What happens when a President with a disapproval rating over 70%, and a Congress with a disapproval rating over 75%, get together and write legislation?
You end up with an inexcusable, $700 billion dollar give-away to Wall Street, a badly drafted bill, riddled with massive loopholes, a bill polished up for public consumption to appear to do "x," when in fact, it does "y."
And true to form, absolutely consistent with the public’s overwhelmingly negative assessment of them, the much reviled President, and the even more reviled Congress, proceed to sell this dog to the electorate through deception and fear.
Ahead, very likely, lies a political day of reckoning for all members of Congress who support this legislation. If the early incendiary efforts at framing this are any indication, that political day of reckoning could well make the political carnage of 1974, 1994 and 2006 look like child’s play.
I write this diary today to expose the misconceptions, and frankly, outright deceptions disseminated by the President, Congressional leaders, and the lapdog traditional media concerning the bailout bill. I want to do what curiously, inexplicably, very few in the traditional media have actually done: I want to walk the readers, and if I could, the American people, through the actual language of the Troubled Assets Relief Program bill (TARP) and explain what this bailout bill actually says, and does.
If you find some of this analysis compelling, you certainly have my permission to cut and paste some (or all) of this diary into an email or fax that you send to your member of Congress. Keep proof of your email or fax, for in the event your member votes to support this bailout bill, and later claims he or she was unaware of the fatal flaws in the bailout bill, you can go to the local press, you can go to the local media, and prove otherwise.
As I will show, this particular bailout bill:
- Does not provide for meaningful judicial review of Secretary Paulson’s actions.
- Allows Paulson to do essentially anything he wants, with anyone he wants, including foreign companies.
- Does not require Paulson to prevent unjust enrichment;
- Does not truly require Paulson to limit executive compensation;
- Does not require Paulson to prevent conflicts of interest;
- Does not limit taxpayers’ exposure to $250-$350 billion, but instead, as a practical matter, authorizes the expenditure of $700 billion.
Let’s start with the issue of judicial review.
MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW IS PRECLUDED
You will recall that the three page, Bush/Paulson bailout plan that was first floated proposed to do away with judicial review of Secretary Paulson’s actions. You will further recall that the idea of a bailout bill that precluded judicial review was widely considered outrageous and unacceptable.
How about this 110 page bailout bill? Does this bailout bill provide for meaningful judicial review to insure, to guarantee, that Paulson follows the letter of the bailout law? You may be surprised to learn that the answer is actually: no, it does not. Has the traditional media reported this fact? No.
But let’s take a step back here, and consider what "judicial review" actually means within the context of this bailout bill. Assume, for example, a member of Congress believes that Paulson is failing to follow the commands, the actual law of the bailout bill, could that member of Congress, go to federal court to compel Paulson to follow the law? Scandalously, the answer is: substantially NO.
The authors of the bailout bill accomplished this result in a very sneaky way. Rather than draft language that explicitly and directly alerted the press, and the electorate, to this result, the authors incorporated language that accomplished the result through a legalistic back door.
In particular, the authors of the bailout bill explicitly eliminated the availability of the legal remedy that would be necessary to require Paulson to follow the law, in this case, what is called injunctive or equitable relief from a court of law.
This sleight of hand is accomplished in Section 119, Section (2), Subsection (A) of the bailout bill which reads as follows:
No injunction or other form of equitable relief shall be issued against the Secretary for actions pursuant to section 101, 102, 106, and 109, other than to remedy a violation of the Constitution.
What this language effectively means is that no Court can ever compel Paulson to comply with sections 101, 102, 106 and 109 of the bailout bill. Wow, just wow. This is really sneaky, back door stuff.
But what are these sections where Paulson is given unchecked power? It turns out that they are the heart, the crux of the bailout bill.
Section 101, "Purchase of Troubled Assets," defines the scope of, and restrictions upon, Paulson’s powers to purchase assets, hire financial agents, sign contracts, establish financial "vehicles," issue "obligations" and ostensibly, prevent unjust enrichment.
