An Internet search of "Founding Fathers intended" will produce a plethora of conservative quotes offering up what they want to believe the Founding Fathers intended. The worst of them are epotimized in this quote:
... I have repeatedly seen an erosion of the powers and the ability of the president of the United States to do his job. We saw it in the War Powers Act. We saw it in the Budget Anti-Impoundment Act. We've seen it in cases like this before, where it's demanded that presidents cough up and compromise on important principles. (...) Because the net result of that is to weaken the presidency and the vice presidency.
And one of the things that I feel an obligation, and I know the president does too, because we talked about it, is to pass on our offices in better shape than we found them to our successors. We are weaker today as an institution because of the unwise compromises that have been made over the last 30 to 35 years...
-Dick Cheney
One can argue what the "Founding Fathers Intended" 'till doomsday; or, actually try to determine what they intended. The best way to determine their intent is to examine James Madison's notes on The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. A copy of the notes can be found at the Constitution Society. (Permission granted to copy with attribution)
What follows is a summary of the debates as they pertain to the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government and the issues we frequently hear associated with the phrase "the Founding Fathers intended."
Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of Government. On May 25, George Washington was unanimously elected president of the Convention and a Committee appointed to prepare standing rules & orders.
Rules were approved and "the main business" undertaken on May 29. Edmund Jenings Randolph, Governor of Virginia, Secretary of State, and the first United States Attorney General, proposed Resolutions that began debates of what became known as the "Constitutional Convention."
Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, "common defence, security of liberty and general welfare."
Debate on the "national Legislature" began May 30. Debate on the "national Executive," described in Edmund Randolph's proposed Resolutions: "that a national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature — for the term of ______ years &c to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the executive powers of Congress &c." was undertaken June 1.
A motion was made and seconded "that the Executive consist of a single person."
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put the question, Doctor Franklin observed that it was a point of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.
::Some sentiments expressed by delegates to the Convention regarding the "Unitary Executive."
John Rutledge, "was for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace..."
Roger Sherman said
... he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depositary of the supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive department ...
James Wilson ...
... preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.
Elbridge Gerry "favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence."
Edmund Randolph "strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy."
He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy (...) He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to consist of more than one.
According to Madison, the first five arguments presented in the debate were about concerns that a single person as Executive might become a version of a Monarchy.
In furtherance of debate on that issue, James Madison said:
... it would be proper, before a choice shd. be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departmt. whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer(...)
He proposed that that the clause "that a national Executive ought to be instituted" be substituted with the clause "with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers 'not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature,' as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature."
Charles Pinckney objected to the phrase "and to execute such other powers 'not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature' as may from time to time be delegated" were unnecessary; the object of them being included in the "power to carry into effect the national laws."
A revision to the proposed amendment was made to include the words "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" so that "improper powers might otherwise be delegated."
The first concern of the Founding Fathers was that a single (Unitary) Executive would attempt to usurp legislative and judiciary powers. George Bush and Dick Cheney have demonstrated that their concern was valid.
On the issue of an Executive Council, "to serve us in the Executive department, without paying them well for their services," James Wilson read these words to the delegates:
... there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. (...)
The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars (...)
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate; the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. (...)
John Dickinson said, "such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy (...) A limited Monarchy however was out of the question."
Pinkey moved and Rutlidge seconded a motion to make the Executive "one person."
Edmund Randolph "opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishmt. of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. (...) He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country."
The motion was postponed and the Committee adjourned. The question was resumed June 4th.
James Wilson supported a unitary executive because "All know that a single magistrate is not a King. (...) the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Governt."
Elbridge Gerry remarked that the policy of three members for the Executive "would be extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads."
The question for a "Unitary Executive" was then put and agreed to.
:: On the issue of Executive veto power
In the original Resolutions proposed by Edmund Jenings Randolph on May 29, 1787:
Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by ___ of the members of each branch.
Elbridge Gerry proposed "that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by _____ parts of each branch of the national Legislature."
James Wilson said:
... neither the original proposition nor the amendment go far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct & independent. The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without such a self-defense the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative.
Doctor Franklin said "He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pena." The negative of the Governor:
... was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. (...) He was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at last eno' would be gotten to influence & bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.
Roger Sherman was against:
enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom (...) we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overule the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature.
Pierce Butler stated that he "had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate," but:
could he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on the laws was to be given him he certainly should have acted very differently. It had been observed that in all countries the Executive power is in a constant course of increase. This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the Executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this Country as well as in others.
Gunning Bedford, Jr. "was opposed to every check on the Legislative." He said,
... it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative Authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The Representatives of the people were the best Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external controul whatever...
George Mason observed that the motion for a "Unitary Executive" in his absence. One reasson he would have voted in the negative for the measure was:
The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures till new appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed all these into his own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium of exerting his negative afterwards.
(...)
He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the late Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the Executive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first instance. He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a single Magistrate.
(...)
The first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what sort may come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy.
