Cross-posted at The Next Hurrah
I was not very coherent yesterday in my discussion of the INR memo posted by the NY Sun. So at the risk of letting my obsessions get the better of me, I'd like to try again on one point. The Sun posted two versions of the INR memo, and a comparison of them with the SSCI report reveals that the INR memo was complicit in covering up how someone at State squelched the debunking of the Niger forgeries.
I base this on the following logic:
- The Sun attempted to reveal just one of the INR memos, thereby hiding the redaction of mentions of an INR staff member
- The INR staff member is almost certainly the Iraq nuclear analyst
- The Iraq nuclear analyst is the guy who debunked the Niger forgeries as soon as they reached State in October 2002 ... but who seemingly disappeared for three months thereafter
While the INR memos don't tell how the Iraq nuclear analyst's input was suppressed, they strongly support the contention that someone at State was trying to cover-up State's involvement with the Niger forgeries.
There are three files I'll be discussing here:
Taken together, the two versions of the memos and the declassification cover letters show four differences between the memos:
- Someone besides Carl Ford obviously initialed one memo
- The memos were declassified at different times (and both at least 6 months ago)
- The memos were declassified by different people
- The June 10 memo includes the following passage:
What follows is based on our paper and electronic files: we are confident that these records and the recollections of person involved at the margin are basically accurate but the two INR staff members who were most involved are not here (one has been reassigned to REDACTED other is on leave) to guide us through the files and emails.
While the July 7 rewrites that passage (in the electronic file--this is more than redaction) to read (I've bolded the differences in both passages):
What follows is based on our paper and electronic files: we are
confident that these records and the recollections of person involved
at the margin are basically accurate but one INR staff member who
was most involved is not here (he has been reassigned to REDACTED to guide us through the files and emails.
In other words, the July 7 removes all mention of a staff person who was central to the questions at hand, the dispute between WH and State over the Niger uranium intelligence. (Curiously, this detail is never included in accounts of Carl Ford printing out the memo and delivering it to Powell; did Ford remove the mention of the second staffer, or did someone else?)
Here is some background explanation on the first three bullets:
I'm guessing that Thomas Fingar, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of INR,
initialed the June 10 one, but that's a wild-arsed guess from reading
the chicken scratch. I base that solely on the fact that the other initial includes an obvious "C", whereas this one appears to start with something other than a "C" in the first initial. In his Bolton testimony, Fingar said that Carl Ford was having health problems and was frequently absent, so it would not be implausible that Fingar signed off on his superior's memo in his absence.
I say the memos were declassified at different times because the PDAS (Deputy Assistant Secretary of INR) listed in the declassification memo is different in each. Thomas Fingar, who approved the June 10 declassification, was PDAS from before the time the memo was written until July 2004 (Fingar went on to become the Assistant Secretary of INR and is now the Chair of the National Intelligence Council). William Wood, listed as the PDAS on the declassification memo for the July 7 document, became PDAS sometime after November 2004, but has since left INR. Additionally, Neil Silver left the position of Director of INR/SPM sometime year.
In other words, if these are in fact declassification memos, the June 10 memo was declassified some time between June 10, 2003 and July 2004 (not incidentally the development period of the SSCI report). Whereas the July 7 memo (the memo the Sun meant to give us) was declassified sometime between November 2004 and roughly September 2005. (I could be wrong about this last date, but I'm fairly certain when I was working on this September post, Silver had already been replaced by Douglas Spelman). These memos appear to have been declassified for months--the June 10 one at least 20 months and the July 7 one at least 6 months.
So why haven't we seen these documents? First, let me explain the last bullet, the removal of (I believe) a mention referencing the INR Iraq nuclear analyst.
The INR Staff Member on leave is almost certainly the Iraq nuclear analyst
One thing the Sun (incompetently) tried to do was publish the July 7, but not the June 10, INR memo. That is either because they wanted to hide the earlier declassification of the document. Or because they wanted to hide the involvement (or lack thereof) of the INR Iraq nuclear analyst. (Or both.)
