It is a paradox. One thinks the very idea of "conservativism" implies an appreciation for "caution." Indeed, I saw that was once the case, as I sadly perused this morning George F. Kennan's famous "long telegram" from 1946, in which he laid out the basic tenets of his view of the emerging problem of Soviet communism. But the conservative worldview, especially on the front of foreign affairs, is today a different beast; it possesses not the virtue of caution, or to use a more venerable term, prudence.
But what is missing? How can an administration that speaks with one voice of dire existential threats, of orange and yellow homeland security alerts, of smoking guns and mushroom clouds, and of malevolent miners from Niger bearing yellow cake, not be rather the very apotheosis of caution?
That is because there is a huge difference between the emotional frenzy of panic and the centered virtue of caution....
Reading Kennan's terse treatise on how to view and confront the Soviet menace, what is striking is the calm and measured tone it strikes, the healthy ratio it possesses between assertiveness and caution. To be sure, Kennan was in fact a hawk in these days; he was not of the belief that the Soviets could really be dealt with as partners or allies. He realized the great confrontation -- that we now call the Cold War -- was on. As he summarizes in his conclusion:
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.
No pacific optimist he!
Thus far, it may seem Kennan was of a piece with our dreadful contemporaries, who argue that can be no peace with the "Islamofascists," that ours is a momentous time of momentous struggle, etc. etc.
But a hugely different picture emerges once one begins to digest the spirit or ethos that then emerges in the wake of his acknowledgment of conflict.
Kennan's spirit is one of a double caution, his ethos one of a double prudence.
First, it is absolutely fundamental to Kennan's analysis of the Soviet mentality and "ideological culture" that it is wholly disconnected from objective reality and is thus shot through with delusional flows of power. This is one front of Kennan's innate prudence: we must beware an irrational foe, who is dangerously cut off from the only true touchstone of a sound national policy, "objective reality." An example of his biting critique of the Soviet irrationalism:
Many of them [Soviet apparatchiks and party leaders] are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question... self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world.
Well, well. Kennan's caution here is subtle; he is arguing that we need to beware a government that is fundamentally delusional, but this delusion is given particular shape and definition. Whereas Bush simply and bluntly states, "They hate us for our freedoms," and leaves it at that, Kennan goes much, much further: he argues that such hatred (then as now, indeed) is irrational because it is predicated on a warped view of reality and how the world works.
This is to say, it is not hatred per se that is the objectionable fact of the Soviet demeanor toward the West, but rather, and much more to the point, it is the delusional and paranoid views of how the world works that is the underlying objection.
As always, it helps to be able to distinguish dependent from independent variables. The fear or hatred of the Stalinist Soviets toward the West is of course an objection, but that fear or hatred is only a symptom, not a cause; the underlying cause, the independent variable, is a fundamental incapacity to see things clearly.
Thus we have the first principle of Kennan's spirit of caution: beware those who close themselves off from reality by means of irrational delusions, fears, and panics. The real objection of the Soviet menace is not per se its hatred of the West, but rather the delusional substrata of its entire national and ideological functioning. As Kennan argued, the hatred of the West is merely the "neurotic" expression of an underlying national-governmental pathology of a xenophobic and conspiracy-obsessed delusionality.
This first spirit of caution -- "Beware those who are disconnected from the real!" as opposed to the simplistic and superficial Bush-esque "Beware those who hate us!" -- leads smoothly to the second facet of Kennan's cautiousness. He argues that, for ourselves, we must not allow ourselves to fall into a similar trap, we must not allow ourselves to become victims of "self-hypnosis," we must remain clear-eyed, we must remain vigilant... about ourselves.
It is the second dominant theme of Kennan's analysis that in regard to the prospects of the West, that the auspices are good. What do we really have to fear? As the old saying goes, nothing but fear itself. It is really only our own missteps that could lead to bad outcomes, he argues, and so we must cultivate a care regarding our own societies and policies. We must cultivate a self-care, a self-caution, for if we allow ourselves to become panicked, if we allow ourselves to fall into our own xenophobic and conspiracy-obsessed delusionality, we will have become like them. Here are his concluding remarks about what the stance of the US must be toward irrational and deluded Soviet communism; it is so wonderfully refreshing in today's age of Bush-panic and fear-speak, I cite them in full:
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
I will not comment overmuch on Kennan's concluding advisements. In today's deluded climate of fear, of people throwing caution to the wind, throwing prudence and cheer regarding our values, who suspend all rights at the drop of a mere hat, who simply have lost the ability to view the future with optimism and with full knowledge the auspices are indeed good, Kennan's words and spirit are refreshing. His is a cautious mind, a cheerful, prudent mind, a resolute mind in the old frame, who is not afraid, but calm and assured. He viewed the threats of his time, as he says, much like how a "doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual."
But today, it is the death of such wise and happy cautiousness. It is replaced with fear and panic, which then masquerades as strength, resoluteness, and clear-eyed realism. But it is not. It is panic cutting itself off from the calm viewing of the real, it is fear swallowing in on itself feeding off of old phobias of the Other.
It is Us vs Them, and it is as a result Us becoming Them.
And to think: Bush wanted the carpet in the Oval Office to express the notion of "Optimistic Man Comes to Work"...
Keep telling yourself that, George, just keep repeating it over and over and over...
Every deluded tyrant that has ever lived in panic and a paralyzed reason has told themselves the same thing...