What are we to make of the ever growing Taliban state in the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, which over the last decade has succeeded in fighting to a standstill the American, Canadian, British, German, French and Pakistani armies? Is this a terrorist movement, a native resistance to occupation, an Islamist revolt or merely another manifestation of the warlike and severe nature of the tribes in the region? It appears to me that what we are observing is the emergence of a new power player on the geopolitical scene. History is littered with the remains of seemingly invincible states, overthrown in an instant by the sudden eruption of aggressive and fearless barbarians organized in a novel way, hostile to the tenets of established civilization. Is this what we are seeing now emerging, once again, from the wilderness of Central Asia?
When we think of the mujaheddin movement, or, to put it another way, of the jihadist network, or, to put in grossly misleading Republican terms, Islamofascism, we think of a disorganized phenomenon, a catch all term for all militancy in the Muslim world. Militant groups resisting local government repression of Islamic preactices, such as in Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, or Pakistan, nationalist groups resisting what they perceive to be outside intrusion into the affairs of Muslim countries, such as in Bosnia, Somalia, and of course Iraq and Afghanistan, government supported militias doing the dirty work of ethnic cleansing and repression of internal dissidents, as in the Sudan, Kosovo (post-US intervention) or Iran, openly separatist movements such as in the Phillipines, Kosovo (pre-US intervention), Checnhya and Eastern Turkmenistan/Western China, these movements can all be said to be similar in certain ideological and methodological aspects, but all of these groups, though spiritually supporting of each other, are acting independently, each driven by local grievances and realities.
But the question that I find most interesting is, has this decentralized and diverse phenomenon moved into a new phase in the area of Pakistan/Afghanistan. Are we seeing a new cultural group being born?Ethnogenesis is a field of study that never truly gained legitimacy in modern historical circles. It is far too speculative to pass the muster even in the liberal sciences field. The Russian historian Lev Gumilev advanced a fairly interesting theory regarding the dynamics of ethnogenesis, which was based on his years of study of the process as it manifested itself in the turbulent environment of the Great Steppe which stretches from Hungary to China, and down to Afghanistan. Gumilev posited that at a certain point, some cause, which may be a mutation in the gene pool of an isolated breeding population, or, as seems more likely to me, some combination of external pressure from surrounding groups and internal cultural developments, causes a particular group of people to become activated, leading to an expansion outward through war and migration, coupled with the generation of internal governing institutions that make the group more cohesive and easier to direct toward certain goals.
The way this translates to the individual level is through the very high rate of the generation of passionaries, people who feel so strongly about the common cause that they are willing to sacrifice themselves without reservations for it. The more of such people a group has, the more dynamic it becomes, and the more success it begins having both in generating internal governing institutions and in war against its neighbors. Some of the passionaries become leaders and some become footsoliders. Gumilev's theory regarding passionaries has received grim factual confirmation in the 20th century with the rise of the fedayeen, who are mostly concentrated in the Middle East and known to the West as terrorists or suicide bombers, and who basically exemplify what it means to be a passionary. These are people who fight for fairly weak, underindustrialized and badly armed groups, who nevertheless through nothing more than sheer contempt for the lives of themselves and others and their devotion to their cause, have changed the face of modern warfare and reshuffled the global geopolitical map. One of the most shocking things about the fedayeen from the viewpoint of older established civilizations such as ours, is their complete disregard for our value system, which we regard as universal because of its age and global spread, and for people's lives.
The fedayeen are not concerned with civilian casualties, with the rights of women or minorities, they do not fear death, and they want nothing from the other civilizations of the world except money and weapons to continue their struggle. Our cultural values, generated and perfected over thousands of years, our technological marvels, our ideals, our consumer goods, our recreations, are contemptible to them, they are dismissed as easily as we would dismiss Byzantine ceremonies and iconoclastic controversies. And while to outsiders these groups appear Islamic, their radical interpretation of Islam places them so far out of the mainstream that they can be viewed to exist outside of Islam, while interpreting and reinventing Islam to generate an entirely new belief system which is as antagonistic to established conservative Islamic tradition as it is toward the Western value system.
