When a failed presidency is on the table, the world begins to operate in a different way.
On Tuesday, Stratfor released its latest Geopolitical Intelligence Report, "The Presidency: Deepening Questions" - and the above sums up an absolutely fascinating article. For those of you unfamiliar with Stratfor, it's an intelligence agency and strategic forecaster widely regarded as one of the most objective, non-partisan, insightful and frighteningly accurate analysts of world events. Barron's calls Stratfor the "shadow CIA." From the Stratfor website:
Founded in 1996, Stratfor has revolutionized the way businesses, trade associations, government agencies, and individuals get access to timely, accurate global intelligence, analysis, and forecasting for making their most important strategic decisions. Stratfor has been cited in the mainstream media for the "uncanny accuracy" of our forecasts and our "ability to uncover the globe's best-kept secrets and predict world-changing events in ways that no one else can" (ABC News).
This report does the best job I've seen of putting Bush's lame duck presidency into both global and historical perspective. Following are pieces of the report, with bold emphasis added by me (and remember, these aren't Democrats talking):
What is a vitally important issue is whether President George W. Bush has the ability to govern. Presidents, unlike prime ministers, do not leave office when they lose the confidence of voters; the Framers did not want a parliamentary system. What happens, rather, is that a president can lose the ability to govern -- either because he cannot get needed legislation passed, or because Congress blocks his initiatives. Congress controls the purse strings and can, by withholding funds, shut down presidential initiatives. That is how the Vietnam War ended: Congress cut off all military aid to South Vietnam, and it collapsed. The idea that a president can continue to govern without congressional support, because of the inherent powers of the presidency, simply isn't true. You wind up with a paralyzed government.
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Consider that Bush recently returned from India with a series of agreements on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation. It is far from certain that Bush will be able to muster the two-thirds vote needed in the Senate in order to get a treaty passed; there is substantial unease in Congress about U.S. acquiescence to any nuclear proliferation, and there is not a powerful pro-Indian lobby on the Hill. Now, it also is possible that Bush will be able to get the votes. But the problem that is emerging is that the president no longer has the ability to negotiate with full confidence. Any foreign leader in negotiations will be aware that the president's word is not final and there will have to be dealings with Congress as well. Since reaching an agreement with the U.S. president, and then having it repudiated by Congress, is more than a little embarrassing for foreign leaders, they will be much more careful in making agreements with Bush -- and much less susceptible to any threats he might issue, since it would not be clear that he has the backing to carry them out.
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Bush is not the first president to face political paralysis; most who did encountered it over foreign policy issues. Wilson collapsed over the League of Nations, Truman over Korea. Johnson collapsed over Vietnam, and Nixon had Watergate with a touch of Vietnam. Carter was done in by the Iranian hostage situation. But there is one difference between these and the current president: Bush is only one year into his second term. He has just reached a critical low in approval ratings and Republicans have begun distancing themselves. If he doesn't recover, it will be one of the longest failed presidencies in history. There would be three years in which foreign powers would operate with diminished concern for U.S. wishes and responses. Three years is a very long time.
Stratfor nails the Republican revolt to the DPW ports deal, and offers an interesting perspective on the defections within the GOP:
Even if Republican senators and congressman did not agree with the views held by their constituents, the pressure they were under still would have been enormous. Thus, they broke with Bush in the face of his early threat to veto any legislation blocking the ports deal. By the end, the president was in retreat, very publicly unable to get his way.
This has not happened before. The president's Social Security initiative died a sort of death, but an outright repudiation of Bush led by Republicans is unprecedented. This likely would not have happened if Bush had not slipped in the polls as he did -- but on the other hand, a lot of his slippage has come from within his coalition. Of late, it was the Republicans who were bolting. Within the party, Bush has held the support of the social conservatives, and he continues to hold the economic conservatives and business interests. But the national security conservatives splintered, and it is not clear that they will come back aboard.
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The core problem for the administration is, of course, Iraq. No matter how much progress one thinks is being made, the fact is that the progress is far from solid, and from the standpoint of American voters, it doesn't seem particularly persuasive. Bush has burned through a huge amount of political capital because of the war. In the end, it is not the cartoons or the ports that did this to Bush, but above all else, his inability to devise an end game in Iraq.
And the upshot:
Whatever is going on, there could be profound geopolitical consequences. The United States is the center of gravity of the international system. When a failed presidency is on the table, the world begins to operate in a different way. The North Koreans and the Chinese, for example, wouldn't negotiate seriously with the United States while Truman was president; they waited for Eisenhower. The North Vietnamese waited for Nixon. Not only did they not want to negotiate with a president who couldn't guarantee agreements, but in fact, the feeling was that time was on their side after Watergate crippled Nixon. The fact that Nixon no longer had any military options that wouldn't be blocked by Congress certainly contributed to the final collapse of Saigon. And the Iranians wouldn't negotiate with Carter over the hostages; they waited for Reagan.
The United States has some crucial negotiations under way. In Iraq, it is trying to broker a deal between the Shia and Sunnis. Its ability to do so, however, depends to a great degree on the perception by both parties that Bush can deliver on both threats and promises. Further complicating matters, the British have announced plans for a drawdown in Iraq, even mentioning a timetable. There are broad implications here. First, if Bush no longer is able to provide guarantees for what is said at the bargaining table, Iraq will suddenly take a dramatically different course. Second, if the Iranians know that Bush doesn't have military options in Iraq and cannot engage in covert negotiations authoritatively, that entire dynamic is changed. Similarly, if the Pakistanis conclude they have nothing to fear from Bush, then that changes everything for Islamabad. Go through the list, from Russia to China, and we see easily what it could mean.
Now, can Bush recover from this weakened position? It is possible, but the historical record for such recoveries is not good. Most presidents who have sunk to such low approval ratings and have a rebellion within their party never recover. The reason is that a psychological barrier has been broken -- and a political one as well. In the GOP, everyone is looking at the 2006 elections. Congress members have to run for re-election; the president doesn't. Bush and Cheney have terrible ratings. It is unlikely, then, that campaign swings into contested areas by either of them will aid the party's chances. At the moment, staying far away from both officials is the most rational strategy for congressional candidates. And to do that, senators and congressmen have to publicly show their independence.
Bush needs a win as badly as Truman, Johnson, Nixon and Carter did. The Koreans, Vietnamese and Iranians made certain those presidents didn't get one. The difference here, the chief wild card, is that those presidents measured their remaining time in terms of a year or so (though Nixon didn't know how short his time actually would be). Bush has three years left in office.
The article is a great reminder that what happens in the U.S., doesn't stay in the U.S. An unprecedented 3 years of lame duckness will produce snowballing implications worldwide.