CSPAN - Thomas Barnett and a Blueprint for Action

I sat transfixed as Thomas Barnett did his amazing PowerPoint show on CSPAN last night on his 2006 book "A Blueprint for Action".  His analysis is extremely critical of the Bush Administration for its blundering, ham-fisted handling of Iraq.  Not, that Barnett disagrees that something needs to be done with the Middle East.  It is that his analytical brief runs to six pages, whereas Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld cannot put six words together about their rationale (`global war on terror' is only four).

I particularly enjoyed his notion that the current crisis is being run by Ford Administration retreads.

Quoting Alex Roslin on Amazon.com:

He advocates "regime change" in North Korea and Venezuela. And his solutions for the problems of the Third World are straight out of a banker's mouth: privatization, deregulation, globalization. But Blueprint for Action is an important account of the current thinking and debates at the highest levels of the Pentagon.

Nevertheless, his six stage vision for dealing with failed states is compelling.  One can either do something, or watch as the Sunnis, Shias and Persians use one excuse after another to beat each other up in blood feuds, dictators starve their people like Kim Jong Il is doing, and "countries" with too little government offer safe haven for terrorists.

Barnett, however, is not of the neocon / Rumsfeld ilk where "we will be welcomed as heroes". Whether you agree or disagree with his analysis and prescription, it remains a well documented and well thought out vision of what might be done. As such, it is very useful in moving the dialog forward concerning the 21st Century.

Two quotes from the book:

"al Qaeda, far from enjoying a winning streak, has instead sustained its movement largely by accepting defeat time and time again and shifting its center of gravity to some new locale . . . But the larger point is this: al Qaeda and the Salafi jihadist movement have won no battles over the years. Instead, they have lived as parasites within ongoing civil wars or easily corrupted failed states. Their history has been one long series of evacuations under duress. Like cockroaches in an apartment building, they are forced to flee to the next unit over every time the exterminator steps in to spray the current nesting place."

(Page 119)

People don't want their future handed to them on a silver platter; they want to build it on their own. What they need from you, the futurist, is just enough information - just enough vision - to give them the confidence to start hammering some stakes into the ground. They want to get rolling, because in the end, they're not interested in following you. They just want you to point the direction and then get out of the way."

(Page 204)

I find some of his thoughts, such as this one, spot on.

In other ways, he glosses over

His book outlines the things already in place to accomplish his vision, and what needs to be created. See Barnett's Glossary

Barnett's six steps to regime change for failed states is to get them networked and connected to globalization:

1. United Nations Security Counsel to indict failed states. (In Place)

2. G-20 Core nations - Arrive at Consensus to carry out UNSC mandate. (Needed)

3. United States Leviathan to take control of failed states. (In Place)

4. International Infrastructure Rebuilding kit. Can be assembled from rule sets already in place. (Needed). Barnett quipped, people ask me "why can't you fix Iraq"? Then along came Katrina and New Orleans, and then they said, "D'oh"!

5. System Administrators - SysAdmin force likewise provides civil security with its police component, as well as civilian personnel with expertise in rebuilding networks, infrastructure, and social and political institutions. (Needed)

6. International Criminal Court to prosecute the bad guys. (In Place)

For an excellent review of the book see Chet Richards from Defense and the National Interest.

From an interview in 2005 with Harry Kreisler at Institute of International Studies at UC Berkeley., here is the short version:

It all started with a simple mapping of U.S. military crisis responses since the end of the Cold War. Once you mapped it on the world, you noticed that there were geographic concentrations. Being a kind of simplistic guy, and maybe it was my soft-scientist, political science background, I said, "What if I just drew a line around 95 percent of them? What have I go for a shape, first, and what does that shape tell me? What are the unifying characteristics of these regions?"

What you end up drawing is a shape that stretches from the Caribbean rim, the Andean portion of South America, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucuses, Central Asia, the Middle East, and much of Southeast Asia. book coverThe argument that I came to was one of those things where you have to make a leap of logic if you're going to start the conversation -- if you wait for the perfect answer you're never going to get it, so you throw out an overarching concept and let the data come to you. Let people say, "You know what? You're right, and I've got this [fact] that proves that, or I've got this database that backs that up."