There are many points at which the existence of a fedayeen culture reveals itself around the world, but since it is revealed only through conflict with the established powers, the places where we see the most activity are not necessarily the centers of gravity for this emerging culture. Palestine offers one example. Through decades of conflict with the Jewish colonists, the Palestinian people, which previously had no national identity and was comprised of many diverse groups inhabiting a backwater province of the Ottoman empire, have convincingly acquired a national identity, one which defines itself almost solely in terms of its struggle with Zionism. Palestine also reveals another very important aspect of ethnogenesis - the passionaries define the culture, but they are few. So while nearly all Palestinians praise the resistance fighters, and shrines to the dead shaheeds are ubiquitous, very few among the Palestinians are actually willing to put themselves at risk by fighting the Israelis. Throughout the modern Zionist period in Israel, the vast majority of the Palestinian population has remained passive, waiting for history to decide their fate. But this passive majority becomes nearly invisible when overshadoowed by the bombast and radical actions of the passionary minority, and is carried along sometimes against its will as the passionaries forge their violent and reckless course.
If the passionaries hit a wall during the early stages of their emergence, if the group in which they emerge is surrounded by far more powerful neighbors, then they will all quickly be killed off in battles with their stronger enemies. They might inflict disproportionate casualties given their small numbers, but in the end, this small lightly armed group cannot be a match against a vital well established state which is itself is not in a state of deterioration or collapse and can draw on the accumulated resources of its older and better organized society. For example, the 19th century saw the abortive near emergence of groups, that, had they not run into a monolith empire standing in the path of their expansion, would have likely founded great and dynamic states of their own. Groups such as the Sioux, the Zulus, the Mahdist state of Sudan, the Asante, and many others succumbed to the better armed and still vital British and American empires. But as the bloody 20th century closed, it became clear that great gaps now existed in the world which could not be controlled by the now unified Western empire attempting to hold onto the accumulated horde of Western imperialism with an ever dwindling pool of recruits in its magnificently equipped mercenary armies or the emerging Chinese power which is still too careful to be pulled into conflicts with newly emerging and dangerous groups.
Perhaps the greatest gap in the geopolitical map is the junction between the emerging powers of India and China, and the chaotic Middle East, which successive and ongoing British/American colonial campaigns have failed to bring into the fold of Western civilization. So long as the USSR was present to exert its considerable influence by supporting the socialists in the region, the forces of the new remained in the background. But as one would expect, the emergence of new groups in the region of the Central Aryan Plateau, which is now claimed by Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran began to manifest itself as the Soviet Empire's presence in the region waned with its decline.
The first to fall was Iran, where the corrupt and decadent Shah was swept away in a popular revolution powered predominantly by youthful and fervent religious students. However, Iran quickly became bogged down, the revolution was co-opted by the established religious hierarchy. Because of this, Iran's post-revolutionary development has been filled with contradictions, a vibrant youth culture and the bold use of novel military tactics, from hostage taking and direct terrorist actions to the training and support of proxy guerilla armies in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine being coupled with an aging closed leadership cadre and the insistence on traditional modes of national empowerment, such as the current nuclear push.
A more exciting development is now taking place in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. Beginning roughly at the same time as the Iranian movement, in the 70s, and then gaining strength as it acquired support from the West, which viewed it as a useful weapon against the socialists in the region and the USSR itself, the mujahidin movement began to come into its own as an independent power player in the region. This is not a nationalist movement, it expressly denies the importance of borders, and relies on fighters from around the world. As such, this movement can draw passionaries not just from the limited pool available to any single ethnic group, but from humanity as a whole, one fifth of which at least is receptive to a revolutionary ideology which, though rooted in Islamic tradition, is primarily a reactionary phenomenon, defining itself by the rejection of dominant Western civilization paradigms and cultural values.
Armed by the West, which in its shortsighted desire to vanquish the Soviet enemy, which was ironically far closer to the West in culture and values than the convenient ally the West found for itself, the mujahedeen proved remarkable effective against one of the top militaries in the world. This was a remarkable revelation to those who participated on the mujahedeen side of the struggle, one that showed that the movement, if it could generate an identity and centralize leadership, was now in a position to prevail at least in a defensive war, against any opponent in the world, something which is a prerequisite to the emergence of a new group. Another milestone occurred when the mujahedeen movement, originally set up by Western colonial minders as a loose confederation of competing groups none of which was strong enough to control Afghanistan on its own and who could be easily managed by being played off against one another, gave way to another movement spearheaded by passionate young religious students, from which it drew its name, the Taliban. Just like the other mujahedeen, the Taliban was adept at getting support from the older established powers which were still not realizing the risk of aggressive ethnogenesis in their midst, viewing the militants instead as useful fools who could be channeled to fight in the interests of their patrons, and obtained the active support of Pakistan in digging its own grave.
