The Princeton study of Diebold vulnerability has already been diaried several times and is a
very important finding. One statistic in those stories and those diaries, however, continues to bother me. It's that 10% figure.
Those Diebold electronic voting machines that will be used by 10% of the electorate in November. To those of us who oppose all computerized voting devices and support only APAH (All Paper All Handcounts), and even just those of us who long for a transparent vote-counting process, 10% is shocking. It is horrifying. But 10% to your average American? Not so much. To the people who decide upon our voting systems, 10% = sour grapes. These people have jumped through their collective fat asses to comply with HAVA (HAHA!), so what (they will ask) do we want?
flip with me and let's discuss that
Are we just gripers and whiners? Will we never be satisfied? How about if Democrats win an election or two? They bet we'll shut the hell up
then! I mean, all you they-stole-the-election people are Democrats, right?
Please keep in mind that I don't believe all that crap. I'm just predicting a response.
Part of the problem is that the Diebold AccuVote-TS machine is a touch-screen machine. Justifiably, touch-screen machines are getting a bad name. How bad a name? If someone predicted that touch-screen voting devices would no longer be used as soon as 2008, I would find that a pretty believable prediction.
But what would they be replaced by?
The touch-screen voting devices will be replaced by optical scan devices. If that happens, I refuse to even call it a step in the right direction. The only difference between the touch-screen and optical scan devices in current use is their means of input. BOTH have their so-called, highly-touted paper trail downstream of the programmed functions of the machines. The optical scan devices have the same programmed vulnerabilities and the same output path as the touch-screen machines. They look different. The touch-screen machines will remind most people of ATM machines while the latest crop of optical scan machines look more like... well... shredders.
"But wait!", you say, "The optical scan machines DO have a perfect paper record... the ballots themselves!"
Well that's right. Except in Florida and some other places, it's illegal to count those. In most other places, it's not illegal to count them, it's just damned near impossible. You can bet that automatic recounts, those required by law in elections where the race is close, involve just running the paper ballots back through the same machines that counted them the first time. Call your local election board and find out what it would take to get a hand count of those ballots. I'm confident you'll learn that hand counts will require a court order. Then, if you somehow get that court order, the candidate who won will get an immediate injunction and it will go to a higher court. On and on. The very least likely result will be the hand-counting of paper ballots. They can't do it. Not once. If they allow it, with reasonable ballot design, everyone will discover how easy and fast and cheap hand-counting of paper ballots really is. They just got all this federal HAVA money and spent it on computerized election devices. They're not going to let anyone make them look like fools. Even those election officials who are Democrats will be equal-opportunity assholes about this. Non-partisan, election-running assholes.
So where does that leave us?
We. Are. Up. Shit. Creek.
That's where it leaves us.
We don't have to stay there. We may be up Shit Creek, but we do have a paddle and it's a great big bastard. We're right. We're right about this and we can prove it. It takes only ONE PERSON PER ELECTION AREA to win on this! One person can educate the electorate about this scam. How? You make election officials do the educating for you. You submit a list of questions to the top person in your area, your city, your county who is the election supervisor (might have a different title). In the cover letter accompanying those questions, you state that they have ONE WEEK... 5 WORK DAYS... to provide written answers. You also state, in writing, that their answers or lack thereof will be published in your local newspaper. Contact your local newspaper ahead of time. They might want to do a story on this. At the very least, you should be able to find a local paper that will allow you to do this via a Letter To The Editor. Local radio stations might also be a good idea. If they can't see what a scoop this is now, they'll realize it after this comeing train-wreck of an election, so leave them your contact information. Apart from that, you can print fliers. You're simply publishing THEIR answers or non-answers, so you're legally safe. I would love for some election officials to say that this stuff is secret. Some will! BIG GRIN! I would love for some election officials to say that they don't have access to this information. Some will say that. BIG GRIN! I would love for some election officials to say that a week isn't enough time to gather this information. Many will! HUGE FUCKING GRIN!
You mean, you're the Supervisor of Elections and you can't answer simple questions about your chosen elections machinery? You don't have anyone on staff who can? What kind of Micky Mouse operation are you running here?
It is VERY important that you do this BEFORE the November 7th elections. Those elections are going to be a mess (there are going to be Republicans demanding hand-counts) and you'll seem like a genius, instead of jumping upon the obvious on November 8th. There's no reason you cannot submit these questions within the next week or so.
Your first step is to find out what specific machines or variety of machines are used in your area -- the specific makes and models. I'm not going to provide links with information on each unit. If you're capable of any of this, you're capable of using Google and finding the information you need to make your questions informed (therefore, powerful and scary). I've come up with some pretty good questions but I would like some help with the ones I've missed.
Note: my area uses ES&S M100 optical scan machines so that's what I use in my questions. Just copy, paste and search-and-replace with your own local machines. The big three are ES&S, Diebold and Sequoia. I live in Evanston, Wyoming.
Voting devices must be ballot-configured for each location. Each location has different candidates and propositions. Historically, most problems with the M100s are because they were inproperly configured, not because they were intentionally hacked.
1. Are our ES&S M100s configured locally or are they configured at ES&S in Omaha Nebraska?
2. If they are not configured locally, how do you verify the configuration of each machine?
ES&S M100s are programmed devices. As such, their systems undergo sometimes-frequent software or firmware upgrades and changes.
1. When was the last time our M100s had their software or firmware upgraded or changed in any way?
2. Were the effects of these changes tested locally?
3. Have any of these changes or upgrades occured since, or at the same time as the ballot configurations?
4. Have any of these changes occured since the deadlines for local, state and national candidate declarations?
5. Has ES&S provided you with a change history for each individual machine, including configurations?
6. Will you agree to open those histories so local citizens and press can examine them?
While voting devices might require a timer or a timestamp fuction, they do not require a time-date function.
1. Does the internal programming of our M100s contain a time-date function or functions? If so, what is (are) the purpose(s) of those functions?
Computerized elections devices, including the ES&S M100 contain programmed functions and accompanying source code.
1. Will ES&S allow you or your elected or appointed agents to inspect and verify that source code?
Security with and access to elections devices has become an important issue.
1. In an article in the Unita County Herald, this Summer, you indicated that Wyoming had decided to use sub-voting-age persons as election helpers because they are less likely to be "intimidated by electronic devices". What access do these sub-adults have to the M100 election devices?
2. Will sub-voting-age persons have access to the locked (lock and key) portions of the M100 devices?
3. How many people, adult or sub-adult, have full or elevated access to areas and functions of the M100 voting devices?
MORE QUESTIONS FROM YOUR COMMENTS WILL APPEAR IN UPDATES TO THIS DIARY
I'm certain our brilliant Kossacks can come up with some more questions. So, in Summary, the Diebold AccuVote-TS machines are just the tip of the iceberg with regard to potential computerized-device-related election problems. The power of individual citizens submitting questions to local election officials is AWESOME and is, in fact, our best hope. Concentrating upon hacking of the devices completely ignores the most common cause of problems with modern elections. Any upgrades or improvements to computerized elections devices WILL BE circumvented by malicious methods and by error and malfunction. Hand counting ballots that were DESIGNED TO BE HAND-COUNTED is THE most valid, accurate method of counting votes. It is cheap. It is simple. It is fast. We simply do not need computerized elections devices, nor their endless modification and complexity.