Section 102, "Insurance of Troubled Assets," is the insurance program, including the scope of, and restrictions upon, Paulson’s powers to insure assets.
Section 106, "Rights; Management; Sale of Troubled Assets; Revenues and Sale Proceeds," is a companion to section 101 in importance, and recites the scope of, and restrictions upon, Paulson’s powers to manage and sell assets.
Section 109 "Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts" is that part of the TARP that requires Paulson to create a plan that "seeks" to mitigate foreclosures.
Thus, every member of Congress, every American should know a very basic fact. Under the bailout bill as presently written, if Paulson fails to follow these key provisions of the bailout bill law, there is effectively nothing you, or anyone else, can do about it in the courts. Surprised? This bailout bill creates unchecked, unbridled power, or, in the parlance of the Bush administration, "trust us" power.
ONE MAN, PAULSON, IS GIVEN THE POWER TO ESSENTIALLY DO ANYTHING HE WANTS
Let’s go straight to analyzing the aforementioned, section 101 of the bailout bill, the heart, or crux of the bill. We examine this section, of course, with the understanding that because no one in the world can ever force Paulson to follow these provisions in a court of law, this language is at best a sort of, well, gentlemen’s agreement.
Here, then, is the gentlemen’s agreement of Section 101, and I have bolded certain key language:
SEC. 101. PURCHASES OF TROUBLED ASSETS
(a) OFFICES; AUTHORITY.-
(1) AUTHORITY.-The Secretary is authorized to establish a troubled asset relief program (or "TARP") to purchase, and to make and find commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary, and in accordance with this Act and the policies and procedures developed and published by the Secretary.
(2) COMMENCEMENT OF PROGRAM.-Establishment of the policies and procedures and other similar administrative requirements imposed on the Secretary by this Act are not intended to delay the commencement of the TARP.
(3) ESTABLISHEMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall implement any program under paragraph (1) through an Office of Financial Stability, established for such purpose within the Office of Domestic Finance of the Department of the Treasury, which office shall be headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except that an interim Assistant Secretary may serve pending confirmation by the Senate.
(B) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.- ...
(b) CONSULTATION.-In exercising the authority under this section, the Secretary shall consult with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Corporation (FDIC), the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
(c) NECESSARY ACTIONS.-The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation, the following:
(1) The Secretary shall have direct hiring authority with respect to the appointment of employees to administer this Act.
(2) Entering into contract, including contracts for services authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.
(3) Designating financial institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government, and such institutions shall perform all such reasonable duties related to this act as financial agents of the Federal Government as may be required.
(4) In order to provide the Secretary with the flexibility to manage troubled assets in a manner designed to minimize troubled assets in a manner designed to minimize cost to the taxpayers, establishing vehicles that are authorized, subject to supervision by the Secretary, to purchase, hold, and sell troubled assets and issue obligations.
(5) Issuing such regulations and other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the authorities or purposes of this Act.
(d) PROGRAM GUIDELINES.- Before the earlier of the end of the 2-business-day period beginning on the date of the purchase of troubled assets pursuant to the authority under this section or the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall publish program guidelines, including the following:
(1) Mechanisms for purchasing trouble assets.
(2) Methods for pricing and valuing troubled assets.
(3) Procedures for selecting asset managers
(4) Criteria for identifying troubled assets for purchase.
(e) PREVENTING UNJUST ENRICHMENT.-In making purchases under the authority of this Act, the Secretary shall take such steps as may be necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions participating in a program established under this section, including by preventing the sale of a troubled asset to the Secretary at a higher price than what the seller paid to purchase the asset. This subsection does not apply to troubled assets acquired in a merger or acquisition, or purchase of assets from a financial institution in conservatorship or receivership, or that has initiated bankruptcy proceedings under title 11, United States Code.
Let’s start by discussing the first grant of authority.
AUTHORITY.-The Secretary is authorized to establish a troubled asset relief program (or "TARP") to purchase, and to make and find commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary, and in accordance with this Act and the policies and procedures developed and published by the Secretary.
