Some Much Needed Background on Bankruptcy Reform
Fri Jun 02, 2006 at 05:09:30 AM PDT
There have been a number of references to "the bankruptcy bill" here at DKos lately, with respect to both its substance and the issue of who voted for or against it.
Unfortunately, there's a lot of bad information out there. To be sure, this isn't the fault, and certainly not the intention, of any diarist or commenter. Rather, it's a reflection of the fact that outside the bankruptcy community not much is known about this new law or its history.
For example, few realize that bankruptcy reform was born in 1997, not 2005 when the new law was passed. Congress tried, and failed, to enact this so-called reform measure in four straight Congresses before it finally became law. Fewer still know that in its first go-around, the Senate passed the bill then pending by an astonishing 97 to 1 vote, with the late Paul Wellstone casting the sole vote in opposition.
So, in the spirit of aiding and abetting an informed citizenry, I offer below some essential facts about bankruptcy reform. If nothing else, you might want to put this on your hotlist for future reference.
Before I begin, let me say that I'm assuming a certain degree of familiarity with
Thomas in this diary. If you need a primer on Thomas,
here's a link with some helpful information. Also note that I'm only dealing with the procedural history of the bill, not its substance. If anyone's interested, I can create a diary on that, too.
The 105th Congress (1997-1998)
The first version of the bill that would become law in 2005 was H.R. 2500, the Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act, which was introduced on September 18, 1997. That date is important because around that time, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission released a report with recommendations that generally favored liberalizing some of the bankruptcy laws in favor of debtors (the people who file).
Although H.R. 2500 got the ball rolling, it wasn't the bill that mattered in the 105th Congress. H.R. 3150 was. It was H.R. 3150 that laid the foundation for what would eventually be enacted into law. The Senate voted to pass this bill by a 97-1 margin, with Sen. Wellstone voting against it and Senators Glenn and Warner not voting. (Record vote no. 284, 105th Congress, 2d session. Sorry, I've never been able to link successfully to these roll calls on the Senate side.)
H.R. 3150 required a conference, but after the conference report (105-794) was released, only the House managed to pass it. (If the link doesn't work, it's roll call no. 506, 105th Congress, 2d session.) The vote was 300 to 125, with nine not voting. It should go without saying that no republican registered a "nay" vote. Some notables in that column include Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), former presidential hopeful Dennis Kucinich and current House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi. Rep. Nadler also voted against the bill and would become one its most strident opponents.
Because the conference report on H.R. 3150 was never voted on in the Senate, the bill died when the 105th Congress concluded.
The 106th Congress (1999-2000)
In early 1999, bills were introduced in both the House and the Senate that were identical to the H.R. 3150 conference report (H.R. 833 in the House and S. 625 in the Senate). After introduction of these bills, however, things get really complicated and the 106th Congress is far and away the hardest part of the bankruptcy bill's history to keep track of because of the myriad bills and amendments.
Suffice it to say that the 106th Congress is where the bankruptcy bill really took shape and became close to the measure that was enacted into law in 2005. It was also in the 106th that a select group of Senators realized either 1) they made a political blunder, or 2) they weren't well informed about this bill in the prior Congress, because Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Feingold and a handful of others switched their votes and would eventually become vocal opponents of the bill.
The House passed H.R. 833 and the Senate eventually approved of it as well (record vote no. 5, 106th Congress, 2d session). Notable in the "aye" column is former presidential hopeful and candidate for vice president, John Edwards.
Again, the House and Senate had points of disagreement and so the bill went to conference. From there, some pretty weird procedural maneuvering went on and the bill eventually became H.R. 2415. This bill, which was essentially the conference report on H.R. 333, eventually passed the House on October 12, 2000 by a voice vote and the Senate by a vote of 70 to 28 (record vote no. 297, 106th Congress, 2d session). Among the Senators voting against the measure were Sen. Reid (D.-NV) John Edwards (D-NC) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was serving his last term as a Senator. It's also noteworthy that the 106th Congress saw the highest number of recorded votes against the bankruptcy measure in its history.
President Clinton pocket vetoed H.R. 2415 in late 2000.
The 107th Congress (2001-2002)
As in the 106th Congress, bills were introduced in both the House and Senate that reflected what was in the failed H.R. 2415 from the previous Congress. Not many amendments were made (and those that were made were of a technical nature of interest mainly in the bankruptcy community). H.R. 333 became the main bill, which the House passed in early 2001 by a vote of 306 to 108, with 18 not voting (roll call no. 25, 107th Congress, 1st session). The Senate passed H.R. 833 in July 2001 by an 82 to 16 margin (record vote no. 236, 107th Congress, 1st session). Senators Reid and Edwards switched to the "yea" column on this vote and, in her first recorded vote on the bankruptcy bill, Sen. Clinton (D-NY) voted for it. One republican voted against the bill, Sen. Hutchinson (R-TX); it's widely believed that her opposition was to the cap on the homestead exemption.
Because of differences between the House and Senate versions, a conference was necessary. The conference committee was set to meet on September 12, 2001, but for obvious reasons that meeting was cancelled. Indeed, in light of the September 11 attacks and its effect on the economy, along with the recession that had set in after Bush became president and the Enron debacle, many thought bankruptcy reform had, at long last, died. But the Congress was not so easily deterred. In the summer of 2002, the conference report on H.R 333, 107-617, was released.
What killed the bill in the 107th was, of all things, abortion. Sen. Schumer had successfully added an amendment that would make debts related to clinic violence nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The amendment was the smartest political move made in the bankruptcy bills' history because it created a conflict in the republicans' service to two masters: the financial services industry and the fundamentalist base. In the closing hours of the 107th Congress, the republicans appeased both bases. Through some procedural maneuvers, House republicans killed H.R. 833 and, thus, the Schumer amendment, but in the wee hours when no one was looking, they introduced H.R. 5745, which was H.R. 333 sans the Schumer amendment, inserted the text of H.R. 5745 as an amendment to H.R. 333, and then, at 2:02 a.m., passed the latter (roll call no. 484, 107th Congress, 2d session).
The 108th Congress (2003-2004)
Not much happened in the 108th Congress. The House introduced and passed H.R. 975 (roll call no. 74, 108th Congress, 1st session), by what had become the normal margin, 315 to 113. The Senate never considered the measure.
The 109th Congress (2005-2006)
This is the part everyone knows. The Senate introduced S. 256 early in the 109th Congress. A few amendments were made by the handful of Senators that opposed the bill from the 106th Congress on. Sen. Schumer tried to resurrect his infamous abortion amendment, but it was defeated. S. 256 passed the Senate with a vote of 74 to 25, with Sen. Clinton not voting (record vote no. 44, 109th Congress, 1st session). The House passed S. 256 by a 302 to 126 margin (roll call no. 108, 109th Congress, 1st session).
And that's it. As I said at the outset of this diary, I might do a diary on the substance and some of the stranger political moves that took place, depending on the response to this one. But at all event, I hope this diary is worth the space it's taking up.
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