June 14th, A question for enabling two thirds of each branch of the Legislature to overrule the revisionary check (Executive veto) was passed.
:: Separation of powers
Some of the remarks by delegates on that subject:
James Wilson said, "the only powers he conceived as strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature." He argued that both branches of the Legislature ought to be derived from the people, "without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States."
John Dickinson said, "the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought to be made as independent as possible..."
George Mason said, "The Executive power ought to be well secured agst. Legislative usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive."
Edmund Randolph said:
... The object of this 2d. branch (Senate) is to controul the democratic branch of the Natl. Legislature. (...) No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness & independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution agst. encroachments of the Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch.
George Mason thought the office of vice-President an encroachment on the rights of the Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legislative & Executive, which as well as the Judiciary departments, ought to be kept as separate as possible.
James Wilson said:
... Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.
Alexander Hamilton suggested amendments for:
The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature of the United States with power to pass all laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.
The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour — the election to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid — The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws passed, to have the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers (Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.
Most of these amendments were included in the final draft of the Constitution.
:: Pre-emptive War
During the August 17, 1787 session, Charles Pinckney opposed the vesting of the power "to make war" in the Legislature. He said:
... Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in Senate, so as to give no advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.
Pierce Butler agreed, but said his objection was "in great degree agst. the Senate." He wanted the President to have that power because he "will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it."
James Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to insert "declare," striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.
Roger Sherman thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too much.
Elbridge Gerry said he never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Oliver Ellsworth stated there is a material difference between the cases of making war and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. peace attended with intricate & secret negociations.
George Mason was agst. giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "make."
:: Impeachment
On June 2, John Dickinson moved:
that the Executive be made removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States.
Dickinson said that it was necessary to place the power of removing somewhere. Gunning Bedford seconded the motion and Roger agreed "that the National Legislature should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure."
George Mason agreed that "Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen." but he opposed "making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle of good Government."
The Clause, "and to be removeable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty" was moved to be added, and agreed to.
The question of the Executive "to be removeable on impeachment and conviction for mal practice or neglect of duty." was taken up on July 20.
Charles Pinckney and Gouverneur Morris moved to strike impeachment from the Resolution; Pinckney said "he ought not to be impeachable whilst in office."
William Davie said, "If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected." Davie "considered this as an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive." James Wilson agreed "in the necessity of making the Executive impeachable whilst in office."
Morris asked, "... who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend his functions. If it is not the mischief will go on. If it is the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement, and will render the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach."
George Mason said, "No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above Justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can commit the most extensive injustice? ..."
Doctor Franklin was for retaining the clause as favorable to the Executive:
... it would be the best way therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.
Gouverneur Morris agreed that "corruption & some few other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated & defined."
James Madison stated that "some provision should be made for defending the Community agst. the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate..."
... The limitation of the period of his service, was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. The case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the Legislature or of any other public body, holding offices of limited duration. It could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an Assembly would either lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for purposes of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or a few members only should be seduced, the soundness of the remaining members, would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.
Elbridge Gerry agreed on the necessity of impeachments, "A good magistrate will not fear them. A bad one ought to be kept in fear of them." He hoped "the maxim would never be adopted here that the chief magistrate could do no wrong."
The "propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle" with Edmund Randolph, who said:
... Guilt wherever found ought to be punished. The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly in time of war when the military force, and in some respects the public money will be in his hands. Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults & insurrections. He is aware of the necessity of proceeding with a cautious hand, and of excluding as much as possible the influence of the Legislature from the business.
Doctor Franklin agreed that impeachment offered the opportunity for "regular & peaceable enquiry," as well as due punishment of the guilty and restored public confidence in the innocent.
Gouverneur Morris stated that his opinion had been changed by the discussion:
... He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any time in office. Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in forign pay, without being able to guard agst. it by displacing him ...
The question of impeachment was postponed until July 26 when a resolution was passed containing the clause, "... to be removable on impeachment & conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty..."
In a Report before the Convention, September 7, Sect. 2. Art: 10. read as follows:
"He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for Treason, or bribery..."
The issue of impeachment was again taken up September 8 when George Mason asked:
Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above defined. As bills of attainder which have saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the power of impeachments. He movd. to add after "bribery" "or maladministration."
The motion was seconded by Elbridge Gerry.
James Madison said that "So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate."
Gouverneur Morris agreed that "it will not be put in force & can do no harm. An election of every four years will prevent maladministration."
Mason withdrew "maladministration" and substituted "other high crimes & misdemesnors agst. the State"
The motion passed.
More debate followed on the issue of changing "Senate" to "Supreme Court." A motion to strike "Senate" failed.
A motion to amend the clause to substitute "State" with "United States" passed.
On the subject of impeachments, a motion was made and passed to add "The vice-President and other Civil officers of the U. S. shall be removed from office on impeachment and conviction as aforesaid" to the clause.
:: Conclusion
It is obvious that the Founders intended for the Executive to be independent, but subject to checks and balances by the Legislative and Judicial branches of government. Madison said, "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."