In order to understand the scope of this authority, we must first reference the definitions section of the bailout bill (Section 3), which to tell you the truth, as federal laws of this scope go, is absurdly brief.
Here is the definition of "financial institution" under the bailout bill, and I have bolded key language:"
(5) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION-The term "financial institution" means any institution, including, but not limited to, any bank, savings association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance company, established and regulated under the laws of the United States or any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia....the United States Virgin Islands, and having significant operations in the United States, but excluding any central bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government.
As you have probably guessed, that bolded language is quite significant, because it means that the words which follow are merely one possible listing of the financial institutions that Paulson can purchase troubled assets from. Thus, the list that has been give is NOT exclusive.
As a practical matter, what this means is that Paulson is authorized to purchase troubled assets from anyone that might plausibly be thought of as a financial institution; no limits. Moreover, though congressional leaders supporting this bailout bill have not told the American public this fact, this language also means that Paulson can use American taxpayer money to bail out foreign banks and foreign financial institutions. Huh? Wasn’t that a controversial proposal just a few days ago? And now? Silence in the traditional media.
The peculiar phrasing here seems almost designed to mislead members of the public, the press, and perhaps even members of Congress. It sure "looks" like it limits Paulson to purchasing from only American financial institutions. But the actual reality is just the opposite. Wow, very crafty.
As a final aside here, I would like to draw your attention to that phrase at the end of the definition: "but excluding any central bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government." Do you suppose that is a limitation?
Well, it sure looks like a limitation. Yet, if you assume that this is a limitation, you are then confronted with a very uncomfortable contradiction created by a later section in bailout bill. In particular, a later section, section 112 says:
SECTION 112. COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN AUTHORITIES AND CENTRAL BANKS.
The Secretary shall coordinate, as appropriate, with foreign financial authorities and central banks to work toward the establishment of similar programs by such authorities and central banks. To the extent that such foreign financial authorities or banks hold troubled assets as a result of extending financing to financial institutions that have failed or defaulted on such financing, such troubled assets qualify for purchase under section 101.
Do you see the contradiction in the law? Do you suppose this contradiction in the law was intentional? Or unintentional? The practical result of this contradiction, I suppose, is that Paulson gets to choose.
But let’s continue examining the gentleman’s agreement that grants Paulson power. The massive and total grant of power to Paulson reaches full bloom in the NECESSARY ACTIONS subsection. Here is the key sentence: "The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation, the following." Did you catch what this language means?
What this language means is that Paulson is actually allowed to take any action, I repeat, any action, I repeat, any action, to carry out the bailout bill. Boy, power doesn’t get much more powerful than that. Wow.
You will notice another curious phrase that was inserted following the grant of nearly unlimited power to Paulson, the phrase "without limitation." Conceivably, Paulson could argue that this phrase further amplifies upon his virtually absolute power to take any action in furtherance of the bailout bill, but the more reasonable inerpretation would be that this phrase expresses the non-exclusivity of the list of actions that are then described.
Assuming the more reasonable interpretation, we might as well briefly examine the non-exclusive list of actions that Paulson is explicitly allowed to take. So...Paulson can hire anyone he wants. Paulson can sign any contract he wants. (Now that is broad!) Paulson can hire financial institutions, Goldman Sachs for example, to be the taxpayer’s "financial agents." (That could be a pretty lucrative contract.) And finally, Paulson can establish "vehicles," a term that is nowhere defined in the bailout bill and "issue obligations."
By now, I hope it is painfully apparent that, contrary to what many in the media and the political leadership of the Congress are suggesting, under the actual terms of the bailout bill, Secretary Paulson can do anything he wants, with anyone he wants, whenever he wants.
Thus the bailout bill grants Paulson nearly absolute power. And as I have shown you, no court can ever be enlisted to stop him from abusing that power. Wow.
THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE PAULSON TO PREVENT UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Section 101, subsection (e), which is in the blockquote above, is the only section of the bailout bill that deals with issue of unjust enrichment. One can well imagine that a healthy number of the boys on Wall Street are presently salivating at the prospect of using this bailout bill to milk the American taxpayers through various technical, financial and tax schemes. (Ya think?). Accordingly, this is a most serious question to ask: how does bailout bill prevent unjust enrichment at the expense of the American taxpayer? Simply put: it doesn’t.
