"We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.
This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace.
We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish."
The quote above may sound like vintage Bush, but it was LBJ, in April 1965, when only 400 Americans had died and he was trying to justify an escalation of the war. My mom was pregnant with me...and my dad was drafted a few months later. By all accounts, my dad left his soul in Vietnam. I wouldn't know how true this is, because the first time I met him, I was 30 years old.
In between my dad's service in Vietnam and my son's current service in Iraq and Afghanistan, I also served in the military, from 83-87, fresh out of high school. Like many students in my time, I was taught that "we would have 'won' Vietnam, if only the politicians had let us." I was taught of our "noble" effort to give the Vietnamese people a "good Christian man" - a priest, no less - to lead them in a "democracy." I remember hearing the stories about "VC, charlies, and gooks" setting booby-traps and ambushes in the villages and jungles that "necessitated" the strafing with bombs, napalm, Agent Orange, white phosphorous, and other invidious chemical and incendiary devices. I remember hearing about women and children and non-combatants being killed and collectively referred to as "collateral damage."
Three years after his 1965 speech announcing the escalation of the conflict, in March 1968, LBJ announced that he would not seek re-election and that the "peace talks" to end the war would begin "immediately." Between 1965 and 1968, we had 30,000 soldiers killed.
For seven years afterward, the nation's leaders wrangled with its desire to not "dishonor" the deaths of soldiers already killed by insisting on "peace with honor." As a result, 28,000 more soldiers died and thousands more were wounded physically, mentally, and spiritually. Our national pride caused these casualties as much as any bullet did.
Some will point to casualty metrics in Iraq and say, "things are way different." Yes, they are different - BUT ONLY BECAUSE OF SUPERIOR BODY ARMOR AND WEAPON ARMOR. There are just as many attacks on U.S. soldiers as there were in Vietnam. There are huge numbers and uncounted number of civilian casualties collateral damage innocent victims caught in the crossfires of a civil war and U.S. effort to suppress it.
I don't think that I'm the only one who has had a sense of Deja-vu. I think that Rep. Murtha is also feeling the same way.
Rep. Murtha's realistic appraisal yesterday wasn't just a pimp slap to the Bush Administration - it was also a wakeup call to the country to face the reality that currently exists in Iraq. What makes it particularly prescient is the man who spoke the words - a decorated Vietnam veteran who was an intelligence officer.
Time for the numbers to back up the reality check. Yes, it may be "wonkish," but damnit, people need to know these things before they pontificate about how "we've got to fix what we broke."
Here is a summary of The Oxford Research Institute's fourth national post-war survey of Iraq (there is a fifth national survey whose results are still being analyzed - they have not been reported):
The fourth National survey of Iraq was completed by ORI in June 2004 (ORI, June 2004). The questions asked were similar to those asked in the survey conducted in the November 2003 and March 2004 surveys. The research population for the study was adults living within the geographical boundaries of Iraq. The research sample of 2,912 was extrapolated using multi-stage random probability matrices, which were calculated based upon demographic figures derived from the 1997 census of Iraq, the 2002 Statistical abstract of Iraq, and UN population data compiled in January 2003 (ORI, 2005). Data was gathered by in-person interviews conducted in the homes of survey respondents (ORI, 2005). Members of interview teams were university-trained in research methodology and conducted interviews only in their native language (ORI, 2005). SPSS testing was performed on the interview data to "detect inconsistencies and emulated/fake interviews" (ORI, 2005).
A nearly even number of men (1468) and women (1534) were in the survey sample, and more than half of the respondents (63.3%) were aged 34 or younger (ORI, June 2004, p. 36). Slightly more than half (54.7%) of the sample were married, and the remainder of the sample identified themselves as single/never married (41.6%), divorced (1.2%), or widowed (2.5%) (ORI, June 2004, p. 36). The average household size of respondents was 7.6; 85.1% of the respondents lived in homes with 5 or more people, and 45% of the respondents lived in homes with 8 or more people (ORI, June 2004, p. 37). Most (80.2%) were native Arabic speakers; the second most dominant group were Kurdish native speakers (17%) (ORI, June 2004, p.38). A relatively small percentage (8%) indicated that they were able to understand English in addition to their native language; 75% of the respondents could only understand their native language (ORI, June 2004, p. 39). The urban to rural breakdown of the sample was not reported, however, 25.6% of the respondents were noted as residing within the governorate of Baghdad (ORI, June 2004, p. 1).
Only 7.2% of the sample were college graduates; most of the respondents (65.4%) had not completed secondary school, and 9.4% were illiterate and had received no formal education (ORI, June 2004, p. 37). At the time of the survey, most of the respondents reported that they were homemakers or caretakers (36.3%), self-employed (22.7%), students (20.6%), or employed full time (13.2%); only 3.5% reported that they were unemployed and unable to find work (ORI, June 2004, p. 37). In a significant decline (11%) from the November 2003 survey and a substantial decline (7%) from the March 2004 survey, 29.9% of those who were employed were employed in the civil service or a public sector/state-owned enterprise - there was also a substantial decrease, from 2 .7% in March 2004 to 1.7% in June 2004, in the number of respondents reporting that they who were employed by private industry (ORI, June 2004, p. 38).