What I threw out on the table was the notion that these regions collectively are the least connected to the global economy, that what we were looking at was the limits of the spread of globalization. That's the shape we were looking at. If you bundled up the almost 150 crisis responses, including some wars that we fought since the end of the Cold War, that was the organizing principle. It's where globalization hadn't extended itself, where the connectivity of the global economy hadn't generated stability, and development, and growth, and peace, and clear rule sets, and democracies. This is where the disconnected people are, and on that basis -- no surprise -- that's where the terrorists come from. That's where the vision starts.

Further Barnett comments:

What I think we've learned in terms of why we haven't seen a great power rise up since the end of the Cold War is that in effect they've outsourced the function to us. They've made us the leviathan -- "they," the rest of the world -- by buying our debt, which is driven to a certain extent but not nearly enough by the defense budget. There's a lot of personal and private spendthriftiness in that, as well, in terms of the way we've racked up a lot of private sector debt. But there is a natural transaction there. They are concentrating in the rest of the world, especially in developing Asia, on economics, and they're allowing us to be the big security player in the system. So, they're buying our debt and paying for that provision of security.

Now, the discipline they offer to us is twofold. One, they can discipline us in terms of our spendful ways by forcing the decline of our dollar over time, by creating other reserve currencies like the Euro, and ultimately we're going to see one based in Asia on convertible yuan and yen in Japan. It's natural, it's got to happen.

So, they'll discipline us economically, but even more important, they'll discipline us militarily and politically, because they can make clear to us in many ways that if they don't see a future worth creating in the employment of our military power abroad, if we don't contextualize it sufficiently within some larger vision of a better world, and bring them along in the process, and make clear what our goals are, and our rule sets, and bring them into the enunciation of the rule sets, and that entire process, then they can stop buying our debt, and on that basis make it economically difficult for us to maintain that force and field it.

I think that's a great thing. That's what keeps us from going over the edge and becoming what a lot of overwrought and slightly hyperbolic foreign policy experts have dubbed the American Empire, which I think is nonsense. Globalization comes with rules, not a ruler.

A powerful presentation. But one I am not buying. It seemed too optimistic.

•  In watching it last night,

  he was very persuasive on the point of the new armed forces were returning in funstionality to the beginning of the 20th century configuration.  So much for a modern army - Rumsfeld could not have been pleased.  Still thinking about what he said and deciding which pieces fit where in my worldview.

  Amusement came from watching him literally speed around the stage, energetically smack the presentation to make enthusiastic points and I thought was that is what 5 Red Bulls too many looks like on C-SPAN.  

  by Pithy Cherub on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 06:12:05 PM PDT

  •  yes - somewhat confusing but

    I think he meant a transformed Marine Corp would be the basis of his war-fighting "Leviathan" force while a transformed Army would be the foundation of his post-conflict "sysadmin" force as in the earlier 20th century; his model is postwar Germany & Japan.   Also of note, he referred to the "green" services (Army & Marine Corp) getting it - his vision- unlike the "blue" services (Navy & Air Force).

    Remember when he lauded Rummy's war plan (Leviathan function) but was very critical regarding lack of a postwar peace plan (sysadmin function)?

    Lastly he praised those working for progress toward a high-speed & modular military for the war phase and ridiculed those wanting more Star Wars and big-ticket systems to fight a Core power - China.

    by longshot on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 08:09:09 PM PDT

    •  Big Ticket

      His Berkeley interview was very critical of big ticket items. Typically snuck in as first year expenditures for R&D without the ten fold per year increase in the out years.  Some systems survive 50 years or more (eg. B-52, but it has proven itself, so it can't be criticised too much), with concommitant expenditures for resupply and maintenance.

      by drdave on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 08:36:08 PM PDT

