Yesterday,
Night Owl raised some troubling questions around the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)"simulation" of low-yield nuclear underground strikes in its Divine Strake testing program.
A report in today's LA Times raises broader questions over the intentions behind plans, called the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, revealed by the Bush regime on modernizing the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure.
The plan, outlined to Congress yesterday by the head of National Nuclear Security Administration Thomas D'Agostino, would restart the production of new nuclear weapons. The last new nuclear weapon was produced in 1989.
D'Agostino claims such production would be part of a larger program to remove aging weapons before they become unstable.
D'Agostino acknowledged in an interview that the administration was walking a fine line by modernizing the U.S. nuclear weapons program while assuring other nations that it was not seeking a new arms race. The credibility of the contention rests on the U.S. intent to sharply reduce its inventory of weapons.
Yet even if Bush isn't seeking to raise the numbers of weapons, there is clearly a shift in the administration's vision to not only replace existing warheads, but to enhance our nuclear capabilities by seeking new bomb designs.
From the Arms Control Association:
At first glance, the RRW program seems a promising solution to the long-term maintenance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The stated goal is to develop new replacement warheads that will be easier and less costly to maintain than current weapons, will be more reliable and easier to certify, and will meet modern safety and environmental requirements.
Moreover, the Energy Department contends that the program could help support future steep reductions in the total number of U.S. nuclear weapons by increasing confidence in the effectiveness of the remaining arsenal.
On closer examination, however, the RRW program seems premature and inherently risky. As administration officials have repeatedly testified, the warheads in the current well-tested U.S. nuclear stockpile are already highly reliable, more so than the missiles that deliver them. Simple changes to existing procedures could increase war head "performance margins" even more . B
By contrast, even the modest design changes envisioned under the RRW program, ultimately intended to replace large parts of the U.S. nuclear deterrent with untested warheads, will inevitably lead to renewed demands that the United States resume underground nuclear explosive testing. This would encourage other countries, such as China, to resume their own nuclear testing programs and allow them to improve the capabilities of their own nuclear weapons.
To be fair, the consolidation aspect of this modernization plan has some merit:
Under the plan, all of the nation's plutonium would be consolidated into a single facility that could be more effectively and cheaply defended against possible terrorist attacks. The plan would remove the plutonium kept at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by 2014, though transfers of the material could start sooner. In recent years, concern has grown that Livermore, surrounded by residential neighborhoods in the Bay Area, could not repel a terrorist attack.
I lack the technical expertise in this field to make sweeping judgements. Nor am I a "no-nukes" advocate.
But I want to raise awareness of this matter to the DKOS community. We spend a lot of time, right so, on the most immediate security issues re Iraq and terrorism, but our strategic balance with China is a huge long term issue.