From
Swords Crossed:
Part 1 of 2.
Trevino wrote a review of Crashing The Gate, Markos and Jerome Armstrong's book on the Netroots and the Democratic Party. Trevino writes a lot of things that merit comment, but I want to focus on his comments on the prescriptions provided for the Democratic Party by CTG:
Among their targets are the "single-issue groups," as they term them: the activist organizations that push one cause above all else, and hence lose sight of the larger goal of Democratic victory. It's an interesting argument, and it has some merit inasmuch as it doesn't make sense -- to appropriate one of their examples -- for NARAL to endorse a pro-abortion Republican when the totality of Republican control will act against their cause.But the authors give short shrift to the causes as such: they have no time for the principled in a party they describe as "stand[ing] for nothing." American leftists may surely need to learn to work together -- but surely the prerequisite for constructive cooperation is not the abandonment of belief? Were they the students of GOP success they attempt to be, they'd know it's a thesis that has found sad currency in modern Republicanism. Thus erstwhile conservatives find themselves defending Medicare Part D, political speech restrictions, Nixonian secrecy paranoia, and Wilsonian foreign policy as the price of governance. Moulitsas and Armstrong think this is the price of victory: but when Republicans finally suffer a serious electoral reverse, it will be the cause of their defeat.
In my view, Trevino has completely misunderstood the thesis of CTG, just as many have misunderstood the thinking of
Ruy Texeira and John Halpin's piece The Politics of Definition". What CTG and T&H are talking about is a Democratic Party that is committed to its core values and also is a Big Tent -- the type of party required to be a majority party in the United States. They are arguing for a party that has defined its values while at the same time NOT requiring lockstep agreement on all the issues across the country. It will be a party where Ben Nelson will stress his fight for working Americans and contrast that with the Republican Party's neglect of the common man, but also a party where a Ned Lamont will battle with Joe Lieberman over the Iraq War and where Ted Kennedy will fight for civil rights. Much may divide Ben Nelson, Ned Lamont and Ted Kennedy, but their core values, values of the Democratic Party, pull them together. And each should stress those values in ways that make sense for each of them in their respective political situations. And in this way a national Democratic brand can be created that appeals in all sections of the country.
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Texeira and Halpin's piece is in four parts and long but should be read in its entirety. But its essence is:
The politics of definition is grounded on five postulates that we believe can serve as the basis for making sound decisions about how best to organize progressive campaigns and present a coherent identity to voters. We then provide an overview of core progressive values and beliefs that can serve as the organizing principles of long-term campaigns and then sketch out how a politics of definition approach would like in terms of economic, social, and national security policy.
The five postulates for the politics of definition -- the guideposts, questions, and "lines in the sand," so to speak, that need to be drawn out in order to craft better politics -- are as follows:
(1) The starting point for all political organizing and campaigns should be: "What are my core beliefs and principles and how do I best explain them to supporters and skeptics alike?"
(2) Every political battle, both proactive and defensive, should represent a basic statement of progressive character and present a clear, concise contrast with conservatives. Do not blur lines.
(3) All issue campaigns and agenda items are not equal. Progressives should focus their efforts on issues that can simultaneously strengthen the base and appeal to centrist voters. Progressives must be willing to make sacrifices and tradeoffs -- in terms of coalition building and budgetary concerns -- to achieve their most important agenda items.
(4) Escalate battles that expose the extremism of the right or splinter their coalition. [Follow-up: When confronted with the right's social, cultural, or national security agenda, the absolute worst response is to fail to combat these caricatures or to explain one's position directly to voters, regardless of the popularity of the position.]
(5) Every political action should highlight three essential progressive attributes: a clear stand on the side of those who lack power, wealth or influence; a deep commitment to the common good; and a strong belief in fairness and opportunity for all.
Some criticism of the Texeira and Halpin's ideas strike me as completely missing the point. Take for example
Matt Yglesias:
I think it's indicative of the sort of problems Democrats face that in part four of the Teixeira/Halpin epic on "The Politics of Definition" ideas about defining progressive national security policy come third on the list behind ideas about defining progressive economic policy and defining progressive culture/values policy. It's also tellingly problematic that of the five bullet points on foreign policy, one ("Transform existing global institutions to better control the downsides of globalization") is more-or-less just an extension of liberal economic policy and another ("Create the political will and leadership to finally address global warming") is an extension of liberal environmental policy.Again, there's nothing wrong with either of those ideas. But insofar as the public has doubts about Democrats as leaders of American's national security apparatus, we all know that those aren't the subjects the doubts are about.
There needs to be focus on questions like -- should we go to war with Iran (no)? Why not? Should we strike a grand bargain? Should we leave Iraq? And, most of all, people need to address these questions in the right order. Not "what should Democrats say about Iran?" but "given that supporting a war with Iran would be daft, how should Democrats say that?"
Yglesias looks at the issue from the sole perspective of 2006. But Texeira and Halpin are not writing a specific proposal for the 2006 election -- they have properly idenitfied one of the key long term problems of the Democratic Party, the ability to shape its image and brand has been hijacked by the Republican Party and Democrats have allowed Republicans to completely control the branding of their own party with no resistance from the Democratic Party.
Texeira and Halpin have identified the problem and, in my opinion, provided very good and workable proposals for attacking the problem. Full disclosure, much of what Texeira and Halpin talk about are ideas I have endorsed for 18 months. Those who know my work from daily kos will no doubt find some of these ideas familiar - The Politics of Contrast, Lincoln 1860, The Party of Dobson, Extremist Republicans. Those themes have been central to much of my writing on Democratic Party politics.
And yet, like Yglesias, I have also stated the, in the short term, the "Keep Us Safe"/Iraq issue has been the #1 issue. And I still believe that. But these themes are NOT mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are complementary. It is because the Democratic Party has allowed itself to be defined as weak and lacking in principle that it has the very political problem on national security issues that worries Yglesias.
Yglesias writes:
Consider this thought experiment in which nothing about the Kerry campaign's domestic message is changed: He does exactly as good (or, if you prefer, bad) a job of appealing to people's economic concerns and exactly as bad (or, if you prefer, good) a job of appealing to people's cultural concerns. But -- and it's a crucial but -- after listening to the two candidates talk national security, most people think that John Kerry would do a better job than George W. Bush at running the country's military and foreign affairs. What would happen? Well, Kerry would have won.
But what did Kerry do to establish his principles on national security? He made a fatal flaw that is what he did. "I voted for it before I voted against i." Texeira and Halpin demonstrate the data - the number one factor in Kerry's loss was he did not seem to believe in anything. And that hurt him especially on national security issues.
The prescriptions provided by Texeira and Halpin are not micro but macro. Too many critiques of their piece have completely misunderstood this. In part 2 I will discuss how Texeira and Halpin's ideas might be applied in the 2006 elections.