Can islam and human rights principles coexist?
I argue that political islam and human rights principles can not coexist. The ruling elites in the middle east are too deeply entrenched, and blatantly autocratic. The interventionist foreign policy of the west (particularly the United States) has only amplified anti-Western sentiment, and legitimized fundamentalist movements as avenues of resistance.
The United States has lost its moral authority (Guantanamo, Abu-Ghraib, etc, etc), and anti-americanism (already quite high) is on the rise.
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-There's a whole lot more to read-
Conflict: Human Rights Principles and Muslim Identity
For better or for worse, we live in a world of deeply entrenched powers. Autocratic oil-rich states spend billions on state of the art military and security forces. Technology for nuclear arms has proliferated to developing states like India and Pakistan, even to third-rate powers like North Korea. The established sources of authority in today's world are stronger than ever, struggling for even more power during the transition from a regional to a global economy. This struggle for dominance is nothing new; we have seen empires expand, clash, and fade throughout human history. The contemporary manifestation of this struggle, however, has created a set of circumstances that are not favorable to compromise, or to human rights principles.
The economic and strategic importance of the Middle East (more accurately, the oceans of oil underneath the Middle East) amplifies this problem, creating an environment where human rights are blatantly subordinate to money and power. The formation of the state of Israel, and repeated political interference from western interests, has effectively cemented the west's identity as an adversary of Islam. In response to western aggression, Muslim culture has embraced a more fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, which rejects human rights principles, and has become "the dominant force in much of the Islamic world"1. Islamic political entities such as HAMAS (and Al-Qaeda) have no incentive to compromise. As conflict escalates, images of violence and stories of war atrocities bring these extremist groups ever more recruits, making them more powerful and more influential. This politicized wing of Islam poses one of the greatest threats to progress, and to the acceptance of human rights principles in the Middle East. The powerful extremist elites owe their power to the continuing conflict, the unavoidable `clash of civilizations'. These extremists have no vision for progress, or for an increased standard of living for their people. They want nothing more than the status quo (conflict), and to instill an ever-deepening sense of victimization and hatred towards the west in their population. Attempts to reform traditions and to bring about change in the status quo are seen as western motivated. Dissent is treated like treason, making real dialogue impossible. Given the present state of politics, Muslim identity, and national history, it is necessary to reject religion altogether (and Islam in particular) in order to secure human rights. Popular Muslim identity is (justifiably) hostile towards all things western, and direct confrontation has only reinforced this hostility. The west must, therefore, confront the Muslim world indirectly, by promoting economic integration, creating economic opportunity, and improving the standard of living. We must eliminate the isolation and extreme poverty that fuels extremist groups with so many desperate young men, trying to legitimize their anger and willing to die for the cause. Religious identity must be rejected altogether, because popular Islam has been corrupted by fundamentalism, and the memories of past injustice are too fresh.
The most damming evidence against Islam, with regards to its incompatibility with human rights principles, is today's undeniable political environment. The wealthiest and most powerful states in the Middle East also happen to be some of the least democratic and tolerant states in the world. They also happen to be surprisingly accepting of fundamentalism (and the inevitable violent extremism it spawns). Fundamentalism has infiltrated Muslim culture and tainted political Islam. Political Islam's corruption is the most blatant in dictatorial regimes like Saudi-Arabia and Iran (two of the region's most influential powers). Both of these regimes are human rights violators. What's worse, they can resist outside political pressure because their oil revenue provides enough capital to fund the modern armies and secret police agencies that they need to control their discontented citizens. `Authority' in these societies comes from a bizarre combination of state, religious, and military leaders that govern through informal ties, power politics, and brute force. This `informal', dictatorial style of government creates countless opportunities for bribes, kickbacks, cronyism, and politically motivated persecution. Islam's ideals can't develop or grow (to meet the demands of modern culture) in this corrupted environment; religious leaders with political power are equally subject to temptation. Saudi Arabian and Iranian rulers both tie their regime's legitimacy to Islam (thereby corrupting Islam through their own immoral actions), and both states promote their own brand of Islamic Fundamentalism. The political structure of these two states provides us with valuable insight into why Islam and human rights cannot currently coexist.
Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most notorious violator of human rights in the Middle East, and continues to do so with impunity. Politically, Saudi Arabia is in a unique position, because it controls enough of the world's oil supply, to have serious leverage over the price of oil. In other words, if Saudi Arabia and the west were to enter into a serious conflict, Saudi Arabia could shut off production and the price of oil would skyrocket2, making western economies grind to a halt. As a result, Saudi Arabia is essentially immune to political pressure (human rights or otherwise). People are routinely killed for acts of adultery, and thieves can be punished by having a hand cut off. Justice is swift and merciless. The Saudi courts follow a particularly strict set of Islamic laws (Sharia), which also happen to serve as a convenient and effective tool of social control.
Saudi courts impose capital punishment and corporal punishment, including amputations of
hands and feet for serious robbery, and floggings for lesser crimes such as "sexual deviance"
(i.e. homosexuality) and drunkenness. The number of lashes is not clearly prescribed by law
and varied according to the discretion of judges, and ranges from dozens of lashes to several
thousand, usually applied over a period of weeks or months.3
The Saudi practice of Sharia provides us with a sterling example as to why Islam and basic human rights principles are irreconcilable. Since Sharia is derived from Islam, the Saudi authorities effectively use Islam to justify acts of torture. Sharia also happens to be an incredibly effective tool to silence critics. Dissenters can be singled out, and since judges have a large degree of interpretive freedom, politically motivated arrests can be disguised as the enforcement of moral principle. The rise of fundamentalism as an ideology has only exacerbated this problem. "Islamic fundamentalist movements promise to replace incumbent authoritarian regimes with totalitarian ones which make political dissent blasphemy, assassinate their opponents, and carry out inquisitions of university professors, journalists, and intellectuals. This has lead the incumbent authoritarian regimes to halt or reverse political liberalization and democratization."4 When a religious doctrine is used to justify political repression and torture, it has become fundamentally corrupted.
Saudi Arabia is effectively the `cultural hegemon' of the Middle East, and it is representative of the contradictory ties between Middle Eastern elites, the west, and Islam itself. Saudi Arabia portrays itself as "a country at the forefront of a global struggle against Western corruption"5, while it simultaneously sells oil to, and invests in, western states. In other words, Saudi Arabia is in the midst of a `struggle' with its greatest economic ally. Without western petrodollars, the Saudi government would have no stream of revenue. The millions of Saudi dollars that support `traditional' society and promote Wahabism would dry up. This hypocrisy is exemplified by the fact that western dollars fund Saudi Arabia's care for the holy cities of Mecca and Madina, and the fact that Saudi owned newspapers such as al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat, and the Saudi owned `Middle East Broadcasting Corporation', are all based in London.6 Saudi leaders have apparently embraced fundamentalism (and Wahabism) as a tool of social control, but they have not embraced the actual values of fundamentalism, because they continue to cooperate with the west economically and militarily. The Saudi people, on the other hand, may despise their state's secret police, but they have embraced the values of fundamentalism and Wahabism. Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. Saudi elites have a love/hate relationship with fundamentalism. It keeps their population (and political dissent) in check, but its ultimate goal (destruction of the west) is not in their best interests. As a result, Saudi rulers are in a perpetual state of conflicted interests.
