Howard Dean's 50-State Strategy: Measuring Dean's Gamble in 2006 -- and in 2016
When former Vermont governor Howard Dean took the helm of the Democratic National Committee, he made a strategic decision to pump resources into all 50 states, in an attempt to build the Democratic Party in places where it hasn't been competitive in presidential races and most federal races for years. His so-called "50-state strategy" has been the source of much controversy, leading to Dean's public battles with Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chair Rahm Emmanuel, who favors focused spending on targeted races. Now James Carville has entered the fray, calling for Dean's ouster as DNC Chair.
Who was right? By most measures it looks like Dean.
[Read analysis below]
Who was right? There are two ways to try to measure the answer: what happened in 2006 and what happens in 2016. The true measurement of Dean's decision will not be measurable for at least a decade, and that only if the Democrats continue to invest in his strategy for several election cycles. The Democratic Party's electoral problems in congressional races in recent years have been grounded in a political geography that they must transform if they are to ever have a relatively secure majority.
In today's electoral politics, when the national partisan division is evenly divided, Republicans win more than 50% support in 30 out of 50 states, which translates into Republicans winning 60 of 100 U.S. Senate seats if every voter voted for the same party in races for president and Senate. Republicans also would win a majority of the vote in 41 more of today's House seats than Democrats in such an election. But 2006 was not a 50-50 year. Democrats took approximately 54% of the national U.S. House vote and were therefore able to overcome their geographic disadvantage to roll up a 30-seat gain, along with a new majority. But, if Democrats cannot either break out of a 50-50 political reality or reshape where they win support, their majorities will always be dependent on their candidates winning in Republican-leaning areas.
Looking through the lens of short-term results, the tidal wave in Democratic votes this year may lead some to believe Dean was wise or lucky for putting resources toward House seats that would seemingly have been impossible to win a year ago. Alternatively, some might suggest he will be dismissed as a fool for losing a series of tantalizingly narrow defeats, such as in NM-1, PA-6, and others around the country. Various perspectives on how to measure the value of Dean's 50-state strategy are discussed herein:
"Dean is a Fool": The way you build long-term is to succeed short-term
·Lessons from a shrinking number of competitive states in presidential races: In 1976, 24 states were presidential battlegrounds. By 2004, that number had more than half, to a mere 13 states. What's more, in 2004, 48 of 51 presidential contests went to the same party as in 2000 - underscoring how difficult it is to overcome rigid state partisanship in presidential elections even when your side has more than half a billion dollars to spend. So why sink resources in 50 states, rather than just 13?
·With U.S. House districts tilted against Democrats, you must win when you can and hold on: The rigid partisanship of states in presidential races is mirrored almost across the board in U.S. House races, and Republicans heading into the 2006 cycle had an advantage of 41 more seats in an evenly divided year - with the median district being one that a Republican in an open seat would be favored to win by 4.5%. Of the 23 seats that were won by 10% or less in 2004, they were concentrated in 17 states. Of those 17 states, only 10 represented pick-up opportunities for the Democrats. So why sink resources in 50 states, rather than the 10 where history indicates actual pick-up opportunities?
"Dean is a Genius": Lift the Party Up, State by State
·It would take an unprecedented national shift for Democrats to win many House seats in 2006. Guess what? It happened: The tilted state partisanship of most of America's congressional districts means that no matter how you draw the lines, a majority of voters in each district will prefer one party to the other. In a nationally even year between the parties in congressional elections, therefore, Republicans typically will win an open seat race in a district that has a 55%-45% tilt with, surprise, 55% of the vote. And if the national climate shifts to a 54% year for the Democrats - the Republicans will still likely carry that district, albeit now by only 51% to 49%. Faced with the fact that most districts tilt toward Republicans and Republicans start out with more incumbents, Democrats needed to do enormously well nationally to shift even just the 15 seats necessary to win a majority of the House. But this was just the year that Democrats needed to win, as they garnered 54% of the national congressional vote that they needed to take back the House with room to spare. The 50-state strategy was luckily timed to take advantage of this once-in-a-generation opportunity and create opportunities in races that few dreamed would be competitive this time last year - which is why Republicans were forced to reallocate their resources to defend House districts in Republican strongholds like Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, in Wyoming. Indeed, Republicans suffered massive losses in red districts within red states with incumbents running strong campaigns.
·In elections witnessing unprecedented national shifts, parties pick up large numbers of seats down-ticket: In a national tidal wave by one party in an election cycle, even though a marginal number of U.S. House seats might change hands, the dominant party can pick up an enormous amount of state legislative seats down-ticket. This year, there were 6,119 state legislative contests in 46 states and control of twenty state legislative chambers was hanging by five or less seats. What indicates the utility of Dean's 50-state strategy here is that of these ten potential chamber pick-ups, five of them are in states that Bush won in 2004: Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, and Tennessee. Indeed, Democrats gained 268 state house seats and 52 state senate seats, leading to regaining control of nine chambers. Remarkably, Democrats gained seats in 22 states that Bush carried in 2004. If these Democrats can stay in office, they can help shape practical policy matters like redrawing district lines in the next scheduled redistricting in 2011.
·Ticket-splitting means rock-solid presidential red-states don't equal rock-solid red-voting in all statewide races: The Democrats picked-up eight Governors' mansions, and four of them are in states that Bush carried in 2004: Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio and Nevada. One by-product of winning high-profile states races is that it establishes these Democrats as candidates who later have a better chance of winning federal elections in Republican-leaning areas.
Conclusion
If this year's partisan shift turns out to be a mere blip, rather than a realignment, the Democrats will need to turn to a 50-state strategy time and again to win elections consistently and to shake up its current dispersion of partisans to cover more areas within states.
This demand is due mainly in part to the natural geographic advantage Republicans currently hold in being the party that is more geographically dispersed across America. What this means is that barring an enduring national partisan shift toward Democrats, Democrats will almost never be secure in the red states and red districts where they see opportunities in this year. Without cultivating a larger base and turnout operation over time in the 50 states and in rural and exurban areas where they now are in the minority, they will not be able to sustain the greater than 55%-45 edge they will need to secure lasting majorities in American congressional elections.