme Court.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, rejected this contention. Taking a very broad view of federal power, the majority stressed that Congress has the power to regulate even "purely local activities" if those activities are part of an economic "class of activities" having a substantial effect on effect on interstate commerce. Growing local medical pot for home consumption did have such a "substantial effect" for the purposes of the Commerce Clause. Why? Because Congress had a "rational basis" to believe that the production of a marijuana "has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market" - and that's all Congress needs. The "rational basis" for this effect is that there could be enforcement difficulties with distinguishing between locally and non-locally pot, which could lead to greater amounts of illicit pot (thereby affecting the national market for marijuana), which in turn could help gut the purpose of the Controlled Substances Act. A stream of inferences, to be sure - but as long as there is a "rational basis" for believing this true, then that's enough to be constitutional.
The majority limited the impact of two recent Commerce Clause cases, United States v. Lopez (a 1995 case striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act), and United States v. Morrison (a 2000 case striking down the Violence Against Women Act). The Court had declared both pieces of legislation an unconstitutional exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause, because the activities regulated in these two Acts - banning possession of guns in school zones, and providing a federal remedy for gender-motivated violence - were activities having nothing to do with economic activity. In contrast, the Raich Court held that the Controlled Substances Act regulates "quintessentially economic activity" (i.e. the drug trade). The plaintiffs in fact accepted this, arguing only that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to their particular activities. The Court saw this as marking a key difference between Lopez and Morrison, because the challenge in those cases was to the entire statutory scheme itself, rather than just the particular enforcement of an admittedly constitutional statutory scheme.
Other Opinions:
Justice Scalia concurred, agreeing with the Court's basic holding, but arguing that the Court's inferential reasoning under the Commerce Clause went too far - that locally growing pot for home use is simply not "economic activity." However, the feds did have the power to prohibit medical pot under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Because such a prohibition could be "an appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end" of eliminating drugs under the Controlled Substances Act, the feds could prohibit it under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
O'Connor dissented, arguing that Lopez and Morrison prohibit federal prohibition of such a local, non-economic activity as growing and using personal medical pot. The majority opinion, she argued, suggests that Congress can regulate anything as long as it is part of an "ambitious, all-encompassing" statute, rather than a specific statute like the Gun Free Schools Act. Justice Thomas also dissented, citing the Federalist Papers, the Constitutional Convention, and other Founding Fathers documents to similarly argue that this activity is wholly outside of both the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper powers of the federal government.
Impact:
So what does it all mean? It means, as a practical matter, that the feds can prosecute anyone caught growing pot, whether or not it is for medical purposes. Raich's more lasting contribution, however, is a big blow to the "New Federalist" movement led by the modern crop of states-rights conservatives. The case makes clear that Lopez and Morrison were more aberrations than anything else, and that Congress really does have great power to regulate almost everything as "interstate commerce", even if the activity itself is non-economic and entirely local.
Personally, I think it was the right decision. Without the broad reading of the Commerce Clause adopted by earlier Courts, key federal pro-environmental, pro-worker, and pro-civil rights legislation would not have met constitutional muster. A rollback of the right of Congress to legislate in these and other areas is a long-term goal of the radical right-wing "Constitution-in-Exile" movement. Raich is and will continue to be a big disappointment for these folks.
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line
(6-3, with Scalia, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissenting). [Topic: Statutory Construction/Discrimination]
Background and Opinion:
This case held that the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits discrimination based on disability in places of "public accommodation," applies to foreign cruise ships. This reversed the 5th Circuit below, which had held that the ADA did not apply because Congress did not give a "clear indication of congressional intent" that the ADA applied to foreign-flagged ships.
The people at the heart of the case were several disabled individuals who alleged that Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL), a company operating cruise ships flying under the Bahamian flag, charged them higher fares and forced them to waive potential medical liability because of their disabilities, and maintained evacuation demonstrations in areas where it was impossible for them to reach. The plaintiffs charged that this was a clear violation of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination against disabled people in areas of "public accommodation", and further requires the removal of physical barriers to access if "readily achievable".
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, went through many pages of statutory analysis. Without getting too much into all of this, he concluded that as long as the statute is not applied to regulate the "internal affairs" of the cruise ship, the provisions of the ADA apply to these foreign vessels even without a "clear statement of intent" by Congress. He also concluded, however, that the removal of physical barriers to access was not "readily achievable." Thus, by operation of the ADA, the cruise line could not discriminate against disabled people (for example, by charging them more for being disabled), but is not required to remove physical barriers to access that are not "readily achievable".
Other Opinions:
There were several opinions concurring, dissenting, concurring and dissenting, and plenty of other fun stuff submitted by other Justices. Simply put, Ginsburg's concurrence would have extended the ADA's provisions as applied to foreign ships even further than the majority, and Scalia's dissent would have reduced the reach of the ADA in these circumstances.
Impact:
Spector is a big (though not total) victory for disabled-rights activists, and helps to clarify a regulatory question that had been perplexing the cruise line industry for a while (in fact, NCL, even though they lost, applauded the ruling for this reason). It's not a huge case overall because of the ruling's limited effect, but if the case had gone the other way, it could have been more important - and bad for progressives. As Justice Kennedy suggests in the opinion, holding that ADA protection did not cover disabled people on foreign-flagged ships could imply that other important legislation - like the Civil Rights Act - would also not be applied to these ships.
Alaska v. United States
(9-0, with Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist concurring). [Topic: Statutory Construction]
Background and Opinion:
This case arose out of a dispute between Alaska and the US over two pieces of land in the state - one piece in what is called the "Alexander Archipelago" off the coast of southeast Alaska, and another in the Glacier Bay (any Alaskan Kossacks know something about these areas?). Alaska claimed that the Archipelago was in "historic inland waters", which would give the state authority over the area. Alaska also claimed that the Glacial Bay land was presumptively theirs and the US could not overcome this presumption.
In short, Alaska lost. Justice Kennedy, writing the majority opinion, went into a long and detailed summary of the history of the Alexander Archipelago and the Glacier Bay, as well as the Alaska Statehood Act, both necessitated by the intense statutory construction in this case. After this history lesson, he concluded that Alaska did not have claim to these lands.
Other Opinions:
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring (and dissenting in part) opinion in which he agreed with most of the majority opinion, but disagreed that the US expressly retained the lands in the Glacier Bay.
Impact:
As you can tell by my short summary (even though the opinion is 60 or so pages), this case is not a rock-your-socks-off type of case. In fact, I probably won't remember what happened in this case tomorrow (no offense, Alaskan Kossacks). Because of the importance of the specific facts and history of the case, Alaska v. United States will have little or no effect on future cases. Just goes to show you that not every Supreme Court case is a blockbuster.
So that's it! I'll be back next week with a roundup of the Court's decisions. In the meantime, you can check out my recent diary on why a Chief Justice Michael McConnell wouldn't be so bad from a progressive point of view - or at least why it would be no worse than any other realistic nominee.
Then again, if you're sick of all this legal stuff, I don't blame you. As long as you're back next week...