Iran, on the other hand, exemplifies a `purer' brand of fundamentalism, in the political sense, because the state is explicitly anti-western (or at least anti-american). Iranian leaders denounce the United States as `the Great Satan', and Tehran sponsors armed fundamentalist movements all over the globe. The Iranian political system is essentially a constitutional theocracy, with a (superficially) democratically elected legislature. Despite some semblance of political representation, the grand majority of the power in Iran belongs to non-elected religious elites. In order to run for office, political candidates must receive approval from the guardian council, a panel of religious leaders. The real power in Iran resides in the 'Supreme Leader', who is essentially an autocrat. In accordance with the religious nature of the state, the Supreme Leader must be a Shiite cleric. Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini was Iran's first Supreme Leader, seizing power after the 1979 revolution. Khomeini revolutionized the conception of political Islam by arguing, that during the absence of the 12th imam (the Shiite messiah), governing authority should belong to the Shiite clerics. After his death in 1989, Khomeini was succeeded by another influential cleric, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who still holds the office. The Supreme Leader appoints the head of the judiciary, has ultimate authority over Iran's armed forces, and can set the political agenda7. He has the right to appoint fellow clerics to high posts of government, such as the 'Council of Guardians', which also has a hand in shaping policy. Many of Iran's political institutions have overlapping jurisdiction and ill-defined limits to authority.
In July, 1997, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, chair of the Judicial Branch and one of the five most powerful people in Iran, said, "Religious leadership and political leadership are not separate from each other. Politics, government, and Islamic rule are for the clergy only and the non-clergy lack the right to interfere in politics".8
This political structure (no separation of powers) ensures that the Islamic religious establishment keeps a stranglehold on Iranian society. Political Islam effectively has an ultimate veto over every act of government. The prominent role of religion in the Iranian government creates an atmosphere where religious elites combine Islam and power politics. How could Islam, the `voice of morality', possibly not be corrupted by power politics? Power politics are devious and Machiavellian by nature. Morality is used as little more than a prop, or a distraction; betrayal and unprovoked aggression can be politically beneficial, or `virtuous' in the Machiavellian sense. The Iranian state and Iranian political culture have had a huge impact on the rest of the Middle East, and the world in general.
The Iranian revolution of 1978/79 has made the term "Islamic fundamentalism" popular world-wide.
Since Ayatollah Khomeini's triumphant return to Iran in February 1979, the world knows that "Islam"
can stand not only for a belief system, but also for a highly dynamic political ideology based on the
presumed fundamentals of this belief system.9
It is important to realize that today's political circumstances weren't arbitrarily created. During the past century, western states and corporate interests have repeatedly influenced politics, violated national sovereignty, and generally offended Muslim sensibilities. Western culture embodies a sense of materialism, excess, and moral indulgence (not to mention competition) that is inherently threatening to traditional honor-driven culture. Yet, despite the west's apparent moral inferiority, it has utterly dominated the Muslim world in a string of humiliating military and political defeats. Israel (although dependent on the support of the United States) is arguably the most powerful, and one of the most prosperous states in the Middle East, despite its tiny size, and lack of oil. Even as the existence of Israel symbolizes western exploitation of the Muslim world, oil rich elites invest untold billions of petrodollars in western banks, instead of using the revenue for domestic economic development, education, or an increase in the standard of living. The west has essentially dominated and co-opted the political and economic leaders of the oil-rich states in the Middle East, and continues to this pattern of behavior in the present day. Consequently, most Muslims see the west as an enemy. America's adoption of more aggressive foreign policy has only deepened this sentiment, especially in the most powerful Muslim states, "the attitude toward the United States had particularly hardened in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where 84 percent and 82 percent, respectively, said their opinion of the superpower had worsened in the past year.10" Muslim leaders pander to this anti-western sentiment, using scapegoat politics, while they simultaneously cooperate with the west and pocket billions for themselves. Therefore, as hatred for the United States and the west deepens, leaders of these authoritarian regimes become more powerful. The unstable environment can even lead to speculation, which drives up the price of oil, providing these regimes with even more revenue. Each side of the conflict is becoming further entrenched. The Muslim people have been swindled, and they place blame on the west, without holding their leaders (or their society) properly accountable. Considering recent history, however, it is unsurprising that this is the case. We have proven ourselves as enemies.