•  I've seen Barnett give his Powerpoint

  presentation before.  It's persuasive, interesting stuff, and this is coming from more of a national-politics geek than a foreign policy geek.  Reccommended.

  by The Strategist on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 07:04:57 PM PDT

•  I saw this too

  and was mezmerized. I encourage everyone to watch it or read his books. But I still came away with the feeling he brought up more problems that concrete solutions. I'd like to see him do a "where to go from here"

  Anyone feel this way? Or did I miss some of his points?

  by We Shall Overcome on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 07:16:38 PM PDT

•  Tip Jar

  I think all the commentators have the same impression I do. Very geeky. Well reasoned. Energetic (yuppers, lots of red bull).

  If we want to do reclamation of failed states, he has identified the missing pieces.

  My position comes down between Barnett and Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall in A Force More Powerful. Ackerman and DuVall argue that not military intervention in the 20th Century was successful (with some 250 documented incursions) in long term regime change. The successful regime changes wer all internally driven. See Serbia and Milosovic, Georgia, etc.

  by drdave on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 08:31:44 PM PDT

•  I don't see how he can still support W's

  2003 move on Iraq:

  Even accepting his belief that the non-integrating / disconnected "Gap" states like Iraq MUST be forcefully toppled and transformed into good "Core" members, to do so in 2003 without 3 of the 6 necessary elements virtually assured failure.  So why does he still support the 2003 invasion ?

  And I was disgusted with his seemingly flippant acceptance of the killing due to the civil strife.  I think he said it was necessary for the Shia, Sunni & Kurd factions to fight it out and sort it out themselves to get to an inevitable 3 state resolution.

  I hope I misunderstood the guy as I saw his first presentation on C-Span and bought the book.  His strategic analyses and prescriptions are realistic, principled and deserve wider discussion.

  by longshot on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 09:03:57 PM PDT

  •  W as Selfish Child

    I heard his remarks as "I think you have to hit the Middle East with a hammer to break things up" but he was quite clear that the "Retreads" did not do the Leviathan thing correctly (not enough boots) and did not do the sysadmin at all.

    That the neocons wanted to do the globalization thing (see the Harpers article) is clear. The neocons wanted the profits, but were Selfish Children: no hard lifting or sacrifice involved.

    by drdave on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 09:24:29 PM PDT

•  Watched it too

  While I did not agree with every point, it was still an interesting and thought provoking presentation. I was somewhat surprised there were not more questions from the audience.

  by Ckntfld on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 09:29:59 PM PDT

•  Barnett

  I've followed Barnett since the first CSPAN presentation on the first book.  He's very theatrical and certainly sure of himself.  He's also too glib by half.

  He styles himself a "grand strategist" and certainly paints the big picture.  It's in the details where he falls down, badly, and there are a few things I believe he ignores completely.

  Watching his presentation last night, I saw that he was pudgier than he was a couple of years ago and almost frantic in his presentation, stalking the stage the way he did.  He makes a good point about the youth boom demographic and terrorism saying that this phase of terrorism is a function of available (expendable) youth and will fade as those youths age over the next two decades.  He notes the importance of India and China in the near future but didn't mention the other demographic bubble that will come to bear shortly in those countries, namely the disastrous imbalance between males and females.  Both China and India have about 150 male children to every 100 female children.  There's going to be a LOT of frustration coming down the pike just as the youth bubble ages into temperance.  I'd like to see somebody ask Barnett about that.

  The other big hole in his presentation is climate change.  Not one word I heard about the way Mama Gaia is kicking our asses and will continue to kick our asses in unexpected and unavoidable ways over the next century or so.  Personally, I believe that we are already probably past the point of no return on climate change but even experts like James Hanson say we have only a decade to make the necessary changes (and that seems to be based upon a significantly higher ppm CO2 atmosphere by 2100 which will be quite a different world from the one we have now).  Katrina proves his point about the lack of a sysadmin force but it seemingly hasn't opened his eyes to the ecological implications of our industrial economy.  Somebody needs to ask him about that too.

