Last week, I wrote a Diary on What General McCaffrey said about Iraq Last Monthabout Iraq Last Month
but while I was researching this I found his report from 2005, on the situation in Iraq in 2005.
I don't know if he did any others, if anyone can find one, point it out in the comments,
but at any rate, McCaffrey was writing about the issues then, lets see what he said
TOP CENTCOM VULNERABILITIES:
1st – Premature drawdown of U.S. ground forces driven by dwindling U.S. domestic political support and the progressive deterioration of Army and Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected melt-down of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months)50%
2nd – Alienation of the U.S. Congress or the American people caused by Iraqi public ingratitude and corruption.Yep
3rd – Political ineptitude of Shia civil leadership that freezes out the Sunnis and creates a civil war during our drawdown.Yep, Yep
4th – “The other shoe” – a war with North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, Iran, or Cuba that draws away U.S. military forces and political energy.not yet
5th – The loss or constraint of our logistics support bases in Kuwait. Clearly we need constant diplomatic attention and care to this vital Ally. If Kuwait became unstable or severely alienated to US Military objectives in the region—then our posture in Iraq would be placed in immediate fatal peril.not yet
6th – Open intervention by Iranian intelligence or military forces to support rogue Shia Iraqi insurgency. (Assassination of Sustani—armed rebellion by Sadr)50%
7th – Continued under-manning and too rapid turnover in State Department inter-agency representation in Iraq.Yep
8th – Lack of continuity in CENTCOM strategic and operational senior leadership. The CENTCOM military leadership we now have is a collective national treasure.2/3rds. Abizaid is gone, Vines is gone, Petraeus is back
so of 8 vulnerabilities we have 5 of the 8 vulnerabilities have come to pass.
What hasn't yet happened is the Guard melting down, The Iranians going hard core,
Another military crisis or a loss of kuwait as a logistics base.
But let's look at his other major observations
1st – US Military Forces in Iraq are superb.True, but irrelevant
2nd – The point of the US war effort is to create legitimate and competent Iraqi national, provincial, and municipal governance.well that didn't happen
The Iraqi Security Forces are now a real and hugely significant factor.Not Really
- TOP CENTCOM VULNERABILITIES:We discussed this before
So he was half right on his basic observations, and half the vulnerabilities he warned about
have come to pass.
- THE ENEMY THREAT:
1st – The Iraqi Insurgency threat is enormously more complex than Vietnam.Yep
2nd – On the positive side of the ledger:
• High Sunni voting turnout and political participation in December will likely set the conditions for the down hill slide of the insurgency.BUZZZTTT
The insurgency can no longer mass against Coalition forces with units greater than squad level BUZZTTT
Insurgents now have a reduced capability to attack Coalition forces by direct fire:BUZZTTT
Suicide IED attack is enormously effective. However, it will soon likely become a fragile tool. The Jihadists will begin to run short of human bombs.BUZZTTT
We must continue to level with the American people. We still have a five year fight facing us in Iraq.Well, that never happened, They were still saying at that time, Last Throes
3rd – The Fallujah Situation:
• The city has huge symbolic importance throughout Mideast.
• Unrealistic expectations were raised on how rapidly the Coalition could rebuild.
• The City appears to be an angry disaster.Well that's still True
So he was half right on the Enemy.
- COALITION PUBLIC DIPLOMACY POLICY IS A DISASTER:
Military leaders on the ground are talking to people they trust instead of talking to all reporters who command the attention of the American people. (We need to educate and support AP, Reuters, Gannet, Hearst, the Washington Post, the New York Times, etc.)
Yep, And still a problem. They are talking to their Right wing bloggers, not, the whole media.
Well he was right about this, but, was ignored.
SUMMARY:
• This is the darkness before dawn in the efforts to construct a viable Iraqi state. The enterprise was badly launched --but we are now well organized and beginning to develop successful momentum. The future outcomes are largely a function of the degree to which Iraqi men and women will overcome fear and step forward to seize the leadership opportunity to create a new future. It's darker now according to his 2007 report
• We face some very difficult days in the coming 2-5 years. In my judgment, if we retain the support of the American people --we can achieve our objectives of creating a law-based Iraqi state which will be an influencing example on the entire region.This isn't happening
• A successful outcome would potentially usher in a very dramatically changed environment throughout the Middle East and signal in this region the end of an era of incompetent and corrupt government which fosters frustration and violence on the part of much of the population.He still gives this a chance
18 months later, his darkness before the dawn appears to be on Daylight savings time,
The White House has refused to listen to his advice on the length of the war and
the Iraqi government is weaker and more corrupt then before.
So he's 0 for 3 on his summary. We are 2 years further along in what he then
described as a 5 year war, but he knew then that the reserve adn guard was only good for 3 years.
Did McCaffrey stand up and say "We have aproblem we need a lot more active and guard units!"?
What I'd like to know Dear Readers is what facts are driving the meltdown of the guard and
reserve he mentions coming up?
Are they all stop-lossed? Is there some change in Law? Is there some sort of aging
issue in the Reserve force?
It is interesting to contrast mcCaffrey's optimism in 05 to 07.
Are there any McCaffrey reports from 03?
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