I AM OF THE OPINION THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR IRAQ BELONGS COMPLETELY TO BUSH BECAUSE HE SNATCHED DEFEAT IN THE MATTER FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY.There are many reasons behind my opinion, many more than I desire to set forth here, but I offer some words of explanation why.
I believe it is accurate to assert that THE AUMF OF 2002 ACTUALLY WORKED EXACTLY AS IT WAS INTENDED by those who supported it, particularly the Democrats. It helped create a UNANIMOUS U.N. Resolution on 11-8-02 to readmit weapons inspectors. It jump started the process designed to find WMD’s and disarm Saddam. It caused Saddam to agree to allow access to his palaces and scientists, without conditions. So what happened?
Despite the success of the AUMF, Bush had little patience for the inspection process. He and Tony Blair tried to unsuccessfully muster, with coercion and deceit, even spying on U.N. members, enough votes in the Security Council for a second resolution to authorize military action. That is why Colin Powell made his U.N. presentation on 2-5-03. However, the majority of the U.N. Security Council and the world, believing that Saddam was cooperating, wanted to continue to pressure him. Knowing they would fail to obtain the votes to authorize military action, Bush and Blair decided not to bother even calling for a second vote. They did not follow the will of the U.N., but ignored it. In hindsight, they treated the U.N., most of our longtime allies, and almost every nation in the Middle East, as irrelevant.
NEED MORE CONVINCING? Here's A TIMELINE that covers what happened between passage of the AUMF -- which directed the President to exhaust all diplomatic efforts and certify that a negotiated settlement was impossible -- and the invasion. You will see that the AUMF had the desired effect of bringing Iraq into conformity with U.N. resolutions, and how Bush deliberately undermined all efforts at a peaceful resolution.
AFTER THE TIMELINE ARE A FEW MORE COMMENTS TO PUT THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE. I HOPE YOU READ THEM!
October 10, 2002
The House votes 296 to 133 in favor of HR Res. 114 authorizing the president to use military force against Iraq, in spite of significant opposition from their constituencies. Commenting on the passing of the resolution, The Washington Post reports: "Yesterday's debate often lacked the passion and unpredictability of the 1991 affair, when members sat late into the night listening attentively to a war of words. By contrast, the House chamber was largely empty most of yesterday: the arguments familiar, the outcome certain, the conclusion anticlimactic." [Washington Post, 10/11/2002]
October 11, 2002
Senators vote 77 to 23 in favor of SJ Res. 46 authorizing the president to use military force against Iraq, despite significant opposition from their constituencies. [US Congress, 10/2/2002; Washington Post, 10/11/2002]
October 16, 2002
President Bush signs the congressional resolution authorizing him to use military force against Iraq. "I have not ordered the use of force. I hope the use of force will not become necessary," he says shortly before signing the document. "Hopefully this can be done peacefully. Hopefully we can do this without any military action." He says he has "carefully weighed the human cost of every option before us" and that he will only send troops "as a last resort." [US President, 10/21/2002]
November 8, 2002
The UN Security Council unanimously votes 15-0 in favor of UN Resolution 1441, which stipulates that Iraq is required to readmit UN weapons inspectors under tougher terms than required by previous UN resolutions. The resolution does not give the US authority to use force against Iraq. [United Nations, 11/8/2002] The resolution makes it very clear that only the UN Security Council has the right to take punitive action against Iraq in the event of noncompliance. [Common Dreams, 11/14/2002]
November 12, 2002
The Iraqi parliament votes unanimously to reject UN Resolution 1441. But since the parliament has no real authority, the final decision is left to Saddam Hussein, who has another three days to respond to the UN. [BBC, 11/12/2002; New York Times, 11/12/2002]
November 13, 2002
Iraqi Ambassador to the UN Mohammed Al-Douri delivers a 9-page letter from Baghdad to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s office agreeing to comply with UN Resolution 1441—without conditions. According to the ambassador, "The letter says that Iraq accepts the resolution, and accepts the return of inspectors. There are no conditions, no reservations. We explained in the letter the whole Iraqi position saying that Iraq... has not and will not have any mass destruction weapons, so we are not worried about the inspectors when they will be back." [Associated Press, 11/13/2002; London Times, 11/14/2002]
December 7, 2002
Iraq submits its declaration of military and civilian chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities to the UN one day early. It consists of 12 cd-roms and 43 spiral-bound volumes containing a total of 11,807 pages.
