Even if the operation is reduced to quite a small footprint, and even if this footprint were not located within the borders of Iraq longterm, there will still be an ongoing presence and commitment, and targeted operations as needed.
Between now and the date of arriving a future full reconfiguration, what the forces in Iraq will be doing will likely look much like today.
It's a fairly static situation, punctuated by intense sweeps when information dictates that action is needed.
To be unkind, it is armed babysitting, and even in a scenario of drawing down steadily and rapidly, some version of this is likely to go on for a while.
The nature of what's taking place in Afghanistan is quite different, although it could perhaps end up similar at some point.
There you have rough terrain which is too disjoint to be simply occupied as if you were laying a carpet over the country.
So you have the ongoing ability, foolish as it may be, for hostile Taliban forces to gather and then launch massed actions against towns or against NATO forces.
The environment is more dynamic and air patrols, troop transport by air and air support is more of an ongoing factor in success day-to-day.
The Marines as a service branch are designed to conduct intense and short missions, to be always at the front, hard edge of a military operation.
They have their own air support, and would like to develop their own way of proceeding, a coordinated air-ground strategy for the 4GW environments being faced.
One thing we face as a nation, confronting so many different complex challenges at once, is the question of how best to evolve new tactics and strategies.
Even as we break out of old boxes, and seize upon something new that is working, that new thing itself could become too rigid, too well-defined, a new box.
A good rule of thumb in this chaotic environment, is to send out a number of somewhat separate, coherent teams, each pursuing variants on what is recognized as an overall good approach.
This experimentation will lead different teams down somewhat different paths, and the understanding found can then be synthesized.
We don't want too much of a mono-culture in any case.
Allowing the Marines to largely own the operations in Afghanistan and its border regions is like setting loose a distinct team, equally inspired by current counterinsurgency insights, but most likely to develop a distinct approach.
Two heads are better than one.
Petraeus should be given all the support he needs and great latitude, but having other commanders in other areas simultaneously developing new ways forward would be even better.
This allows both teams to be more fluid and trust their own instincts, while still learning from each other.
Let the approaches cross-pollinate and inform each other.
In Iraq, as the troops at some point move away from day to day supervision of Iraqi life, the forces that remain, whether in-country or nearby, may themselves be Special Forces.
And they may be much more dynamic, in that being a smaller force and located at a distance from flare-ups, they would be highly coordinated with air patrol, then hopping in and out of situations on short notice.
The Air Force and Navy needn't be cut out of all this.
One thing to look at, of which much can be said, is a massive investment in effective border systems in these regions.
We should make a commitment as a nation to seeking 'real borders', with good fences, roads and patrol bases paralleling them, effective cargo scanning and tracking, and real-id (biometric) for all persons transiting, between all nations and autonomous zones of the world.
Regional, cooperative security organizations can work together using these infrastructures to put an end to the flow of fighters, arms and WMD.
This will take years to build, maybe in 12 - 15 years much of it can be done.
It will be a massive project, but one we should start.
These real borders can be conjoined with radar and detection stations, which will reduce the risk of being left unaware of hard-to-detect arms development, movements, testing, deployment, etc.
These border systems and stations need not be seen as 'permanent US bases' in the sense of occupation.
Rather they should be envisioned as joint endeavors between local and regional partners and the US.
Security in the region will then look like a coordinated effort between highly dynamic patrol and targetted enforcement teams (Marines or Special Forces if they are drawn from the US), along with Air Force and Navy coordinating with ground installations to guarantee good visibility and ability to hinder cross-border problems, esp as regards WMD.
Again, all based on maximally inclusive cooperation with local nations and regional security organizations, and minimizing the need to be regularly threatening war.
Obviously Air Force and Navy are also involved in any deployments, and transport in general.
The Army, leaving apart Special Forces, may indeed on occasion have to perform overwatch for a time, if a situation calls for it.
It should be trained, equiped and provided with the support at every level, including adequate rest time, so as to be able to do that well.
It may also be involved in post-conflict and non-conflict deployments, helping areas rebuild.
The goal long term is getting each nation and region to staff its own security infrastructure, but in many cases we will have to be a big part of helping build that infrastructure, physically, diplomatically, militarily, etc.
The goal is peace through cooperation, relying on ground level structures that we actively help bring into existence.
We won't own or occupy or dictate, but we help build a stable situation, using tools at all levels, and are part of the global team that keeps the whole thing functioning smoothly and at as low a cost as possible.
Bush and Condi, during this next year, could kick off a parallel track to the peace process, which would be bringing together the nations of the region at the level of diplomats, military, intelligence, law enforcement, customs, border patrol to begin discussions of a greater Middle-Eastern security compact or organization.
The organization could eventually offer different levels of membership, with different responsibilities, different requirements for transparency regarding internals of a nation and different authority within the organization.
