A few days ago, I wrote that in spite of much media attention, the North Korean nuclear test is more notable as a
a failure than as a vast threat to humanity.
A recent article in Chemical Engineering News covers much of the ground I discussed, but elaborates on some of my discussion as well as providing some information I didn't provide. It also features the almost amusing commentary by Richard Garwin, who worked on the development of the American hydrogen bomb.
As the level of hysteria increases - and let's be sure that mostly it
is exactly that, hysteria - it is worth referencing this article.
The test registered around 4.0 on the Richter scale, indicating an explosive yield of between about 500 and 1,000 tons of TNT.
Richard L. Garwin, a key designer of the hydrogen bomb in the 1950s and a member of science- and defense-related government boards, explains that other nations' initial tests have been in the range of 5,000-15,000 tons for a relatively simple starter warhead.
He describes the North Korean test as a fizzle and a "waste of plutonium." He speculates the low yield was due to either poor design or preignition-the blowing apart of the device before it had fully functioned...
...Peter Zimmerman, an arms control expert now at King's College London, comments that "the North Koreans may have just taken the gold medal for the world's worst first nuclear test."
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty calls for establishment of a worldwide monitoring system composed of 321 seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound sensors around the world. By the end of last year, 219 had been installed and another 37 were under construction...
An explanation of what "pre-ignition" means - and why its cause is a matter of economics as well as physics - can be found in my earlier diary entry.
It is important though, to note that no nuclear weapons is morally acceptable, either a fizzling one or well designed, well maintained and well tested weapon. All nuclear weapons are a "waste of plutonium." It is absolutely critical (pun intended) that the world's inventory of plutonium be brought under international, well regulated, and managed control. It is important that any weapons grade plutonium that exists be isotopically denatured by running it continuously through nuclear reactors. Although we can not "uninvent" nuclear weapons, we can do quite a bit to make them more difficult to manufacture and far less reliable. The North Korean situation points exactly to how this might work.
Although the Korean nuclear test is yet another demonstration of Bush administration incompetence we need to recognize that of all George W. Bush's vast failures, the Korean nuclear test probably doesn't register in the top ten. To my mind the number one failure, before Iraq, before Afghanistan, before Katrina, before the debt, etc, was his deliberate inaction on climate change.
I am not going to hide my agenda:
Make no mistake, the physics, chemistry, politics and perception of plutonium is very much involved in what little chance we have to address climate change, if we do in fact have any chance. On a risk managed basis, the threat of global climate change is far greater than any threat we might face from the unfortunate dictator in North Korea. It is important to make these distinctions. The time we have to act on climate change is very narrow, and we really shouldn't elevate this matter more than it deserves.