I'm almost certain the INR Iraq nuclear analyst is the INR staff member redacted in the July 7 version of the memo. The following lists each paragraph of the non-redacted portions of the memo, with the State Department personnel it mentions (note that NP, Non-Proliferation, is a sub-section of then-Bolton's and now Joseph's department; it is not a part of INR).
Paragraph 1: Summary
Paragraph 2: Douglas Rohn
Paragraph 3: No State personnel listed
Paragraph 4: INR NIE dissent noted
Paragraph 5: NP mentioned wrt the forgeries, as well as the reference:
These documents ... were not adequately analyzed until much later and were judged to be fraudulent.
Paragraph 6: NP releases fact sheet, as well as this reference:
On January 12, 2003, INR "expressed concerns to the CIA that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries." The conclusion may, however, have been reached and communicated for the first time somewhat earlier: the record is not clear on this point.
Paragraph 7: The reference:
There is no indication, however, that anyone in INR met with Ambassador Wilson except at the February 19, 2002 meeting hosted by CIA, or discussed his trip and what he learned with anyone in the Department of at CIA.
That is, the only INR staff members mentioned, except for Douglas Rohn, are involved in the NIE dissent and the refutation of the forgeries with State.
Now let's look closer at who these unnamed people might be.
Paragraph 4 mentions the NIE and, by default, those INR staff members involved in the creation of the NIE. The SSCI report provides these details about INR personnel involved in the NIE:
At the NIE coordination meeting, the only analyst who voiced disagreement with the uranium section was an INR analyst.
[snip]
When someone, the NIO was not sure who, suggested that the uranium information be included as another sign of reconstitution, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up and said that he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text indicating their disagreement in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution.
[snip]
Because INR disagreed with much of the nuclear section of the NIE, it decided to convey its alternative views in text boxes, rather than object to every point throughout the NIE. INR prepared two separate boxes, one for the key judgments section and a two page box for the body of the nuclear section, which included a sentence which stated that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."
[snip]
Both the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs and the INR's senior WMD analyst told Committee staff that INR's dissent on the uranium reporting was inadvertently separated from the reconstitution section and included in the aluminum tubes box in the annex of the NIE. [my emphasis]
So the two INR staff members mentioned in the NIE passage are the Iraq nuclear analyst and the senior WMD analyst.
Paragraph 6 refers to mid-January communication that the Niger forgeries were BS. The SSCI report provides these details about a similar communication (though there is a discrepancy with the date).
On January 13, 2003, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst sent an e-mail to
several IC analysts outlining his reasoning why, "the uranium purchase agreement probably is a hoax." He indicated that one of the documents that purported to be an agreement for a joint military campaign, including both Iraq and Iran, was so ridiculous that it was "clearly a forgery." Because this document had the same alleged stamps for the Nigerien Embassy in Rome as the uranium documents, the analyst concluded "that the uranium purchase agreement probably is a forgery." When the CIA analyst received the e-mail, he realized that WINPAC did not have copies of the documents and requested copies from INR. CIA received copies of the foreign language documents on January 16, 2003. [my emphasis]
Unless the January 12 communication was entirely different from the email sent on January 13 arguing the same thing, the Iraq nuclear analyst is the INR staff member mentioned in Paragraph 6, as well.
Now look at the non-mention of an INR staff member in Paragraph 5.
These documents ... were not adequately analyzed until much later and were judged to be fraudulent.
Again from the SSCI report, we learn:
(U) Immediately after receiving the documents, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst e-mailed IC colleagues offering to provide the documents at a previously planned meeting of the Nuclear Interdiction Action Group (NIAG) the following day. The analyst, apparently already suspicious of the validity of the documents noted in his e-mail, "you'll note that it bears a funky Emb. of Niger stamp (to make it look official, I guess)."
(U) The INR Iraq nuclear analyst told Committee staff that the thing that stood out immediately about the documents was that a companion document - a document included with the Niger documents that did not relate to uranium - mentioned some type of military campaign against major world powers. The members of the alleged military campaign included both Iraq and Iran, and was, according to the documents, being orchestrated through the Nigerien Embassy in Rome, which all struck the analyst as "completely implausible." Because the stamp on this document matched the stamp on the uranium document, the analyst thought that all of the documents were likely suspect. The analyst was unaware at the time of any formatting problems with the documents or inconsistencies with the names or dates.