This will probably take time to formulate and evolve, but at least one or two such meetings could occur, so that people can begin to imagine what can work.
Centering it on Iraq tends to limit things, Iraq has particular problems.
What's needed is a view of how to work together to manage security threats that all agree are a problem.
You start with even one issue all agree is an issue, and formulate a system for addressing it.
Then another, then another.
If at some point, not everyone wants to be a part of the next level of coordination being proposed, you start to envision the multiple levels of membership.
Probably any nation, even ones not entirely friendly, can be some level of member.
Border systems is probably a great topic to start with, apparently they don't work too well ... so, how to proceed?
What will look different in all these areas of national security moving forward, from a Democrat's point of view, is not an abandonment of preparation for missions, nor of intent to perform them when needed.
Dems won't abandon readiness or willingness to engage and resolve the problems that need to be resolved.
But simply that there is a formal commitment to appropriate and accountable deployments.
All operations must make sense, must be well-planned and entirely transparent.
The American people must grant buyin to a mission, and the mission must be well-understood by all.
Cost and value must be in proper balance, be clearly declared, formally and regularly measured.
In all cases, diplomacy and every sort of bridge-building must be employed, so that there is a maximal leveraging of local resources to solve local problems.
We should never be in deeper than makes sense, than we want to be, than local partners and peoples want us to be, except when pursuing highly focussed and generally brief missions to deal with significant threats.
But clearly, in one way or another we will be involved.
And developing the greatest variety of expertise as possible, is good.
We can also share this expertise with local partners via training and advising.
Letting the different branches own different aspects of the total picture allows them to really take the lead in that area and develop their own unique set of insights, which in the long run adds value across all branches.
As far as how to get the Marines to Afghanistan, it needn't be done all at once.
As the drawdown already either planned or hinted at in Iraq unfolds, some of this ongoing repositioning of forces can involve, in addition to removing forces, trading them between one theater and another.
Over the course of the next year or year and a half or less, the Marines could be out of Iraq.
As far as leaving Anbar with less support, there are several themes to consider.
One is the Iraqi govt must somehow agree to allow more provisional forces into the formal Iraqi armed forces.
If new branches need to be created, or more management layers so that people can feel secure with the power these new recruits have, then do that.
If some of these provisional forces can be organized into recognizable divisions or brigades, then they can be given the security rule over a chunk of Anbar.
Limiting their mission to a specific area is a good training approach, and allowing that area to be extensive enough so that it supports reduction of significant American presence, is a good way to explore forward motion.
So Anbar might be segmented into a few large parts, security-wise.
Perhaps at first you leave American troops or national Iraqi troops or a coordinating structure sitting between the various sections.
And perhaps you encourage a spreading of power within these provisional forces, while still maintaining an overall unity, so that you get some balance of power.
These provisional forces should have an multi-layered officer's tier that is professional, disciplined, where peers can call out abuses and seek accountability, rather than it looking like a warlord ruling all.
Perhaps a short-course, a 3-month officers course can be developed, getting these forces to look more predictable and thus more likely to be accepted into the main Iraqi forces.
If some chunk of Anbar can become coherent enough and patrolled by a singular division of provisional forces with clear command, that then becomes an area Marines can pull out of.
If the provisional force is given meaningful incentives for keeping it together and driving extremists out, they'll probably do it.
Generally in Iraq, things go well when an area is controlled and led by the people who live in that area, and when that is a coherent bunch of people.
There's a perceived need for more American troops when the coherent pieces of territory are small and have no natural borders.
It's not impossible to stitch a quilt together out of these small pieces, but it takes work.
Basically, we need to simply dramatically improve our cost/value ratio in what we do in these turbulent places.
To say 'do nothing', because it's risky and scary and things are finally going less bad, is going to simply leave us somewhat stranded in a cost/value ratio which is gradually draining us.
And realistically, the security challenges will be ongoing, in many areas, for years to come, so we can't afford to plan in a condition of being continually drained.
At some point we will have enough regional infrastructure, politically and physically, that many sorts of security threats can be brought under control.
But as this will take years to build-out, we need to also remain fluid enough to function in the meantime.
This isn't to say drawdown because it is a 'defeat', it's just a relentless push towards realism, which requires we move towards a flexible and viable stance
.
The goal will have been achieved when these unstable regions are stable and happy.
So, let's keep moving forward, keep becoming more flexible and dynamic, keep improving the cost/value ratio, the sustainability, keep devolving power and responsibility, and keep making the entire process more transparent and inclusive, domestically and internationally.
Dems and Repubs may argue on how fast to move, what risks to accept, what specific cost/value outcome we should view as natural, but let us one way or another keep pushing forward and wind our way out of all situations which aren't yet meeting the standards which history and the American people and spirit demand.
In the interest of peace and cooperation
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