For starters, this section does not require Paulson to explicitly and directly prevent unjust enrichment. Instead, Section 101, subsection (e) inserts some very curious language between the "shall" and the "prevent." It requires Paulson to "take such steps as may be necessary" to prevent unjust enrichment. This sounds almost credible, almost worthy, but in truth, what does it mean to "take steps?" And what does it mean to take steps that "may" prevent unjust enrichment? Why even insert this confusing language? Do you want steps? Or, do you want the actual prevention?
But, there is a much greater problem here with respect to unjust enrichment. The law essentially fails to define "unjust enrichment!" What do you think constitutes unjust enrichment? What does Paulson think constitutes unjust enrichment? Who is right? Who is wrong? We have no idea because the bailout bill is virtually silent on this issue.
True, we are given one single, simplistic example of unjust enrichment: "preventing the sale of a troubled asset to the Secretary at a higher price than what the seller paid to purchase the asset." Sounds good, but really now, considering the ingenuity of Wall Street, with all the accounting schemes, tax schemes, derivative schemes, hedging schemes and the like that can be brought to bear, this seems like a wholly inadequate grade school definition of "unjust enrichment." It’s like bringing a squirt gun to the front lines.
There is yet another problem with the drafting of the law here with respect to unjust enrichment. Notice that as drafted, the bailout bill requires Paulson to take steps that could prevent unjust enrichment only with respect to "this section," meaning section 101. As a result, shockingly, Paulson is not even required to give a second’s thought to unjust enrichment when working with any of the other sections, for example, the insurance program described in section 102. The language here should have used the words "this Act" rather than "this section."
But in a real sense, the sham unjust enrichment provisions in the bailout bill are largely moot, because these unjust enrichment provisions were crammed into section 101, and section 101 is effectively beyond judicial review. There is simply no way to use the courts to force Paulson to do anything with respect to unjust enrichment. As a practical matter, one man, the multimillionaire former head of Goldman Sachs, will decide when he believes someone is being "unjustly enriched" by the bailout. And you can’t do a damn thing about it. Comfortable?
THE LAW DOES NOT TRULY REQUIRE PAULSON TO LIMIT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
The prospect of billions of taxpayer dollars under this program flowing to assist companies that pay outrageously inflated executive salaries and/or provide ridiculously large departure bonuses has obvious political dimensions. The voters are not going to like this when it happens, and rest assured, it will happen.
So, let’s get right to it: does the bailout bill actually prevent outrageously inflated executive salaries or ridiculously large departure bonuses for those who participate in the bailout bill? What’s your guess? If you guessed no, you would be correct. Hey, you’re learning!
Here is the one section of the bailout bill that deals with this issue, Section 111, in its entirety, with bold that I have added:
SECTION 111. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(a) APPLICABILITY.- Any financial institution that sells troubled assets to the Secretary under this Act shall be subject to the executive compensation requirements of subsections (b) and (c) and the provisions under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as provided under the amendment by section 302, as applicable.
(b) DIRECT PURCHASES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Where the Secretary determines that the purposes of this Act are best met through direct purchases of troubled assets from an individual financial institution where no bidding process or market prices are available, and the Secretary receives a meaningful equity or debt position in the financial institution as a result of the transaction, the Secretary shall require that the financial institution meet appropriate standards for executive compensation and corporate governance. The standards required under this subsection shall be effective for the duration of the period that the Secretary holds and equity or debt position in the financial institution.
(2) CRITERIA.-The standards required under this subsections shall include-
(A) limits on compensation that exclude incentives for executive officers of a financial institution to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution during the period that the Secretary holds and equity or debt position in the financial institution;
(B) a provision for the recovery by the financial institution of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on statements of earnings, gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and
(C) a prohibition of the financial institution making any golden parachute payment to its senior executive officer during the period that the Secretary holds an equity or debt position in the financial institution.