  In general, I prefer John Robb of Global Guerrillas to Thomas Barnett.  Barnett is too sure of himself, too arrogant, too "smart."  I don't think he's particularly wise or open to the possibility of his own failure.  This is a characteristic I've observed among our military and certainly our punditry has it in spades.   Smart is not wise and we have a lot of smart, smart people who make really dumb decisions.  William Kristol is very smart and just about as wise as a slab of concrete.

  Barnett thinks he has the answers.  I believe it is much wiser to have the questions.  

  Lastly, I don't believe he has combat experience.  I wonder how much direct contact he's had with death and injury.  His seemingly cavalier attitude toward others dying and suffering does not sit well with me.  He strikes me as being too quick to write off whole populations as sacrifices to history or the greater good.

  PS:  Barnett has a blog and, at least a few years ago, answered questions from his readers.  I exchanged a few emails with him around that time.  He is open to being questioned but I doubt the true flexibility of his mind.

  by gmoke on Sat Aug 19, 2006 at 10:51:07 PM PDT

  •  Glib and Smart

    Thanks for the commentary. Well reasoned and inciteful, and quite in agreement with my, several days removed, ongoing assessment.

    by drdave on Sun Aug 20, 2006 at 01:08:40 AM PDT

    •  Agreement

      Since we agree, we must be right!

      by gmoke on Sun Aug 20, 2006 at 02:44:04 PM PDT

  •  good post

    Sean Meade (Tom's webhelp) posted that Tom has been "kos'ed" on the blog, however the initial rebuttals are focused on the Diary not your Post, which I personally (having seen Tom's brief + read both books  + read his blog regularly) think brings up FAR greater criticisms and unanswered questions THEREFOR I am cross posting this to his Blog in the hope he'll either jump over here, or answer over there.

    (I like instigating these little skirmishes)

    Knowing Barnett , I can already give you the answer for the Global Warming question: "When it gets bad enough the world will make a 'ruleset reset'" He even vaguely points to this in BFA in terms of China's horrid environmental abuses and how they are being FORCED to regulate pollution due to their high rural populations suffering...

    I personally think thats too much of a "leave it to chance" attitude. Barnett is all about military intervention if he think's it could give a quick fix and the prognosis for clean up is there, but if it's capitalist regulation or enrivonmental standards...well just ROLL THE DICE, itll all work out right!?

    Not constant logic in my opinion. That being said, he's right about a lot of things, its the HOW he tends to have trouble with. PNM was "the why" BFA was his "HOW" attempt...meh, lukewarm.

    I wouldnt go so far as to call his mind inflexible, he likes to consider new ideas, its just that he wont be deterred from saying we should intervene in the "gap" how we intervene is open to debate for him, although he's got a strong instinct to keep the military option on the table at all times.

    off to crosspost.

    by BrandonM on Sun Aug 27, 2006 at 10:01:52 PM PDT

•  He's trying to lay foundations, not build palaces

  Dr. Barnett's explicitly trying to create the groundwork for the next era of bipartisan foreign policy. Containment, for good or for ill, was something that had enough 'give' in it that it could be pursued by both liberals and conservatives. You can be a passionate progressive and sign on to Dr. Barnett's framework or a rock ribbed conservative or live somewhere in between.

  One major benefit to this is that it makes US foreign policy predictable, coherent, and much more effective than if every party change in control of the White House leads to a major shift in foreign policy outlook. If we're going to survive the curve balls that the world will throw at us, a common framework is very important.

  Dr. Barnett, with whom I have corresponded, has made it perfectly clear that he is much more interested in laying out the foundations that will underly both parties foreign policy than in carrying the flag for his preferred political party, which happens to be the Democrat party. He's remarkably tolerant of people on both left and right that take his work and extend it. He, quite frankly, encourages it.

  So if you think there's some sort of detail or twist that is left blank, think of it as an invitation to fill it in, not as some sort of weakness in the structure. He does answer correspondence.

  by TMLutas on Mon Aug 28, 2006 at 01:13:05 PM PDT