The sad truth of the matter is that we are enemies. We are in the midst of a blatant propaganda war11. There are fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, including Wahabism, that conflict directly with western sensibilities. We differ on issues so basic that neither side can compromise without betraying our beliefs. Sharia, for example, is considered a source of justice and moral authority in Saudi-Arabia, where hands can be cut off for theft, and women can be killed for adultery. The legitimacy of Sharia is tied directly to Islam, and is therefore directly tied to Muslim identity. Seriously changing or eliminating Sharia would be a blatant betrayal of traditional Muslim values, and would be seen as an attack on the Muslim people, making compromise next to impossible. From the western perspective, no democratic leader (that values human rights) would accept that Sharia gives Saudi Arabia the sovereign right to cut off the hands of thieves and to execute adulterers. A 'compromise' wouldn't ever be acceptable unless there were fundamental changes, which would be seen as a western aggression. Similarly, even if a compromise caused the rights of women to improve, it would be unacceptable to western leaders unless women were granted full equality under the law. Our most basic values are so divergent that we can't even acknowledge the legitimacy of each others practices. In order for there to be a significant change, one side (the Muslim world) must 'lose', and the other must win. This is today's political reality.
The current relationship between Muslim identity and human rights principles is untenable, because anything and anyone remotely associated with the west is stigmatized. Our fundamentally divergent perspectives make compromising with one another nearly impossible, and culturally, we aren't at the point of mutual understanding where Muslims can differentiate between the 'good' aspects of western culture (like human rights) and the 'bad' aspects of western culture (like atheism and materialism). The same can be said of the west's understanding of Islam. Islam is not inherently violent, only certain interpretations justify violence. Moreover, Muslim opinion (and identity) is not homogenous with regards to violence and religion. Even Saudi opinion is far from unified, "Saudi Arabia is a very complex mixture of the traditional, the modern, and the post modern, depending on the region... a few examples being the liberal Sunni cosmopolitan in the western region, Shi'i liberal and Western in the east, conservative but Westernized in the center."12 These groups do not necessarily agree on issues such as violent resistance. Violence is a tool of desperation, and a large number of Muslim men and women happen to be desperate. Just as Muslims can't acknowledge that some western values are legitimate, the west seems unable to acknowledge that some Muslim anger is legitimate. Each side has shortcomings, but in the context of a conflict, those shortcomings are ignored in favor of a more dogmatic perspective of cultural supremacy. This state of affairs has created a sort of paralysis among human rights groups. We can no longer use standard avenues of western power to promote human rights, because the mere association of human rights and the west will cause people to resist human rights. We can no longer legitimately call attention to the shortcomings of other states (and expect a positive political change), because our own blatant shortcomings (such as Abu-Ghraib, and Guantanamo bay) have left us morally bankrupt.
Just as Muslim societies must acknowledge their own shortcomings, the west must acknowledge its economic exploitation. Neither are likely to happen any time soon. In today's political environment, authoritarian leaders are becoming more powerful, and U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has fuelled the fires of anti-western sentiment and caused armed resistance groups to mobilize all over the globe. Given this reality, there is no room for human rights principles in Islamic states. Islamic identity and human right's principles are irreconcilable, and fundamental reforms are politically impossible (without armed confrontation and regime change).
What's more, even if the ruling elites in the Middle East accepted human rights principles (which they obviously don't), the principles of basic human rights are irreconcilable with Muslim identity. The role of women in Middle Eastern society, for example, could not coexist with equality between the sexes, let alone western theories of feminism. Even though the prophet Mohammad confided his fear and uncertainty in his wife, and valued her judgment, he made an explicit distinction between his own opinions and those of Allah. Women, in the Koran, are not seen as equals13. The subjugation of women isn't simply an accepted cultural practice; it is a tradition, tied to the Koran. As a tradition, it is an undeniable part of Muslim identity. Individuals who speak out against the current plight of women are considered to be traitors or tools of the west. Islam also happens to be different from all other major religions in the sense that it influences nearly every aspect of life. Islam is the only major religion that can be used to regulate business practices, to determine criminal sentences, and to regulate social standards of conduct.
The rise of fundamentalism has only served to reinforce the most brutal and repressive aspects of Islam. Fundamentalists, like any other ideologues, want to gather as much power as possible, and to entrench themselves deeper into the mechanisms of justice and government. Towards this end, they attack anything that appears to be threatening or subversive - anything that goes against `tradition' (like, human rights reforms, for example). Fundamentalists pervert the teachings of the Koran for their own political (or even financial) gain, and they simply want to entrench and deepen the fears and prejudices behind the status quo.