(3) DEFINITONS.-For purposes of this section, the term "senior executive officer" means an individual who is one of the top 5 executives of a public company, whose compensated (sic) is required to be disclosed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and any regulations issued thereunder, and non-public company counterparts.
(e)AUCTION PURCHASES.-Where the Secretary determines that the purposes of this Act are best met through auction purchases of troubled assets, and only where such purchases per financial institution, in the aggregate exceed $300,000,000 (including direct purchases), the Secretary shall prohibit, for such financial institutions, any new employment contract with a senior executive officer that provides a golden parachute in the event of an involuntary termination, bankruptcy filing or insolvency, or receivership. The Secretary shall issue guidance to carry out this paragraph not later than 2 months after the date of enactment of the Act, and such guidance shall be effective upon issuance.
(c) SUNSET.-The provisions of subsection (e) shall apply only to arrangements entered into during the period during which the authorities under section 101(a) are in effect, as determined by section 120.
Okay, so under the terms of the law, the executive compensation limitations, such as they are, apply in very, very, very, very limited circumstances. (Get the idea?) Why? Simple: there are really only two events that trigger application of these provisions:
- direct purchases of troubled assets from an individual financial institution where no bidding process or market prices are available; and
- auction purchases of troubled assets, and only where such purchases per financial institution, in the aggregate exceed $300,000,000 (including direct purchases).
The first triggering event occurs when Paulson determines that he has purchased a troubled asset that has a market value of zero, zed, nada, zip. So, in all those other instances, when the asset Paulson purchases has a value to somebody, anybody in the world, of at least one penny, one lousy cent, the triggering event has not occurred, and thus, there is no need for Paulson to even advance to the remaining terms of Section 111. (Which are hopelessly weak anyway.)
As a practical matter, I would assume that 99% of the assets that Paulson "purchases" under bailout bill will have a value to somebody, anybody, of at least one penny. A contrary hypothesis seems implausible, for it would envision Paulson spending taxpayer’s money on assets that every single person in the world considers to be completely, wholly, and totally worthless. Why would Paulson spend taxpayer money to "purchase" assets that cost nothing? Bottom line: this triggering event is not going to occur.
So, in truth, we are left with only the second triggering event, wherein Paulson decides to hold an auction, then purchases assets from a seller at his auction, then the total number of assets held from that seller are in excess of $300 million. Such auctions may happen, or they may not happen. Who knows?
But let us assume that Paulson decides to hold at least one auction, then ends up reaching the $300 million figure. He would then advance to these exciting executive compensation restrictions:
the Secretary shall prohibit, for such financial institutions, any new employment contract with a senior executive officer that provides a golden parachute in the event of an involuntary termination, bankruptcy filing or insolvency, or receivership.
Notice three problems. First, this applies only to new employment contracts. Second, more significantly, what does the term "golden parachute" actually mean under the bailout law? Strangely, the bailout bill contains no definition for this term! As such, a fair question to ask is what dollar amount renders a severance package "golden"? The law is silent. As such, what constitutes "golden" would be entirely up to Paulson. Thirdly, the law here does not actually preclude golden parachutes in the event the executive leaves voluntarily (wink, wink) perhaps to spend more time with his family (wink, wink). What?! This is a major loophole.
In a recent article, on this subject, Paul Abrams (JD, MD) examined the executive compensation provisions in even more depth than I have here. He concluded that that the executive compensation limitations in the bailout bill were weak and pathetic. I certainly agree with this assessment, but I (and I suspect the American people when they learn about them) would probably take it one step further.
The executive compensation limitations in the bailout bill are a sham, an utter and complete fraud upon the American people.
THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE PAULSON TO AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Here is the one section of the bailout bill that pertains to avoiding conflicts of interest, with bolding added:
SECTION 108 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
(a)STANDARDS REQUIRED.-The Secretary shall issue regulations necessary to address and manage or to prohibit conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the administration and execution of the authorities provided under this Act, including-
(1) conflicts arising in the selection or hiring of contractors or advisors, including asset managers;
(2) the purchase of troubled assets;
(3) the management of the troubled assets held;
(4) post-employment restrictions on employees; and
(5) any other potential conflict of interest, as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest.