Still, after its 1994 victory, the Taliban seemed like they might follow the path of the Iranian revolution - a marginalization of the youthful passionary elements in favor of an older religious elite, and entanglement in the delicate spider web of tribal custom which still governs the dally life of people in the region. One can look to the difference in attitude toward al Qaeda between the old and new leadership of the Taliban to see the evolution that was beginning to occur as the Taliban evolved into the government of Afghanistan. Mullah Omar, the old leader of the Taliban, flirted numerous times with turning Bin Laden over to the Americans, going so far after 9/11/01 as to offer to extradite him for trial in a neutral third country, in order to preserve the Taliban in power in Afghanistan. His reluctance to go even further was motivated as much by traditional tribal concepts of the host/guest relationship as by an ideological affinity. On the other hand, the new generation of Taliban leaders, such as Baitullah, unswervingly and proudly proclaim their loyalty to the al Qaeda cause.
So, as often happens, external stimuli provided the impetus to further ethnogenic developments. The American invasion of 2001 drove the Taliban from power, and denied it the comforts of established authority which favored the older clerics. It was again the time of warlords leading bands of young men not afraid to die. Further, the tribes, led by older tribal chiefs who are naturally concerned more with the safety of their people and the preservation of their status, cut deals with the Western occupiers, leaving the Taliban isolated, but also untethered to any previous order. Lacking a center of authority, it is difficult to speak of the Taliban as a unified movement. It is more accurate to describe them as allied war bands, led by charismatic warlords who subscribe to a roughly similar ideology. The defining characteristics are the boldness of their ambitions, the novelty and deliberate ruthlessness of their methods, their complete disregard for older and established traditions and power arrangements, and their fearlessness in the face of death, the risk of which reaches a level of near certainty over time for the highest figures in the movement. These are all defining features of passionaries, and can be found during the study of every ethnogenic movement.
Though similar in many ways to the tribes from which they draw a majority of their members, the Taliban are culturally distinct, with distinct military tactics, organization, goals, and a revolutionary mentality of conquest and liberation that far exceeds the limited tribal worldview. While still drawing the majority of their recruits from the Pashto people, the Taliban has always been international, operating in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and drawing fighters from Chechnya, China, India, and the worldwide Muslim community. As such, the Taliban transcends and is hostile to traditional ethnic groupings, just as the mujahedeen movement as a whole transcends and is hostile to traditional Islamic religion. The center of gravity of the Taliban is now on the Pakistani side, in the loosely held tribal areas. Led by dynamic young figures such as Baitullah Mehsud, this movement fearlessly challenged the Pakistani state, the Pakistani army, but also as importantly, the traditional tribal hierarchy governing the region. The Taliban in Pakistan attacks both the trbial leadership, the Pakistani state, and the Pakistani military, which has lost thousands of soldiers battling them.
Ostensibly, the Taliban claim that if sharia law as they interpret it is established in their zone of control, they might stop hostilities. However, theirs is not a religious struggle. Nor is the real focus of the struggle against the Pakistani state, which has always had at best a tenuous grip on this region. The battle for control is with the tribal elders who ruled the people prior to the emergence of the Taliban. Here we see the struggle of ethnogenesis in its purest form, as the people choose between following the new passionaries or the old authorities.
Tribal elders in Pakistan and Afghanistan are routinely targeted, assassinated, and deposed by fighters loyal to the Taliban leadership. Behavior tolerated under the already fairly strict tribal Islamic tradition, such as the playing of music, has been nearly eliminated in Taliban controlled areas. The Taliban agenda extends far beyond the modest conservatism of the tribes. Their operations carry them into Afghanistan and beyond, and their continued association with al Qaeda plugs them into a global struggle against the established powers. The boundary between the ideology of the Taliban and of al Qaeda is tenuous and undefined. Fueled by the same passion, one is concerned with creating an area of control within which it can birth a new and powerful state, while the other is engaged in a worldwide struggle, as they see it in defense of Islam as a whole. The regional and international roles dovetail nicely, which is may be why despite intense pressure, the Taliban have never agreed to renounce their association with al Qaeda.
Faced with the birth before our eyes of this highly aggressive, dogmatic group, we feel the same fear that ancient cultures felt when they first became aware of the threat posed by the Germanic tribes, the Huns, the Mongols, or the other primitive conquerors who have time and time again swept away the seemingly eternal pillars of the established order and spread the Dark Age in their wake. And we have to ask ourselves, what can we do, while we still have the power to do it, to preserve ourselves and our way of life in the face of this new power? Do we make peace with it and accommodate it into the world order, ceding to it the region where it is currently dominant and hoping that it will not expand much further? Or do we use all power at our disposal to smash this formation in its infancy, even if takes decades or centuries, like Rome's German Wars or the Anglo-Zulu wars?