December 22, 2002
Iraq announces that it will permit UN inspectors to interview Iraqi scientists without government officials present. At a news conference in Baghdad, Amir al-Saadi, an adviser to Saddam, invites the US to send CIA agents into Iraq to lead inspectors to the alleged weapons sites. Gen. Amir Saadi says, "We do not even have any objection if the CIA sent somebody with the inspectors to show them the suspected sites." [MSNBC, 12/22/2002; Washington Post, 12/23/2002; New York Times, 12/23/2002] The Bush administration dismisses Baghdad’s offer as a "stunt." [USA Today, 12/22/2002; Guardian, 12/23/2002; Washington Post, 12/24/2002]
December 31, 2002
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan says in an interview with Israel's Army Radio that Saddam's government is cooperating with UN weapons inspectors and that he sees no reason for the use of force against Iraq. "Iraq is cooperating and they [inspectors] are able to do their work in an unimpeded manner and therefore I don't see an argument for a military action now," the secretary-general says. "They may give an interim report before the [January] 27 [deadline] and I really do not see any basis for an action until then, particularly as they are able to carry out their work in an unimpeded manner." [Reuters, 12/31/2001; BBC, 12/31/2001; Independent, 1/1/2003] The Independent of London call his remarks "a blunt warning to Britain and the United States that they will need clear evidence of clandestine weapons programs in Iraq to win support from other nations for any military campaign against Saddam Hussein this winter." [Independent, 1/1/2003]
January 13, 2003
US President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell meet alone in the Oval Office for twelve minutes. According to Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, Bush says, "The inspections are not getting us there.... I really think I’m going to have to do this," adding that he is firm in his decision. Powell responds, "You’re sure?... You understand the consequences.... You know that you’re going to be owning this place?" Bush indicates that he understands the implications and asks, "Are you with me on this?... I think I have to do this. I want you with me." Powell responds: "I’ll do the best I can.... Yes, sir, I will support you. I’m with you, Mr. President." Woodward will also say in his book that Bush had never—ever—asked his Secretary of State for his advice on the matter of Iraq. "In all the discussions, meetings, chats and back-and-forth, in Powell’s grueling duels with Rumsfeld and Defense, the president had never once asked Powell, Would you do this? What’s your overall advice? The bottom line?" Woodward will write. [New York Times, 4/17/2004; Washington Post, 4/18/2004 Sources: Top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward]
January 14, 2003
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expresses optimism that the Iraq conflict could be resolved peacefully. In contrast to Bush’s statements (see January 14, 2003), Annan says that Saddam’s level of cooperation has improved since the UNSCOM inspections of the late nineties and therefore there is reason to hope that war can be avoided. He also states very clearly that it is premature to discuss whether or not the use of military force will be needed. "I am both optimistic and hopeful that if we handle the situation right, and the pressure on the Iraqi leadership is maintained and the inspectors continue to work as aggressively as they are doing, we may be able to disarm Iraq peacefully," he says. [New York Times, 1/15/2003; Washington Post, 1/15/2003]
January 19, 2003
During a meeting with foreign ministers from 13 of the 15 Security Council member states, US Secretary of State Colin Powell encounters strong resistance to the Bush administration’s view that the inspections are not working and that Iraq is not cooperating. Russia, China, France and Germany all express their satisfaction with how the inspections are proceeding and say that their preference is that the inspectors be permitted to continue their work. Only Britain appears willing to provide support for Washington’s position, reiterating the American stance that Saddam is running out of time. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin is the most vocal in his opposition to the Bush administration’s attempt to rationalize the need for war. In an interview, he says the UN should remain "on the path of cooperation" and that France will never "associate [itself] with military intervention... not supported by the international community." He adds,"We think that military intervention would be the worst possible solution." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov also disagrees with the Bush administration’s insistence that military force will be needed, explaining: "Terrorism is far from being crushed. We must be careful not to take unilateral steps that might threaten the unity of the entire [anti-]terrorism coalition. In this context we are strictly in favor of a political settlement of the situation revolving around Iraq." [Washington Post, 1/20/2003] Germany’s Joschka Fischer similarly states: "Iraq has complied fully with all relevant resolutions and cooperated very closely with the UN team on the ground. We think things are moving in the right direction, based on the efforts of the inspection team, and [they] should have all the time which is needed." [Washington Post, 1/20/2003; New York Times, 1/20/2003]
January 28, 2003
Bush gives his State of the Union address, making several false allegations about Iraq. [US President, 2/3/2003]
January 31, 2003
