We've heard many Iraq analogies, mostly to Viet Nam. Now, British General Sir Michael Rose suggests a better analogy is to the American Revolution.
He said: "How was it a small and extremely determined body of insurgents, thieves and deserters could inflict such a strategic and potentially disastrous defeat on the most powerful nation in the world?
Sir Michael was referring to our war of independence, a subject about which he authored a book. The Currently retired General also commanded the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Hercegovina from 1994 to 1995.
So what does he think about Iraq? Well, he pulls no punches.
"There is no way we are going to win the war and (we should) withdraw and accept defeat because we are going to lose on a more important level if we don't," he said.
More importantly, he says we should announce a timetable for withdrawal. Unlike those in the pro-war crowd who say such a move would make the situation worse he, speaking from his years of experience which included a stint at bringing peace to the Balkans, says the opposite is true.
"Give them a date and it is amazing how people and political parties will stop fighting each other and start working towards a peaceful transfer of power," he said.
It is always amazing when a respected military leader speaks the obvious, "[T]hose who don't read history are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past."
The General's statements highlight something arguably more important. The dire predictions of the consequences of "defeat" by those who push nations into war and expend every effort to keep the war going are almost never borne out.
When Britain lost the Revolutionary War, the effects on Britain were minimal and transient, and in some ways beneficial. Trade with the former colonies was hardly interrupted since that trade was mutually beneficial. Yes, animosities continued and some low level conflicts occurred, mostly involving the impressing of sailors from U.S. merchant ships. Those conflicts led to the War of 1812, which many view as the second revolution, after which the conflicts ceased. Sure Britain had lost "face" in the eyes of the world and particularly with their arch rival, the French. But that didn't create any serious problems for them and being rid of the American conflict arguably helped them win their two subsequent wars with France.
We now hear about this incredible list of horribles that will ensue if we leave iraq "too soon." Putting aside the fact that most of the purveyors of this bunkum are the same prognosticators that predicted all sunshine and light from our invasion, is there any evidence to support such predictions. History suggests not. The last two centuries have seen two world wars and countless lesser conflicts. The history of those lesser conflicts is instructive.
From the American Revolution in the Eighteenth Century through the post colonial and neocolonial wars of the Twentieth Century the eventual defeat of the dominant country proved largely meaningless and in some ways beneficial to the loser. Yes, prestige was lost as the colonies separated from Britain, France, Holland, Portugal and Spain. but the economic relationships generally remained unchanged. And in many instances a significant military burden was lifted from the colonial power.
What of the Cold War conflicts? Each one was fought with the articulated earnestness of a life and death struggle for America's survival. The problem is that, with the exception of Korea, it is hard to tell today which of those wars we lost and which we won. We lost Viet Nam but have much stronger economic ties with that country than ever before in our history. We helped win the Afghanistan war against the Soviets but we are now there fighting a different enemy. We "won" the war in Grenada, but lost the one in Nicaragua. Was Danny Ortega's election as President really the death knell for the U.S.? Of course not, and yet we fought the Sandanistas and ripped apart the Constitution as if our national survival was at stake.
Sadly, in Iraq, the same we hear the same histrionics regarding dire consequences that we have heard so many times before. In July, 2005, I wrote an article discussing that point, one which has doubtless been made by countless other.
Now many "experts", most in the mold of the Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and Cheney, would disagree with my suggestion. You remember, "cakewalk," "we know where the WMD are," and "we'll be greeted with flowers in the streets." The folks who gave us that wisdom now have a new litany of sage prognostications which they announce as if they are reading off stone tablets. "Failure is not an option". "Iraq will descend into chaos, possibly civil war". "We have to stay the course to avoid a humiliating defeat." "Our oil supplies are at stake." "Iraq will become a breeding ground for terrorists," "If we do not succeed Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Emirates and the rest of the region will be thrown into chaos and be vulnerable to extremists," ad nauseam.
The problem with all of these statements, aside from being totally refutable on their merits, is that they assume we can "win" in the sense of bringing a peaceful, democratic, stable, pro-American, devoid of insurgent groups, unified Iraq into existence. We can't. And the sooner we come to that realization the sooner we will be able to put this sorry episode behind us, bear the shame of having failed, put up with some more regional uncertainty, and hope to begin the very slow process of rebuilding our national and international self esteem.
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Everyone knows that Vietnam is not a perfect analogy, but consider this. What was the difference between the U.S leaving Vietnam after the Tet offensive in the Spring of 1968, and when we finally withdrew in 1973? Sadly, the answer is about 30,000 American lives and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese lives. We could have had "Peace With Honor" in 1968 and saved ourselves and the Vietnamese a lot of death and destruction. But we didn't because we were told, failure was not an option, Vietnam would descend into chaos, the Communists would take over the country, we would suffer a humiliating defeat, the Soviet Union would use our defeat to press its advantage throughout Africa and the Middle East, and all of Southeast Asia would fall to the Communists, jeopardizing even South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Australia. At the time, these outcomes were accepted as gospel and were so dire that they could not be seriously debated.
Did any of that happen? Yes. We suffered a humiliating defeat and Vietnam became Communist. We got over our defeat and now have diplomatic relations with Vietnam. It's hard to argue that our international prestige was in worse shape after the war than it was during the last five years of the conflict. But the rest was all conventional wisdom bunk.
(There was one other thing, though. We destroyed our Army, which took over a decade to rebuild. We are well on the way to destroying it again and the rebuilding period could well be longer.)
Here we are again. We have a choice. We can accept reality now or accept it two, five or eight years from now. For the United States the difference will be the numbers of brave Americans killed or wounded in the process, the amount of money spent, and the level of resentment we leave behind. For the Iraqis, it will only mean a delay in the arrival of that day when they complete the process of establishing the country they desire, with or without civil war. It may be one country or maybe three, but they will get there. And the length of the period of turmoil will be less the sooner we leave.
Yes the General is right. The Iraq tragedy is like our Revolution much as it is like Viet Nam and the countless other conflicts that have been waged in the last one hundred years where a dominant power gets mired in an unwinnable conflict in the mistaken belief that that it's national interests require "victory." It doesn't. And the sooner we open our eyes the better for all parties concerned.