Governor Bill Richardson has called for the removal of all of our troops from Iraq in six to eight months; and in no case more than a year. The other candidates in the race for president have called this irresponsible and simply not logistically possible.
Given that none of the Senators or Congressman running have prior military logistical experience, one must assume they consulted logistics experts for their conclusions. Yet, they never identify these so-called experts.
Now appears US Army (Ret.) LTC Lon Cross, who has drawn upon his knowledge as a retired field-grade infantry and logistics officer, and presented the facts that are relevant to an evaluation of what is logistically feasible regarding the redeployment of US Forces from Iraq.Lon Cross is a Research Fellow at LMI (formerly known as the Logistics Management Institute) where he specializes in Logistics and Supply Chain Risk Management and Process Improvement. Currently, all of his clients reside within the Department of Defense.
Lon is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel. He took part in drafting the 82nd Airborne Division's Operations Orders for Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, as well as the re-equipping of a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division following the first Persian Gulf War. He holds an undergraduate degree from Dartmouth College and a MBA from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
In a memo to the Richardson campaign, released today to the MSM, Colonel Cross outlines how Governor Bill Richardson's call for a complete redeployment within six to eight months is "very much achievable."
Colonel Cross attacks the "myth being propagated that there is only one route into and out of Iraq, there are actually seven land routes."
These routes include: four that lead to the Kuwaiti ports, including the main expressway from Baghdad to Umm Qasr as well as a highway that rolls along the Tigris to Umm Qasr, and two highways that cut through Saudi Arabia into Kuwait. In addition, there is a viable rail option in the north into Turkey (the Army Corps of Engineers has upgraded the line), as well as the expressway north into Turkey and one that leads into Jordan.
Therefore, depending on what we can expect in the way of political support from neighboring countries, we can reasonably assume between four and seven land routes out of Iraq.
Next comes the question of what has to traverse those routes, and there are three primary logistics problems to solve. First, there are some 50,000 pieces of rolling stock -- vehicles, both combat and non-combat, such as tanks and Humvees, that can propel themselves out of Iraq. A simple division of 50,000 by six or eight months shows that we would need to withdraw an average of, respectively, 274 or 205 vehicles per day.
Remember when those in the debate and later on Daily Kos ridiculed Governor Richardson for saying "roads"? Hmmmm....I guess he has the last laugh now!
Colonel Cross goes on to say:
Second, there are some 200,000 Short Tons (2000 pounds per Short Ton) of unit equipment and supplies that will require being carted into containers and shipped out. This number is actually a conservative estimate, but it also gives lie to the second myth about a future redeployment: we do not need to bring back everything we brought to Iraq.
To be sure, these 200,000 Short Tons include all weapons, ammunition, and sensitive items. But it leaves behind fixed-assets such as barracks and gymnasiums. Risking even a single troop's life through delay in order to break these assets down brick-by-brick would be a travesty.
The 200,000 Short Tons would then be broken down and placed on 40-foot containers that will transport 15 Short Tons each. Thus, it would take some 13,333 containers to remove all of our necessary stationary equipment from Iraq. Again, this is quite doable, with a six-month redeployment requiring 73 containers per day, and eight months requiring 55.
Finally, we must of course account for the brave men and women who are serving in Iraq right now. These troops represent both the most important and the easiest of the logistics equation, as many would be integrated as security into the convoys that will bring the equipment home. Additionally, a fleet of C-130s, C-17s, and civilian jet liners could assist by air, as is currently done to transport most troops.
Combined, then, US Forces would need to redeploy a sum total of 347 and 260 moveable units daily (for the six and eight month scenarios, respectively). Moreover, in reality, these two flows need not be mutually exclusive. Some portion of the 200,000 Short Tons may be moved by the rolling stock fleet. For here, however, I am going to treat these two numbers as discrete so as to provide the analysis for a more conservative time-line.
Assuming that we employed as few as three of the seven available roads every day in order to maintain tactical surprise, the redeployment would require moving 116 or 87 vehicles per path, per day. This task is quite achievable by a military that moved half a million troops and accompanying equipment out of Iraq in four months following the first Gulf War.
Finally, his summary makes the point Governor Richardson has made all along:
I do know, however, what is possible, and a safe and complete redeployment of all American forces within six to eight months is, without question, achievable.
It is not impossible, it is not unsafe, but it would provide for a complete redeployment.
The only problem with this logistical plan is that it does not have a senatorial spin to it. The Senate has done such a wonderful job of screwing up appropriations, the Mukasey confirmation, FISA, SCHIP, and failing to act on No Child Left Behind, I am sure the most appropriate path for this plan would be to send it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and let them screw it up.... They have done such a good job at providing oversight on the War in Iraq...