US President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair meet at the White House to discuss Iraq. Blair presses Bush to seek a second UN resolution that would provide specific legal backing for the use of force against Iraq. According to the minutes of the meeting, Bush says that "the diplomatic strategy [has] to be arranged around the military planning" and that the "US would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would ‘twist arms’ and ‘even threaten.’" But if such efforts fail, Bush is recorded saying, "military action would follow anyway." Bush also tells Blair that he hopes to commence military action on March 10. Blair does not demur and offers Britain’s total support for the war, saying that he was "solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam." Notwithstanding, he insists that "a second Security Council resolution would provide an insurance policy against the unexpected, and international cover, including with the Arabs." According to Bush, the question that needs to be addressed is what should they cite as evidence that Iraq is in breach of his obligations under UN Resolution 1441. The minutes indicate that there is concern that inspections have failed to provide sufficient evidence of a material breach. "The US was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colors," the minutes report. "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach." [Sands, 2005; Channel 4 News (London), 2/2/2006; MSNBC, 2/2/2006; Guardian, 2/3/2006; New York Times, 3/27/2006]
February 5, 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell presents the Bush administration’s case against Saddam to the UN Security Council, in advance of an expected vote on a second resolution that the US and Britain hope will provide the justification to use military force against Iraq. [US Department of State, 2/5/2003] At the insistence of Powell, CIA Director George Tenet is seated directly behind him to the right. "It was theater, a device to signal to the world that Powell was relying on the CIA to make his case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction," Vanity Fair magazine will later explain. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 371-2; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 232] In his speech before the Council, Powell makes the case that Iraq is in further material breach of past UN resolutions, specifically the most recent one, UN Resolution 1441. Sources cited in Powell’s presentation include defectors, informants, communication intercepts, procurement records, photographs, and detainees. [US Department of State, 2/5/2003] Most of the allegations made by Powell are later demonstrated to be false. "The defectors and other sources went unidentified," the Associated Press will later report. "The audiotapes were uncorroborated, as were the photo interpretations. No other supporting documents were presented. Little was independently verifiable." [Associated Press, 8/9/2003]
Mid-February 2003
Washington considers a plan to convince dovish Security Council members of the need to use military force against Iraq. Unnamed administration officials tell the New York Times that Washington intends to test the willingness of Iraq to disarm by imposing new demands. Under the administration’s plan, Iraq would be required to (1) permit overflights by American, European and Russian surveillance aircraft; (2) allow weapons inspectors to interview Iraqi scientists without the presence of government "minders" ; and (3) destroy all the equipment associated with its Al Samoud II missile program. At the same time these new demands are made, Washington would present a draft for a second resolution to the United Nations which would declare Iraq in violation of past UN resolutions and promise "serious consequences" if Iraq does not mend its ways. Then if Iraq fails to meet the new demands, the Bush administration hopes that Security Council doves would support the new resolution. [New York Times, 2/16/2003 Sources: Unnamed administration officials]
February 20, 2003
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says that the US and Britain are pressuring inspectors "to discontinue their operations in Iraq... or to pressure them into coming up with assessments that would justify the use of force." [Associated Press, 2/20/2003
February 24, 2003
The United States, Britain and Spain submit a draft to the UN Security Council for a second resolution declaring Iraq in "further material breach" of previous UN resolutions. The draft claims that the declaration Iraq submitted to the UN Security Council on December 7, 2002 (see December 7, 2002) contained "false statements and omissions" and that Iraq "has failed to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of" UN Resolution 1441. Meanwhile France, Russia and Germany field an alternative plan aimed at achieving peaceful disarmament with more rigorous inspections over a period of five months. China expresses support for the alternative plan despite efforts by Powell to convince its government to support the more aggressive proposal. [Fox News, 2/24/2003; United Nations, 2/24/2003] At this point, it seems that only Bulgaria will support the American-British-Spanish resolution. Eleven of the fifteen council members have indicated that they favor allowing the inspectors to continue their work. Fox News suggests that the US may be able to convince some countries—like Angola, Guinea and Cameroon—to support the resolution since "there is the possibility that supporting the resolution may reap financial benefits from the United States." [Fox News, 2/24/2003]
February 24, 2003
An unnamed senior UN diplomat tells the Washington Post that he had been told by US officials: "You are not going to decide whether there is war in Iraq or not. That decision is ours, and we have already made it. It is already final. The only question now is whether the council will go along with it or not." [Washington Post, 2/25/2003 Sources: Unnamed (non-US) senior U.N diplomat]
February 27, 2003
Iraq agrees to destroy all the equipment associated with its Al Samoud missile program, including warheads, SA-2 missile engines, machinery to produce missile motors, fuel, launchers, testing equipment, components as well as all software and documentation. The UN had earlier concluded that the missile program was in violation of UN resolutions because the range of the missiles exceeds the 150km limit imposed in 1991 after the Gulf War (see February 12, 2003).
