International Law and the War in Iraq

Two weeks ago I agreed to take the side of supporters of the war in Iraq and argue that, under international law, the war was legal. We had a spirited debate and in the end I felt I presented the most convincing view even though that view was contrary to my own personal and legal opinion.

Now I have a chance to set the record straight. What follows is my argument, for my final paper in my international law class at NYU, that the war was illegal.

The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq began in a fog of controversy over the issue of the war’s legality, timing and rationale. Distinguished jurists, statesmen/women and others around the globe have added their voices to the din surrounding the issue of legality vs. illegality which today remains unanswered and without definitive conclusion.

UN Resolutions, Charter and Laws

The United Nations Security Council had passed over 17 resolutions dealing with the situation in Iraq prior to the US-led invasion in 2003. The first was resolution 660, which dealt with the initial Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The following resolution, 661, specifically mentioned Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which states in part in Article 39:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Security Council, acting under its obligation to restore international peace and security in the region, ordered a package of measures put in place including comprehensive sanctions to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

Because Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait and as a member of the United Nations was in violation of international law, the UN Security Council subsequently passed resolution 678, which again stated that the council acting under Chapter VII:

2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

Following the successful ejection of Iraq forces from Kuwait the UN Security Council passed resolution 687 which "welcomed the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity." The resolution also imposed conditions on Iraq for ending the war, most of which concerned Iraqi obligations to end its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The relevant articles of the resolution are as follows:

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

Resolution 687 goes on to state:

33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.

Resolution 687, as stated above, finds that the UN Security Council "remains seized of the matter" of Iraq’s compliance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the conditions imposed as a result of the passage of those resolutions. It also states that it can "take such further steps" as are necessary "to secure peace and security in the area.

Following a long period of low-level hostility between Iraq and the United States, the US acting with Great Britain as the armed party responsible for enforcing UN resolutions regarding Iraq began pushing for additional resolutions arguing that Iraq was in violation of its obligations under previous UN Security Council resolutions, in particular those named above.

The result was UN Security Council resolution 1441, which stated the following:

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations

Supporters of the argument that the Iraq was legal tend to rely on UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and the following resolution 1441. In particular the arguments put forward, in public, by British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, who stated in a written parliamentary answer that the combined resolutions mentioned above gave the US-led coalition authority under international law to invade Iraq. In his advisory opinion he stated the following:

Authority to use force against Iraq exists from the combined effect of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. All of these resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the use of force for the express purpose of restoring international peace and security.

In resolution 687, which set out the ceasefire conditions after Operation Desert Storm, the Security Council imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to restore international peace and security in the area. Resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678.

3. A material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use force under resolution 678.

4. In resolution 1441 the Security Council determined that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of resolution 687, because it has not fully complied with its obligations to disarm under that resolution.

5. The Security Council in resolution 1441 gave Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" and warned Iraq of the "serious consequences" if it did not (Goldsmith).

These arguments, relying on the UN resolutions mentioned above, were echoed by the legal experts representing the US government as well as that of Australia. All relied on the language of continuance emanating from resolution 687 and then buttressed by UN Security Council resolution 1441, in particular the language of "material breach."

Those against the war take issue with the arguments by the states and their defenders arguing for the war in Iraq.

The "revival argument" states that a case can be made for war under existing UN Security Council resolutions and specifically mentions resolutions 678 and 687. Lord Goldsmith in his opinion marked "Secret" says the following regarding what is called "the revival argument."

Law Officers have advised in the past that, provided the conditions are made out, the revival argument does provide a sufficient justification in international law for the use of force against Iraq. That view is supported by an opinion given in August 1992 by the then UN Legal Counsel, Carl-August Fleischauer.

However, the UK has consistently taken the view (as did the Fleischauer opinion) that, as the ceasefire conditions were set by the Security Council in resolution 687, it is for the Council to assess whether any such breach of those obligations has occurred.
I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. I have already advised that I do not believe that such a resolution need be explicit in its terms. The key point is that it should establish that the Council has conduced that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled (Goldsmith).

Lord Goldsmith goes on to state, regarding the issue of Iraq and whether a "reasonable case" can be made for war:

"But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with this view."

Looking further at UN resolution 1441 one can see clearly strong language used in this resolution, including "material breach," "final opportunity" and "full compliance." However unlike UN Security Council resolution 678, resolution 1441 does NOT mention "all necessary means" anywhere or feature any text authorizing any UN member to use force against Iraq.

The resolution declares Iraq in "material breach" but then does not anywhere provide a remedy to mend that "material breach." When a lawmaking body, such as the UN Security Council, finds a party in breach it would then typically assess a penalty for that breach. In the case of Iraq the United States and its coalition allies took it upon themselves to remedy that breach using the argument that older UN Security Council resolutions authorized them to do so.