(b) TIMING.-Regulations or guidelines required by this section shall be issued as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act.
You will notice that by using the conjunction "or," the bailout bill actually allows Paulson to decide for himself whether he wants to prohibit conflicts of interest...at an uncertain date in the future (wink, wink)! So... when he finds it practicable to issue regulations, Paulson has the option of prohibiting conflicts of interest! Don’t hold your breath. The conflict of interest provision of the bailout bill is, accordingly, a bad faith joke.
AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE BAILOUT BILL DOES NOT LIMIT THE OUTLAY TO $250-350 BILLION, BUT INSTEAD, AUTHORIZES $700 BILLION.
Section 115 of the bailout bill describes the amount of taxpayer money Paulson is authorized to spend:
SECTION 115. GRADUATED AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE.
(A)AUTHORITY.-The authority of the Secretary to purchase troubled assets under this Act shall be limited as follows:
(1)Effective upon the date of enactment of this Act, such authority shall be limited to $250,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time.
(2)If at any time the President submits to the Congress a written certification that the Secretary needs to exercise the authority under this paragraph, effective upon such submission, such authority shall be limited to $350,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time.
(3)If, at any time after the certification in paragraph (2) has been made, the President transmits to the Congress a written report detailing the plan of the Secretary to exercise the authority under this paragraph, unless there is enacted, within 15 calendar days of such transmission, a joint resolution described in subsection (e) effective upon the the expiration of such 15 day period, such authority shall be limited to $700,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time.
It will be appreciated that this strange language sets up a situation wherein $250 billion is immediately allocated. Then, Bush need only "ask" Congress, and Paulson is then given another $100 billion. My goodness what a high threshold to spend the next $100 billion! Bush need only ask.
Then, if Bush asks for the remaining $350 billion, Paulson is given that $350 billion, unless both houses of Congress pass a law, and Bush signs that law within 15 days. But the idea that Bush would sign such a law makes no sense, since after all, Bush was the one who requested the extra $350 billion!
Which leaves us with only one wholly implausible scenario to prevent the last $350 billion from being spent. In response to Bush’s request, both houses of Congress pass the law, which Bush then vetoes, and this is then followed by a 2/3 vote by Congress to override that veto, all of this taking place within 15 days. Yeah, right, and I have a bridge I want to sell you.
So truly, the notion that this bailout bill is somehow limited to $250 billion is a sham, designed, I presume, to mislead the American people, or provide, I suppose, some sort of plausible deniability on the part of members who vote for this bailout bill. I didn’t know it was for $700 billion! This bailout bill is a $700 Billion give-away to Wall Street. It is not a $250 billion give-away.
CONCLUSION
It is abundantly clear, that as was the case in the lead up to the Iraq war, the traditional media has utterly failed the American people. What percentage of the American electorate do you suppose realizes the truth about this bailout bill, that it:
- Does not provide for meaningful judicial review of Secretary Paulson’s actions.
- Allows Secretary Paulson to do anything he wants, with anyone he wants, including foreign companies.
- Does not require Secretary Paulson to prevent unjust enrichment;
- Does not truly require Secretary Paulson to limit executive compensation;
- Does not require Secretary Paulson to prevent conflicts of interest;
- Does not limit taxpayers’ exposure to $250-$350 billion, but instead, as a practical matter, authorizes the expenditure of $700 billion.
Eventually, however, the electorate will learn the truth, and when they do, they will be very angry.
A recent poll found that a full 72% of the American public is very concerned that those who are responsible for causing this economic crisis will be let off the hook.
Sadly, this $700 billion bailout bill for Wall Street is essentially designed to do just that, to let these people off the hook. They got us coming, and if this passes, they will get us going.
So, to that 72% of the American public, I say let us work together toward that day of reckoning for those who caused this economic crisis...and for all those members of Congress who vote for this bailout bill.