March 1, 2003
Iraq begins destroying equipment associated with its Al Samoud Weapons program which the UN had determined was in violation of UN resolutions since the range of the missiles exceeds the 150km limit imposed in 1991 after the Gulf War (see February 12, 2003). [BBC, 3/2/2003; CNN, 3/9/2003]
March 2003
Diplomats from 6 UN Security Council member-states secretly meet one night to write an alternative resolution to the US-British-Spanish draft (see February 24, 2003). The compromise resolution would give UN weapons inspectors additional time to complete their work. But the next morning, a US diplomat contacts the Mexicans and tells them not to proceed with the alternative draft. Former Mexican Ambassador to the UN Aguilar Zinser will tell the Associated Press almost a year later: "Only the people in that room knew what that document said. Early the next morning, I received a call from a US diplomat saying the United States found that text totally unacceptable." [Associated Press, 2/12/2004; Observer, 2/15/2004 Sources: Adolfo Aguilar Zinser] "‘When they [the US] found out, they said, ‘You should know that we don’t like the idea and we don’t like you to promote it.’" Zinser will also tell The Observer. [Observer, 2/15/2004] Aguilar Zinser believes that US knowledge of the secret initiative meant that the meeting had been under surveillance. "It was very obvious to the countries involved in the discussion on Iraq that we were being observed and that our communications were probably being tapped," Aguilar Zinser will later explain to the Associated Press. "The information was being gathered to benefit the United States." [Associated Press, 2/12/2004; Observer, 2/15/2004 Sources: Adolfo Aguilar Zinser] Chile will make similar claims, saying that its UN mission telephones were under surveillance. [Associated Press, 2/12/2004]
March 6, 2003
During a televised national press conference, President Bush states that the US will call for a vote in the UN Security Council, regardless of the anticipated vote. A reporter asks, "[T]he Security Council faces a vote next week on a resolution implicitly authorizing an attack on Iraq. Will you call for a vote on that resolution, even if you aren’t sure you have the vote?" Bush responds: "No matter what the whip count is, we’re calling for the vote. We want to see people stand up and say what their opinion is about Saddam Hussein and the utility of the United Nations Security Council. And so, you bet. It’s time for people to show their cards, to let the world know where they stand when it comes to Saddam." But 11 days later, Bush will announce that the US will not call for a vote, saying, "The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours." The decision is made not to seek a second resolution when it becomes apparent that it would not pass. [CNN, 3/6/2003; US President, 3/10/2003]
March 7, 2003
UN diplomats debate the text of an amendment to the American-British-Spanish draft resolution that will give Iraq a March 17 deadline to disarm. The amendment, submitted by the British, demands that Iraq demonstrate "full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations." Notably, the resolution does not provide any specific means for the UN to measure Iraqi compliance, thus requiring that any judgment concerning Iraq's level of cooperation be arbitrary. [CNN, 3/7/2003; Guardian, 3/8/2003] A diplomat tells CNN, that he has "a better chance of getting a date with Julia Roberts than Iraq has of complying in 10 days." [CNN, 3/7/2003] There is significant opposition to the text of this draft and a diplomat tells CNN that the resolution will likely be defeated by a landslide. France, Russia, and China believe that the inspections should be given more time. France's Foreign minister says he will veto the resolution. "We cannot accept an ultimatum as long as the inspectors are reporting cooperation," he says, adding: "That would mean war. By imposing a deadline of a few days, would we be reduced to seeking a pretext for war? France will not allow a resolution to pass that authorizes the automatic use of force." [CNN, 3/7/2003; Guardian, 3/8/2003; New York Times, 3/8/2003]
March 7, 2003
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission chief arms inspector Hans Blix provides a quarterly report to the UN Security Council on the progress of inspections in Iraq, as required by UN Security Resolution 1284 (1999). It is the twelfth such report since UNMOVIC's inception. Blix's report to the Council does not contain any evidence to support US and British claims that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction or the programs to develop such weapons. [United Nations, 3/7/2003 pdf file; CNN, 3/7/2003]
March 17, 2003
In a televised address to the nation, shortly before the US officially begins its invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush justifies the need to use military force. He asserts that the US has "pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war," but that Iraq "has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament." He maintains that Iraq "continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised" and "has aided, trained, and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al-Qaeda." "Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed," he insists. Bush then gives Saddam Hussein an ultimatum, warning the Iraqi leader that if he and his sons do not leave Iraq within 48 hours, the US will use military force to topple his government. The choice is his, Bush says. "Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it." He assures Iraqis that the US will liberate them and bring them democracy and warns Iraq’s military not to destroy its country’s oil wells or obey orders to deploy weapons of mass destruction. [US President, 3/24/2003]
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/...
