This is the latest in a succession of short studies in how to assess the power of nations, and how relative power sorts out choice of allies, enemies, and countries we'd as soon not have anything to do with.
This one uses the basic model to infer what various global and regional players want from the current system of state and nonstate actors.
In some cases, the model produces counter-intuitive results. In others, there is reaffirmation of conventional wisdom.
I offer this as an alternative, an attempt to step away from the iterative human associative process and consider that perhaps what we want, what they want, what we all want in common is not quite what we thought in the first place.
Links to related:
The Hate List: A short list of candidates for invasion
The Diss List: Countries we just aren't interested in, and why
History Matrix VIII: Checkers
History Matrix VII: Many speak of Europe
History Matrix VI: New Alliances
This analysis is based on a series of premises
(1) that the power of a human society is a function of
(a) population
(b) investment in education
(c) investment in infrastructure
(d) natural resource base (especially water resources)
(e) investment in technology
(2) that countries seek the highest net gain in alliance partners, avoid partnership with those countries which present the greatest net loss.
(3) those countries with the means to pick and choose their friends (and enemies) are dominant, and have a feedback system that helps to preserve their dominance.
(4) however, levels of investment, population, natural resources (esp. water) change over time, such that one day's pauper may well be the next day's prince -- and he'll have his own choice of friends and enemies.
(5) there are 'sweet spots' in the range of prospective friends and foes, countries that are relatively inexpensive to dislike and compel relationships with (usually hostile ones); this was covered in yesterday's "The Hate List".
(6) today, we're going to add the mirror-image: that there is a leading edge of promising allies, a pool of possible relations that countries seek to improve upon.
(7) from this, it is possible to discern the overall character of a given country's foreign policy goals.
Mechanics of the process
(1) Have a comprehensive set of power ratings that can be adjusted in case of changes (ex. fragmentation of Iraq) and forecast across time. (One of the more entertaining aspect of this model is that it makes forecasts of who will be a rising star, and when, and which countries will fall in and out of favor with one another -- and about when such events will occur.)
(2) Arrange a matrix, showing the net gain to the original power rating of a every country, matched up with every other country.
(3) Identify the Sweet List and the Hate List countries, those whose net gain/loss contributions fall within a preset, uniform number of standard deviations from the mean (we're using from +0.75 to +1.25 StDevs up from the mean for the Sweet List, the reverse for the Hate List)...we may tweak the ranges, based on further research.
(4) Cull out ludicrous or outmoded pairings (Guatemala keeps showing up as a target country for the United States...which back in the days of United Fruit, it most certainly was!); this is subjective. Hey. I'm workin' on it.
(5) Identify patterns in common, address (dis)(similarities with conventional interpretations (ex, China (per the model) is disinterested in electing to invade Taiwan, and in fact Taiwan is on China's "Sweet List", a country that Beijing is (the rhetoric aside) working to ally with, not conquer.
China and Taiwan, as an example
What keeps this interesting is that Taiwan is on our Sweet List, too, only it's even more valuable to us than to the Chinese point-wise, thus there's a tug-of-war going on...and that's not all. Japan, Russia, the European powers and South Korea most of all value relations with Taiwan, just as it is -- kind of, sort of, not really sovereign and independent.
From the Taiwanese perspective, they get the most mileage out of being pals with the United States, Japan and China, and in that order, and under current circumstances don't have to choose just one!
Now, for the results
The United States
Friendly Endeavors
The United States is interested in maintaining good trade relations with the rest of the Americas, and to breaking the diplomatic and rhetorical empasse between itself and both Venezuela and Cuba...though that's going to take a lot more work than is being effected these days.
Elsewhere, the Americans are working on improving bilateral relations with a wide range of European states, the Scandinavians and eastern Europeans being targeted, to either (a) block the consolidation or a united Europe or (b) increase its pool of friends within a hypothetical United Europe.
Continuing competing aggressively for the friendship and autonomy of Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand vis a vis both the Chinese and the Japanese.
Compete, albeit quietly, with Australia for influence in New Zealand and Papua New Guinea.
Strengthen the bilateral ties with Turkey and Israel as the chief partners in all projects Middle Eastern.
Improve relations with key central African states, such Congo.
Unfriendly Endeavors
Select friendly intiatives aside, assert containment policy toward socialist ideology in the Americas outside of Venezuela and Cuba; assist in the crushing of such movements in places such as Mexico and Peru, where attainment of real power is not unforseeable.
Increase American influence in the one area it has never been strong: Africa. Use variety of objectives, war on terror, oil and access to strategic resources, to pressure local governments into accepting change of status.
Areas of critical concern are central Africa, along the oil-bearing Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa, and along the Mediterranean coast of the continent, especially Morocco and Algeria.
Destabilize, destroy and reconstitute (if possible) the countries of Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, not necessarily in that order. American perspective is that leaving anarchy in its wake is preferable to the existence of strong, stable disagreeable regimes.
Use tsunami aid as pretense to assert stronger presence on the island of Sri Lanka, as a check to rising Indian power.
As trade-off, partner with India to assist in the crushing of Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
China, etc.
To be continued in later updates.
This is hard work. :)