Current Central Intelligence Agency Director General Michael Hayden appeared on Meet the Press with Tim Russert this morning, in his first Sunday morning interview since taking office. He made a number of statements worth further examination.
He discussed the situation in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan, interrogation techniques, and our intelligence on Saddam Hussein.
What we learned after the jump...
Tim Russert asked Director Hayden about the following statement he made in November of 2006:
The inability of the [Iraqi] government to govern seems irreversible
He added that he had made that statement in reference to the "short-term." He went on to state that there are no "natural breaks" left, that is anywhere where we could make significant gains without significant cost in blood and treasure. The first election is Iraq is an example of the type of natural break he was referencing.
He admits that our intelligence report on Saddam was wrong (he was Director of the National Security Agency at the time). He partially blames relying too much on older intelligence without new intelligence to support it, and said that now the U.S. intelligence community is taking time into consideration when making judgments in their confidence in intelligence reports. Which is wise, but not something that we should have needed the intelligence failures pre-Iraq to learn.
He refused to confirm or deny that we have stepped up strikes against al-Qaeda in Pakistan due to concerns that our ability to do so will be reduced by the negative results for President Musharraf in the recent elections in Pakistan. He did, however, talk some about the situation in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, or AfPak border. He stated it presents (clear and present) danger to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the West. He stated he believes Osama Bin Laden is there, and that if there is another attack, it will originate from that region. Al-Qaeda has been able to create a safe haven, and has been able to bring in Western-looking operatives for training.
I would like to make a few comments on the above. This supports the assertions Obama has been making that we should focus more on Afghanistan than Iraq (while al-Qaeda is present in Iraq, they do not have the strength there they do in the AfPak region). It supports his assertion we should have built relationships with Pakistani leaders other than Musharraf. Our failure to do so may negatively impact our ability to hunt Bin Laden in that region. The danger of profiling was also highlighted, as there is an opportunity for al-Qaeda to circumvent measures aimed at Arabic-looking travelers by recruiting non-descript operatives.
The CIA does not believe that Osama Bin Laden is operational involved in al-Qaeda, but is rather an iconic figure. I think this highlights the value of capturing Bin Laden, rather than simply killing him. Killing him will create a martyr for the Islamic-terrorist community, and will not cripple them operationally, if he is in fact more of a figurehead. By capturing and trying Bin Laden, however, we can work to reduce his influence.
Director Hayden mentions a very large number of al-Qaeda operatives are Egyptian. The American public needs to understand the list of countries producing terrorists and with some ties to these terror groups is much longer than just Afghanistan and Iraq, and includes U.S. allies (most notably Saudi Arabia). It is no way remotely feasible to invade each of these countries, nor would that be effective. There assistance in helping us root out al-Qaeda is absolutely necessary.
He points out the disaster of President Musharraf's hands off attitude towards al-Qaeda activity in the AfPak region. While a heavy military hand is not normally desirably, or conducive to long-term economic success, in this case the lack of one allowed al-Qaeda and the Taliban their "safe haven."
Tim Russert read the following quote from Lt. Gen. John Kimmons on new guidelines from the U.S. Army field manual:
The new U.S. Army manual bans torture and degrading treatment of prisoners, for the first time specifically mentioning forced nakedness, hooding and other procedures that have become infamous since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. ...
It also explicitly bans beating prisoners, sexually humiliating them, threatening them with dogs, depriving them of food or water, performing mock executions, shocking them with electricity, burning them, causing other pain and a technique called "water boarding."
This applies to the Army, not to the CIA. Per Director Hayden, the CIA has not water boarded anyone in the past three years and only three people in the life of their interrogation program. So the DOJ is fighting for a method that the CIA itself does not see fit to use. I inferred he did not feel comfortable with water boarding, regardless of previous legal opinions.
He makes a good point when he argues that the CIA should not be limited to what the Army feels confident training young soldiers to do under minimal supervision against lawful combatants, in a transient battlefield situation. The CIA's situation is distinctly different, with highly trained agents, a controlled environment, and a specific goal to obtain valuable intelligence. He welcomed whatever box the government chose to put the CIA in, but argued it should not arbitrarily apply the standards of another organization (in this case the Army). While I believe the box should be tightened, I agree that the standards should be CIA specific.
Russert played a clip of Cheney arguing for expanded power and secrecy immediately after 9/11. I really believe we had two of the worst possible people in the Oval Office at the time.
Director Hayden stated all the calls monitored as a part of the post-9/11 wiretapping program were international calls. He dodged a question of whether any innocent people were targeting. He believes Iran is still pursuing nuclear weaponization.
At the end of the interview, Director Hayden made a statement that I had not heard before and that I believe is very important. He said that Saddam had a nuclear and WMD program that had been halted for many years, but before he died he admitted "he maintained the illusion because he wanted the world...to believe he still had these weapons."