THE CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESEARCH SITE CONTAINS A SLEW OF INFORMATION TO SHOW THE MENDACITY AND CULPABILITY OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION FOR THE IRAQ WAR, FAR AND BEYOND THE PRESENTATION HERE.
Parenthetically, here’s an interesting part of the story:
(February-March 2003)
In February, Hassan al-Obeidi, chief of foreign operations of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, pays a visit to Imad Hage, a Lebanese-American businessman living in Beruit who has contacts in the Pentagon. Obeidi requests his help in relaying a backchannel offer to Washington in an attempt to avert war. Hage later tells the New York Times that Obeidi told him: "If this is about oil, we will talk about US oil concessions. If it is about the peace process, then we can talk. If this is about weapons of mass destruction, let the Americans send over their people. There are no weapons of mass destruction. Americans could send 2,000 FBI agents to look wherever they wanted," At one point, Obeidi says that Iraq would even agree to hold elections within the next two years. Hage relays everything to Pentagon staffer Mike Maloof in Washington. [New York Times, 11/6/2003] Hage then travels to Baghdad and meets with Iraq’s chief of intelligence Tahir Jalil Habbush Al-Tikriti. Hage later recalls: "[The Iraqis] would be willing to allow between 1,000 to 2,000 US agents, FBI and/or scientists, into Iraq to verify, according to them, the absence of weapons of mass destruction or that they no longer had weapons of mass destruction. The second point, they offered to turn over Abdul Rahman Yasin, [under indictment in] the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. And on the third issue, they offered to hold free and fair elections in Iraq within a year or two. They kept on asking why they were targeted or they would be targeted, that they didn’t wish confrontation with the United States. If it was about oil, they’d be willing to make concessions on oil." [New York Times, 11/6/2003; CNN, 11/7/2003] On February 19, Hage faxes a three-page report to Maloof listing five concessions the Iraqis were willing to make: cooperation in the war on terrorism, "full support for any US plan" in the Arab-Israeli peace process, giving "the US... first priority as it relates to Iraq oil, mining rights," support for United States strategic interests in the region, and "direct US involvement on the ground in disarming Iraq." Details of the Iraqi offer are sent to several top Pentagon officials. [New York Times, 11/6/2003] In early March, Hage and Richard Perle meet in London. Hage informs him that the Iraqis would like to arrange a secret meeting with him to discuss their offer. According to Perle, he then contacts the CIA seeking permission to meet with the Iraqis. But according to Perle, the CIA isn’t interested. "The message was, ‘Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad.’" The agency also tells Perle that they had already pursued other backchannel leads with the Iraqi regime. According to one senior US intelligence official, the other leads "came via a broad range of foreign intelligence services, other governments, third parties, charlatans, and independent actors. Every lead that was at all plausible, and some that weren’t, were followed up." [New York Times, 11/6/2003; Risen, 2006, pp. 183-184] In spite of the CIA’s refusal to engage in talks with the Iraqis, Hage continues to forward offers by the Iraqis to Maloof. The US ignores them. [New York Times, 11/6/2003]
In the hands of a thoughtful and competent President, the AUMF would not have led to this disaster. In the hands of Bush, it became a dangerous blank check. Many recognized this at the time, even some who voted for the AUMF, yet wanted to create leverage at the U.N. as a means to compel Saddam. Faced with a resolution that was broader in scope, as seen below, the majority of Congress was willing to give the President of the United States the benefit of the doubt. Bush had, after all, promised to use diplomacy through the U.N. first and force as a last resort. Or so he claimed.