The June 2004 Survey respondents seemed to have a sense of guarded optimism about the future. When asked how their life was now, compared with how it was in the Spring of 2003, 11.8% indicated that their lives were "much better now," 31.8% said that their lives were "somewhat better now," and 31.5% reported that things were "about the same (ORI, June 2004, p. 2). In looking to the future, 32.7% of the respondents said that "peace and stability" were the best things that could happen to them; American forces leaving Iraq was the second best thing, according to survey respondents (ORI, June 2004, p. 3). Concerns about lack of security and chaos remained preeminent on the list of "worst things that could happen" (29.6% of respondents), followed by the fear that American forces would never withdraw from Iraq (19.5% of respondents) (ORI, June 2004, p. 3).
When asked, "From today's perspective, and all things considered" whether the U.S. was right in invading Iraq, only 40.8%, down from 48.2% in March 2004, believed that the U.S. "absolutely right" (13.2%, down from 17.3%) or "somewhat right" (27.6%, down from 30.9%) in doing so (ORI, June 2004, p. 5). A question whose responses are perhaps indicative of a growing sense of distrust of the American occupation was "What do you find acceptable or unacceptable about the following political actions of other people?" and proceeded to list groups of victims that have been attacked in Iraq, asking whether the respondent deemed those actions "acceptable" or "unacceptable." In response to the question of whether attacks on coalition forces were "acceptable," 32.9% of Iraqi respondent responded in the affirmative; in comparison, attacks on other groups had far lower rates of "acceptability" to the respondents, to wit, attacks on the CPA (26.3%), attacks on foreigners working with the CPA (14.9%), attacks on Iraqis working with the CPA (9.7%), attacks on foreigners working for the UN and other humanitarian organizations (5.6%), and attacks on the new Iraqi police (3.1%) (ORI, June 2004, p. 24).
Survey respondents overwhelmingly viewed U.S. forces as an occupying force (53%) as opposed to a liberating force (16.8%) or a peacekeeping force 10.9%) (ORI, June 2004, p. 30). A majority o f respondents (57.9%) indicated that they somewhat opposed (22.6%) or strongly opposed (35.3%) the continued presence of occupation forces (ORI, June 2004, p. 29). The optimism and sense of improvement seen in prior survey responses markedly declined. Only a small percentage of respondents (19.9%) believed that the situations for peace and stability had improved in the preceding three months, whereas 62.4% believed that they had worsened (ORI, June 2004, p. 33).
In response to the question, "What does Iraq need right now?" 70.1% strongly agreed and 18.2% somewhat agreed with the response, "An Iraqi democracy" (ORI, June 2004, p. 13).As to the form that such a government should take, 74% strongly agreed and 15.4% somewhat agreed with the response, "A single, strong leader," preferring this to a group of strong Iraqi leaders, a UN transitional government, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Iraqi Governing Council, et.al. (ORI, June 2004, p.13). When asked to name the one single thing that Iraq needs within 12 months, an individual leader for the nation was selected by 49.9% and an Iraqi democracy was selected by 31% of the respondents; when the respondents were asked to identify the single most important thing for Iraq to have in 5 years, an Iraqi democracy was selected by 50% of the respondents, followed by a strong individual to lead the country, at 36.1% (ORI, June 2004 p. 15). From the pattern of answers in the surveys over the past two years, it appears that the Iraqis may see having a strong, single person to lead Iraq is a prerequisite to democracy.
The greatest sense of trust was in Iraqi religious leaders (87%, up from 78.5% in March) and the new Iraqi army (74.4%); the least trust was remained in political parties (6.8%) and US/UK occupation forces (5.3, down from 7% in March) (ORI, June 2004, p. 12). In a query of respondents about Iraqi leaders, 18.7% (down from 59% only three months earlier) indicated that Ahmed Chalabi "could not be trusted at all"; second to Chalabi on the "distrust" scale was Saddam Hussein, at 6.2% (down from 17% in March 2004) (ORI, June 2004, p. 10).
When asked to rank governmental priorities for the next 12 months, regaining public security remained the highest priority (70.2%, up from 65.7% in March 2004), followed by rebuilding the infrastructure (10.6%, up from 6.9%) (ORI, June 2004, p. 5). The things that were designated as worthy of "no priority at all" and least important to the Iraqis surveyed were "dealing with members of the previous government" (83.7%, down from 89.2% in March 2004), "seeing that people have more say in how things are done in their communities" (4.1%, the same as March 2004), and "ensuring that oil production increases" (6%, up from 2.5% in March 2004) (ORI, June 2004, p. 6).