Yesterday, I posted a diary that is very time sensitive, but got little attention; Senate hearings will be held tomorrow (Wednesday). I am reposting the diary today so that it has a chance of being picked up on radar. I apologize for breaking the rules but this is one of those times when doing so is actually conscienable and arguably an issue of national security. There is too much at stake to not repost--over one-third of all states in the union, and 213 out of the 270 vote majority needed to win the Presidency will not be fully auditable under the current bill.
If you care about the integrity of the electoral process, I need you to (1) rec this diary to the top and (2) contact your Senator today or tomorrow regarding Bill S.3212, the "Bipartisan Electronic Voting Reform Act of 2008" introduced by Senators Feinstein and Bennett.
With only 98 days till the election, this could be the most important action you take to protect your vote (and those of your neighbors).
Here is how the team at Verified Voting described things:
Here is what's happening. This Wednesday, the U.S. Senate will hold hearings on S.3212, a bill aimed at providing independent verification of ballots cast on electronic voting machines. That's a laudable goal, but S.3212 gets it wrong - very wrong.
S.3212 would allow electronic "verification" of votes cast on electronic voting machines. If S.3212 becomes law, elections in many states would still depend on the trustworthiness of computer software. This bill also fails to require hand audits of federal election results, and contains other measures that could set back years of progress toward transparent and trustworthy elections.
I am incredibly despondent that the Senate has waited until 98 days before the election to act to protect our votes (given the widespread coverage of shady practices in the 2004 election).
According to Verified Voting, seventeen states and the District of Columbia will be using paperless systems to some extent in the General Election in November.
Voters in six states (60 electoral votes) — Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Louisiana, New Jersey and South Carolina — will use entirely paperless machines.
In seven other states (104 electoral votes) — Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia — most of the machines are paperless.
Four other states (49 electoral votes) — Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi and Wisconsin — will have a small number of paperless systems in place.
Altogether, that means that over one-third of all states in the union, and 213 out of the 270 vote majority needed to win the Presidency will not be fully auditable!!!
For those of you not familiar with the situation, please watch these two videos:
The first is a snippet from the documentary "UNCOUNTED: The New Math of American Elections" made by Emmy award-winning director David Earnhardt.
The second is videotape of computer programmer Clinton Eugene Curtis testifying under oath that he wrote a prototype computer program in October 2000 for State Senator Tom Feeney (Speaker of the House of Florida at the time) that would flip an election 51%-49% and then "eat itself" leaving no trace of its existence after execution!!!
Holy Fixed Elections, Batman!!!
When you go to the bank and do a transaction, you are always given a paper receipt of the transaction.
When you go the convenience store, the cash register prints both your receipt and an additional receipt (on a long spool of paper) for auditing purposes later.
If our banks and our convenience stores both require paper trails of all transactions, then why isn't the U.S. government demanding the same for our votes?!?
Many of the world's most prominent computer scientists have concluded that a voter-verified paper record of every ballot is crucial to the integrity of elections.
In my opinion, it there must be a Federal law requiring all electronic voting machines have (1) a paper trail of votes cast, and (2) a way for the voter to visually verify that the vote recorded was the vote cast.
This is the minimum required for a healthy democracy.
Here is a list of the concerns that Verified Voting has with the current bill. I will cut and paste the short version here to expedite everyone's communications with his/her Senator.
S. 3212: A Step Backward for Voting System Transparency
Contact: Pamela Smith
July 25th, 2008
On June 26, 2008, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Senator Robert Bennett (R-UT) introduced the Bipartisan Electronic Voting Reform Act (S. 3212). The press release accompanying the introduction of S. 3212 observes "the ability to ensure there is an accurate, reliable and transparent method for Americans to cast and count votes is fundamental to our democratic process." Unfortunately, S.3212 falls far short of ensuring accuracy, reliability, and transparency in our elections and is likely to do more harm than good.
The bill contains some generally commendable provisions relating to election security (Section 4), voting system testing and certification (Section 5), and ballot layout design (Section 10), but the positive aspects of these provisions are outweighed by the problems created by many of the other sections of this bill. Despite its worthy motivations, the bill fails to carry out its objective.
A number of troubling provisions require us to urge opposition to S. 3212:
- S.3212 allows "independent" vote records that would exist only in computer memory to be used to verify electronic vote totals.
- The non-paper verification methods allowed by S. 3212 would increase the costs and burdens of conducting elections without the benefit of increased confidence and auditability.
- Language in the bill would exempt from any verification requirement those paperless voting systems purchased before January 1, 2009 to meet HAVA's accessibility requirements. This would leave millions of voters (particularly those with disabilities) dependent on insecure paperless electronic machines for the foreseeable future.
- S. 3212 is opaque and disturbingly open to interpretation on a critical question: would the bill require that it be the voter that verifies the contents of the independent record?
- S. 3212 would not define the legal status of the independent record in the event of a discrepancy in vote tallies.
- The bill would not require states to use the independent records in post-election audits.
- S. 3212 would not require the EAC to adopt model audit guidelines for jurisdictions that use paper ballot optical scan technology (now the most common voting system in the United States) nor would it require optical scan paper ballots to be utilized in any audits conducted in those jurisdictions.
- S. 3212 is unclear regarding how its requirements would apply to accessible ballot marking devices.
- S. 3212 could restrict the publication of valuable information about the security and reliability of voting systems.
- S. 3212 would place a representative of the voting system manufacturing industry on the committee that drafts federal voluntary voting system guidelines.
It is our view that all elections should be accessible, publicly verifiable, independently auditable, and as simple and cost-effective as possible, both to conduct and to audit. There is room for innovation, but innovation occurs even without such legislation, when demand exists. But we must take the necessary steps to safeguard all our elections—today, not years down the road. Yet this bill does not do that. Instead, it allows unverifiable systems to persist indefinitely.
However well-intentioned, S. 3212, if enacted as written, would damage the transparency and reliability of Federal elections in the U.S. for decades to come. VerifiedVoting.org respectfully urges citizens and members of the United States Senate to oppose its passage.
Download Verified Voting's complete statement on S. 3212
Please take a few minutes today to send a fax or email to your Senator.
UPDATE:In the earlier post, SC Kitty commented that Rush Holt's bill in the House (HR 811) is substantially betterthan S.3212. For those interested, you can see that bill here.