"The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war."
And so begins the very first page of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), submitted by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on February 3, 2006. The report itself is a normal function of the Department of Defense, and some of the "normal" neoconservatives who worked so hard to guide us into conflict with both Afghanistan and Iraq had a hand in completing it, even though they have left the Pentagon for other posts - namely, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith.
The rest of the Preface to the QDR speaks of the war on terrorism, and protecting the American homeland from weapon of mass destruction. But, is that what the QDR really is about? Or, does it hint towards much more?
During his briefing of reporters on the QDR in D.C., Ryan Henry, a Pentagon policy official,
stated that the Long War is really a new term for the War on Terrorism (
also briefly known as the Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism). "When we refer to the long war," he said, "that is the war against terrorist extremists and the ideology that feeds it, and that is something that we do see going on for decades."
But, the document clearly goes beyond just a long war in terrorism. The QDR specifically identifies what it calls "four priority areas for examination": (1) Defeating terrorist networks, (2) Defending the homeland in depth, (3) Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, (4) Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD. The report then discusses each in depth. However, the following two areas should be reviewed carefully.
Defeating terrorist networks
The QDR declares:
Currently, Iraq and Afghanistan are crucial battlegrounds in this war, but the struggle extends far beyond their borders and may well be fought in dozens of other countries simultaneously and for many years to come.
No effort is made to explain how Iraq and Afghanistan are "crucial battlegrounds," nor how they came to be such. Neither does the QDR explain why the war will be fought for years to come - it is just treated as a given.
Al Qaida and its associated movements operate in more than 80 countries. They have conducted attacks around the world - in New York, Washington, D.C., Jakarta, Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London, Islamabad, New Delhi, Moscow, Nairobi, Dar Es Salaam, Casablanca, Tunis, Riyadh, Sharm el-Sheikh, and Amman - killing ordinary people of all faiths and ethnicities alike. .. They exploit poorly governed areas of the world, taking sanctuary where states lack the capacity or the will to police themselves. State sponsors such as Iran and Syria provide yet another form of safe haven...
By broadly defining Al Qaeda as including "associated members," without ever defining how or why these "members" are "associated," the QDR paints a picture of Al Qaeda as a massive worldwide network that can, and has, been able to strike anywhere it pleases. No effort is made to carefully analyze the capabilities of Al Qaeda - they are just a major threat.
So, how does the Pentagon defeat this massive, deadly network?
Victory will come when the enemy's extremist ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their host populations and tacit supporters, becoming unfashionable, and following other discredited creeds, such as Communism and Nazism, into oblivion.
In other words, we must defeat an idea. And, through the Pentagon's efforts, terrorism will become "unfashionable" - like the mullet and acid wash jeans.
Ignoring the logical fallacy of declaring terrorism a major worldwide threat that is also something akin to a "fad" that can be made unfashionable, the question becomes: How do we do that with our military?
This requires the creation of a global environment inhospitable to terrorism. It requires legitimate governments with the capacity to police themselves and to deny terrorists the sanctuary and the resources they need to survive. It also will require support for the establishment of effective representative civil societies around the world, since the appeal of freedom is the best long-term counter to the ideology of the extremists. The ultimate aim is that terrorist networks will no longer have the ability or support to strike globally and catastrophically, and their ability to strike regionally will be outweighed by the capacity and resolve of local governments to defeat them.
Did you see that? It was rhetorical sleight of hand before your very eyes: terrorists can kill anywhere in the world; they take refuge and get support from weak countries; therefore, we must change these countries in order to achieve victory, which is defined as the eradication of an idea.
How the US military can affect changes in other countries is outlined in the third "priority area." But, becoming involved in the affairs of other nations has other goals besides defeating terrorism.
Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads
This section comes very close to calling for the sort of "benevolent hegemony" that Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan dreamed of back in 1996.
Specifically, the QDR sees its roll as "shaper" to be much broader than in just the Middle East:
Beyond Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America are in flux and represent new geo-strategic crossroads. The United States will seek to shape not only the choices of countries in those regions, but choices of countries outside them that have interests or ambitions within them.
How the "shaping" will be done is explained:
The United States will work to ensure that all major and emerging powers are integrated as constructive actors and stakeholders into the international system. It will also seek to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional or global security. It will attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States or other friendly countries, and it will seek to deter aggression or coercion. Should deterrence fail, the United States would deny a hostile power its strategic and operational objectives.
The "international system" would be as defined by the United States. Preventing other countries from dictating "the terms or regional global security" and dissuading military competitors from gaining a "regional hegemony" are, of course, fancy words for "maintaining US global military superiority." The last sentence is a more respectful way of saying "we'll kick your ass if you challenge us."
The QDR further outlines what can be described as "military globalization." Where economic globalization stresses that interdependent national economies are less likely to come into conflict, the QDR envisions a military globalization where allied nations, as well as other nations we seek to "shape" the choices of, become more and more dependent on American military and intelligence capabilities through integrated defense systems, as well as technology and know-how provided in order to "strengthen partner nations' capabilities to defend themselves and withstand attack..."
The goal is clear: as targeted nations become more and more dependent on U.S. military and security assistance, they will (hopefully) be more stable as well as less likely to be willing to do us harm. Where President Bush opposed becoming the World's Policeman before the election, he and his Pentagon are now encouraging it.
And, to increase our ability to "deter" those who are not interested in joining our "international system," the Pentagon declares:
To dissuade major and emerging powers from developing capabilities that could threaten regional stability, to deter conflict, and to defeat aggression should deterrence fail, the United States is further diversifying its basing posture. Based on the Department's Global Defense Posture Review, the United States will continue to adapt its global posture to promote constructive bilateral relations, mitigate anti-access threats and offset potential political coercion designed to limit U.S. access to any region. The United States will develop capabilities that would present any adversary with complex and multidimensional challenges and complicate its offensive planning efforts. These include the pursuit of investments that capitalize on enduring U.S. advantages in key strategic and operational areas, such as persistent surveillance and long-range strike, stealth, operational maneuver and sustainment of air, sea and ground forces at strategic distances, air dominance and undersea warfare, defense training to increase understanding, strengthen allies and partners, and accurately communicate U.S. objectives and intent.
This clearly goes far beyond combating terrorism. "Diversifying basing posture" appears to refer to the establishment of "enduring bases" in many parts of the world (an effort that is already underway). "Air dominance and undersea warfare" certainly have nothing to do with combating terrorism, since Al Qaeda has no air force or navy.
But why such a show of force?
The aim is to possess sufficient capability to convince any potential adversary that it cannot prevail in a conflict and that engaging in conflict entails substantial strategic risks beyond military defeat.
Any potential enemy? Any at all? Doug Feith probably wrote this section himself. It goes far beyond combating terrorism into a territory suspiciously close to world dominance.
Although the QDR speaks in broad terms, and fails to go into any depth at all, it is clear that the Pentagon has thought long and hard about how to posture itself and the United States in a post-9/11 world. Combatting terrorism is only one part of a larger strategy that would see the military becoming infinitely more involved in the affairs of other nations. And the "theater of operations" would not just be the Middle East, but throughout the world, including our neighbors in South America.
How far will the Pentagon go to carry out these objectives? Are such long-term plans for a Long War realistic? Will the rest of the world really be willing to join the "international system? What sort of resistance would the US face, and what would be done about it?
And, finally, how is the Long War plan compatible with the fact that President Bush's term is up in 2008, and a new President may have very different goals and ideas?
These questions are unanswered, but the QDR is certainly giving us a hint towards the Pentagon's thinking.
It should give us all pause.