Again, in hindsight, Bush wasn't deserving of that trust. However, even for those who now claim they knew better back then, who were not at the time charged with any responsibility, (especially people reading these words), NONE of the following were known: The failure to have any plan for post-invasion; Abu Graib, Guantanamo, torture and rendition; Halliburton and war profiteers; The Medicare money scandal; Abramhoff; Armstrong Williams and Jeff Gannon; Spying on and data mining of Americans; FISA; Wilson & Plame; Schiavo; and Katrina. The list is far from complete. These types of horrors and crimes undeniably color our present perspective, but not one of them was present in any Senator’s (or any person’s) frame of reference in October, 2002, the time of the vote on the AUMF. Maybe it would have been different with such knowledge of the ultimate mendacity and incompetency that Bush would exhibit. Then it could more likely resemble 2006 or even right now, when it's time to stop this President. Unfortunately, it wasn’t.
There is another related thing to consider in this matter. As the Congress was constituted in 2002, there were just two alternative resolutions that had the possibility of passage.
The first resolution was overreaching in scope. It was preferred by Bush and supported by the leaders of both parties in Congress. It was called Daschle-Lott, SR45 (Gephardt-Hastert in the House). Under it, the President was:
"authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region."
In response, a consensus resolution was sponsored by Lieberman, SR46 and co-sponsored by others, later to include Edwards, based on an earlier resolution circulated by Biden and Lugar that focused on the use of force against Iraq, as opposed to the entire region, and specified that the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction would be the reason for using military force. That proposal, derailed by Bush and a Democratic leadership fearful it would be an election issue, was recreated into the AUMF of 2002, supported by Clinton, Dodd, Biden and 74 others, to limit the overreaching power that Bush would have otherwise obtained, perhaps to use force against Iran or Syria.
YES, THE AUMF OF 2002 WORKED! It gave Bush authority, as he asked, to go to the U.N. and get a resolution concerning Iraq and WMD, and even a second one. U.N. Resolution 1441 was UNANIMOUS. Iraq agreed to fully comply and did so. Bush claimed as late as March 6, 2003, that he would seek that second U.N. resolution, as Resolution 1441 made clear that only the U.N. Security Council had the right to take punitive action against Iraq in the event of noncompliance. But he did not. So how are the Democrats to blame?
In law, there is a concept called the Doctrine of Superseding Cause. Under this doctrine, a defendant in a tort action is allowed to argue that while it may have made a mistake somewhere along the line, ultimately any blame for the claimant’s injuries should be shifted to a third person, whose bad conduct was really at fault for the incident. In legal jargon, the defendant was allowed to argue there was no "proximate cause" between its conduct and the plaintiff's injuries because the sequence of events was broken by the superseding act or force of a third person. In the case of the AUMF of 2002 and the Iraq War, although the Democrats who supported the AUMF made a mistake, the sequence of events was broken by Bush’s bad conduct. He is really at fault. He is the "proximate cause" for the Iraq War.
Of course, there will always be people who neglect the facts and circumstances set forth above. They must. For many, it does not serve their own partisan purposes. This diary was not written for them. In effect, they would just as soon blame a Democrat as Bush. They call people cheerleaders and war mongers at the drop of the hat. That shows where they are coming from. Alternatively, they say it is a matter of judgment. Perhaps it makes them feel pure. To me, their focus is misplaced. They obsess on the past while seeming to ignore the present, where there are important matters about ending the war how best to do it. Again, this is not written for them, but for those who strive to be objective, who want to understand and form judgments about now and the future based in context. To those for whom this is written, including any lurkers, before you place fault on anyone besides Bush, please keep these words in mind.
One final note, Ted Kennedy and George McGovern authorized LBJ to use force in Vietnam. RKF actually helped LBJ sell escalation in Vietnam. Each ended up as a vociferous opponent of that war. Do we question their credentials? Would we as Democrats have rejoiced if any had become President? Should we have a double standard today? Just some food for thought.
Thanks for reading if you made it this far. I appreciate it, you lurkers and open minded souls, more than you know.