But who is responsible for fundamentalism? Although the answer to this question is not clear cut, the west has played a major role in the rise of fundamentalism, and the west (primarily America) continues to do so. Western powers have shaped Muslim identity, and made it what it is today. Our continued exploitation of the natural resources in the region has had the unavoidable effect of alienating the population (just as all acts of colonialism, imperialism, and aggression do). There have been several moments over the past several decades that have defined Muslim identity in relation to the west, and very few of them are positive.
The formation of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948 has long been the keystone with regards to anti-western sentiment. After declaring independence, Israel handed a humiliating military defeat to the Islamic world, and created a serious refugee problem, resulting from the mass exodus of Palestinians during the war. This humiliation was repeatedly deepened, during the 1956 Suez war (between Nasser's Egypt and Israel), and the `Six Day War', (which took place from June 5th through June 10th, 1967). Israel, with the support of the west, managed to expand its borders, and to claim unequivocal victory over its much larger foes. This humiliation, especially at the hands of the Jews (who happen to be a vilified minority in many cultures) has had a lasting impact on Muslim identity. Today's confrontational, fundamentalist environment is a direct response to this history.
A lesson that western powers have yet to learn is that military intervention does not work. We have repeatedly seen western states engage in military intervention in order to protect corporate interests, and the response to these interventions is inevitably negative. Iran, for example, was in the first stages of developing a liberal democracy, when in 1953; western powers intervened (in response to an attempt to nationalize Iran's oil industry) and installed the Shah, a brutal autocrat14. Establishing a client regime in Iran may have been highly profitable for two and a half decades, but the cultural response and impact on Iranian identity were uncontrollable. The 1979 revolution, a response to the Shah's brutal policies, has created a lasting enemy of the United States--apparently an `unforeseen' consequence. Unfortunately, the west has not yet learned. After invading Iraq, Americans were supposed to be treated as liberators and heroes. Instead, we have a protracted, bloody insurgency on our hands that has tainted the image of America and the U.S. Military all over the world. By eliminating Saddam, we have actually provided our sworn enemies, Iran, with a new Shiite ally in the region. Our interventionist history has created more conflict than it has solved, and has legitimized fundamentalism as a form of resistance to occupation. We have essentially created the enemy that we are fighting now. Considering this History, it seems impossible that modern Muslim identity could accept any western values, including human rights principles.
How, then, do we improve the state of affairs? Our only hope for actual peace (not simply domination or submission) is to empower Middle Easterners economically. The only aspect of Western culture that the Middle East has unequivocally adopted is the capitalist system. Even Iran is dependent on the world market, and the global economic collapse that would result from the `defeat' of Iran's enemies, would be politically crippling15. Our economic ties with Saudi Arabia are even deeper than those with Iran - the Saudi's have billions invested in western banks and corporations. The path to change is not through military intervention, but through forcing Middle Eastern states to compete economically. If Saudi society, for example, were to come to a consensus that the only way to remain competitive in the world market was to allow women to work outside of the home, and to receive education, it would be a massive blow to one of the pillars of fundamentalism (subjugation of women). Once women in the workplace were accepted, perhaps women would be allowed to drive cars (for the sake of efficiency and competition). If we can find economic justifications for social reforms, we can detach Muslim identity from some of our interactions with the people in the Middle East. Economic necessity (a death in the family, for example) forces people to swallow their pride, and to work, even if it is considered shameful or socially unacceptable. Although slow and painful, this is what real progress looks like. Fifty years ago in the United States, treating women as equals in the workplace was unheard of, and working mothers were reviled or pitied. Today, it isn't at all unusual to see women in positions of corporate and political power - in fact, it has become one of our most basic assumptions about society. In order to remain competitive, American culture changed its views on women's equality. If we want any progress in regimes like Iran and Saudi Arabia, we must integrate economically, and force them to compete.
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