(U) On October 16, 2002, INR made copies of the documents available at the NIAG meeting for attendees, including representatives from the CIA, DIA, DOE and NSA. Because the analyst who offered to provide the documents was on leave, the office's senior analyst provided the documents. She cannot recall how she made the documents available, but analysts from several agencies, including the DIA, NSA and DOE, did pick up copies at that meeting. None of the four CIA representatives recall picking up the documents, however, during the CIA Inspector General's investigation of this issue, copies of the documents were found in the DO's CPD vault. It appears that a CPD representative did pick up the documents at the NIAG meeting, but after returning to the office, filed them without any further distribution. [my emphasis]
Not only do we learn the forgeries were immediately judged to be fraudulent (contrary to the claims of the INR memo), but we learn the Iraq nuclear analyst is the one who made that analysis.
When we compare the INR memo with the SSCI report, it becomes clear that the INR staff member "most involved" in the events described--even more so than Douglas Rohn, then the West African analyst--is the Iraq nuclear analyst. The only other possible candidates to be the redacted person are the "senior analyst" in the Iraq nuclear analyst's office or the "senior WMD analyst" referenced wrt the NIE. But the "senior analyst" is Beth Frisa, proliferation division chief. And the "senior WMD analyst" is either Neil Silver or Beth Frisa. In short, the only other candidates who could be this redacted staff member are people who signed off on the document, and therefore were almost certainly not on leave.
Also note the areas where mention of the Iraq nuclear analyst has been suppressed all relate to areas that remain vague or under dispute. The memo puts the date when the Niger forgeries were analyzed as a vague "much later." Then it admits:
The conclusion [that the Niger forgeries were forgeries] may, however, have been reached and communicated for the first time somewhat earlier; the record is not clear on this point.
The June 10 memo mentions the second INR staff member to explain some of the vagueness related to the content of the memo. We can clearly see how the absence of the Iraq nuclear analyst would prevent INR from solidly fixing the date when the Niger forgeries were debunked ... which we know (and Beth Frisa, who signed off on the memo, must have known) happened in October 2002.
Because the INR Iraq nuclear analyst was not involved in the production of the INR memo, it was possible to portray the debunking of the Niger forgeries as occurring three months later than that debunking actually happened.
(Interestingly, we could probably make a parallel argument about the absence of Douglas Rohn; had he been present, he probably could have clarified the what he meant by his references to Valerie Plame.)
So what do I think happened?
First let me rehearse the probably chronology traced above. In May, Libby asked Marc Grossman to find out more about the Joe Wilson trip (interesting that he make that request of someone at State, rather than someone at CIA). Carl Ford (or, perhaps, Thomas Fingar) asks Neil Silver to develop that memo. Silver relies on Douglas Rohn's notes (since Rohn has recently been reassigned to Pakistan). And, because the Iraq nuclear analyst is on leave, Silver can't fill in some of the critical details about the Niger forgeries.
Using the knowledge summarized in the INR memo, Marc Grossman briefs a group at the White House about its contents.
Then, a month later, when Wilson publishes his op-ed, Richard Armitage has Carl Ford recreate the memo for Colin Powell's consumption. Perhaps the INR analyst is no longer on leave. Perhaps he's still on leave but someone else wants to remove all mention of him. But for some reason, even this shred of evidence about the inaccuracy surrounding the Niger forgery is removed.
Sometime in the following several months--probably as part of the SSCI inquiry--the June 10 memo is declassified. (Though the CIA claimed in December 2003 that the INR memo was still classified.)
Then, sometime after the Presidential election, the second INR memo is declassified (perhaps this was a response to Jane Harman's request for both copies of the INR memo). But the two copies are not shown together--at least not intentionally.
Beyond this chronology, I can't yet offer much explanation for the shenanigans with this memo. But I will repeat an observation I made yesterday. Two of the five major things redacted in the declassification process (which had to have happened while Bolton was still at State) serve to hide Bolton's department's involvement in propagating the Niger claims, including accepting the Niger forgeries from SISMI.
This stinks. It stinks to high hell.