Inspired by heathlander
Dedicated to Red Auerbach
Questions sometimes arise about American Jewish attachment to Israel. In Arab and Jewish Americans agree, I discussed a Zogby poll commissioned by Americans for Peace Now and the Arab American Institute, which uncovered considerable agreement between the two communities. (See Tables 9 and 10.)
This diary discusses American Jewish Attachment to Israel (pdf), a recent study from social scientists at Brandeis University. One interesting discovery is that, "[t]o the extent that American Jews participate in the broader political culture, the increasingly pro-Israel orientation of the American public likely provided support for specifically Jewish feelings of attachment."
The study also undermines the claim that younger American Jews are becoming less attached to Israel.
In recent years, "a mounting body of evidence" (pdf), mostly by Steven M. Cohen, of Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion and the Florence G. Heller-JCCA Research Center, "has pointed to a growing distancing from Israel of American Jews, and the distancing seems to be most pronounced among younger Jews." "We are, Cohen concluded, "in the midst of a massive shift in attitudes toward Israel, propelled forward by the process of cohort replacement, where the maturing younger cohorts that are the least Israel-engaged are replacing the oldest cohorts that are the most Israel-engaged."
But more recent research from faculty at the Steinhardt Social Research Institute at Brandeis University comes to a dramatically different conclusion. Examining survey data from 1994 to 2007, in particular, the new study finds that "the proportion of respondents agreeing that Israel is a 'very important' aspect of their Jewish identity holds stable throughout the entire time period."
The current study shows, . . . that no significant decline is evident in the survey data for the period extending from the early 1990s to the most recent years. In addition, the study demonstrates that age-cohort differences today are comparable to those reported in the past and are thus most likely related to life-cycle and aging. Finally, the study indicates that general political orientation and views regarding the future of the Occupied Territories are largely independent of feelings of attachment to Israel.
Every year since 1994, except 1997, respondents have been asked whether "Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew." About three-quarters of respondents consistently say that it is.
According to the authors, the recent dip in support "is not a statistically significant trend, and, in any case, it represents a return to the levels seen in 2000--prior to the intifada and to 9/11. In absolute terms, it remains that an overwhelming majority of survey respondents see Israel as very important to their Jewish identity."
Also, from 1994 to 2000, the percentage of American Jews who feel very or fairly close to Israel has increased from about 66% to 70% (having peaked at 77%).
Having shown that the overall level of American Jewish attachment to Israel has not declined over the last twenty years, the study goes on to consider evidence to answer the question whether "younger American Jews are more distant from Israel than their counterparts a generation ago?" Looking at the survey data for 2000 and 2005 survey, the most recent one for which the full data set is available, the study found that taking "a snapshot image of American Jewry, younger respondents appear less attached to Israel than older respondents." But the data show that this difference relates to life-cycle effects, not progressively weaker ties to Israel on the part of successive generations of American Jews.
The study examined longitudinal data, which show no decline in the longitudinal data from 1994 to 2007. That is, over time, as birth cohorts have aged they have become more attached, or no less attached, to Israel than their predecessor birth cohorts.
Survey data from the 1970s and 1980s also showed that younger birth cohorts were less attached than they later became (turning into the older, more attached cohorts of the 1990s and 2000s). "In sum, age-differences have been a consistent feature of the survey evidence on American Jewish attachment to Israel. However, such differences are evident in surveys from the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, and no evidence shows that attachment has declined across the generations. The conclusion that best fits these observations is that American Jews have tended to become more attached to Israel as they grew older[.]"
The data also show that liberal American Jews are not more detached from Israel due to opposition to particular Israeli government policies.
American Jews are somewhat divided in their attitudes towards the Occupied Territories and creating a Palestinian state.
But "respondents’ general political orientation on a continuum from 'extremely liberal' to 'extremely conservative' is not related to attachment to Israel." (Indeed, last year's Cohen study also concluded that "left-leaning politics" did not correlate with diminished attachment to Israel.) "For most American Jews," the new study concludes, "opinions regarding Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians are independent of feelings of attachment to the Jewish state."
Does age make a difference. Yes, but in a very surprising way. "Younger Jews with right-leaning politics are especially alientated from Israel, even more than their counterparts with left-leaning political views."
Interestingly, fluctuations in American Jewish attachment to Israel tracks general American sympathies between Israel and the Palestinians. Between 1996 and 2006,
"the proportion indicating pro-Israel sentiment increased by 21 percentage points (from 38 to 59 percent), whereas the proportion indicating pro-Palestinian sentiment increased by five percentage points (from 15 to 20 percent). To the extent that American Jews participate in the broader political culture, the increasingly pro-Israel orientation of the American public likely provided support for specifically Jewish feelings of attachment."