In late November 2003 Richard Pearle, a prominent neo-conservative and architect of the Iraq war, said this in London:

"...international law ... would have required us to leave Saddam Hussein alone", and this would have been morally unacceptable... I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right thing."

Here you have an architect of the war, a member of the Pentagon defense review board which advises the US Secretary of Defense, stating clearly that the war was illegal but offering up the rationale that when international law is inconvenient a state can simply break the law.

In 2004 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan statedthat the Iraq war was illegal under the UN charter:

"I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view and from the charter point of view it was illegal."

While the Secretary-General is not a judge his opinion does carry weight internationally.

The United States and its coalition allies relied in many ways on the concepts of a "just war" in stating that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a bad one and that it posed a danger to peace and security in the area.

But the idea of a "just war" disappeared more than 300 years ago. As Shaw states, "States were sovereign and legal and no state could presume whether another’s cause was just or not." For the purposes of this report "just war" is non-important, "legal war" is.

Further arguments in opposition to the war exist in a reading of the UN charter. Section 2 (3) and (4) state:

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

These principles, that a state must settle disputes peacefully first, are a matter of treaty law to which all UN members ascribe when they sign and accept membership in the United Nations. Furthermore the principle of settling disputes peacefully could be considered to now be a rule of customary international law.

The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law states the following:

The principle that States shall refrain in their international ~ relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations

Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.

A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international law (Shaw 1019).

In its war against Iraq the US operated on the principle that Iraq should be punished through use of force and specifically stated that its goal was to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. While the 1970 declaration is a UN General Assembly resolution (2625) and not one from the UN Security Council it does add to the weight of international opinion.

Under a reading of the UN charter and subsequent UN resolutions dealing with the situation in Iraq the US-led attack against Iraq was illegal under international law. The US-led attack violated the UN charter section 2 (3) & (4). The US did not posses the authority on it own to enforce UN Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

Customary International Law – Interceptive/Anticipatory Self-defense

The US claimed Saddam Hussein posed a "grave threat to peace" and thus could make a claim that it was exercising its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN charter and customary international law (White House, Oct 7, 2002). This theory would be known as "interceptive self-defense" and would depend on the evidence shown of an imminent threat.

The Caroline Affair of 1838 established as a rule of customary international law:

...the principle of "anticipatory self-defense" in international politics, which holds that it may be justified only in cases in which the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."

Did the United States have a clear and compelling case for the use of interceptive or anticipatory self-defense?

Arguing in the law journal of the International Law Department of the University of Miskolic, law professor Louise-Phillipe Rouillard wrote the following:

The existence of a right to anticipatory self-defence can be established and there certainly are clear and imminent dangers that must be pre-emptively addressed. But they must be so addressed within the strict and narrow confines of the exhaustion of all alternative means, the necessity of its actions being established by the immediacy of the danger, and must be proportional to the threat. Regardless of the excuses given so far toward the extension of this right, none have either been conclusive or even remotely convincing. None have been accepted so far by the international community and certainly none should be.

How, exactly, did Saddam Hussein present an "imminent threat" to the United States when in July 2001 (then) National Security adviser Condoleeza Rice said the following:

"We are able to keep arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt."

Yet the evidence indicated, in statements from US administration officials and the memos mentioned below, that the US had already decided to "go after" Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Clearly the doctrine of "anticipatory" or "interceptive self-defense" do not apply to a war that was years in the making before it was launched.

The US also violated customary international law by not seeking to settle its differences with Iraq peacefully and by seeking to use the cover of the UN, which it ultimately did not receive, to wage war against Iraq when it had already decided, on the basis of secret memos published in the Sunday Times of London, to go to war against Iraq more than a year before the actual invasion began.

Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections (Manning).

These memos, which were notes sent between members of the UK foreign policy team, clearly indicate that the US planned to take military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime regardless of whether it received UN permission or not. The war was a premeditated act of aggression unsanctioned by international law. The war was illegal.

Terrorism

The United States was struck on September 11, 2001 with a horrendous attack which killed nearly 3,000 people. Understandably the United States government and its people were traumatized by this attack and vowed to take all necessary measures to prevent another attack from occurring.

Using this rationale could the fact that Saddam Hussein’s government had expressed support for and glee about the attacks be used as a basis for attacking Iraq? Could the fact that Saddam Hussein, in providing cash payments to Palestinian suicide bombers in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel in violation of UN Security Council resolution 687, Section H (32) serve as a legal basis for the US-led attack on Iraq?

On September 16, 2001 Vice-President Dick Cheney, when asked of the US had any evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 attacks, said the following:

"No."

There was no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to any attack on the United States immediately after 9/11 or before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Nor has there been any evidence presented since the invasion linking Iraq to 9/11 or any terrorist attack on the United States or its citizens.

Saddam Hussein was in violation of his obligations under UN Security Council resolution 687 by vocalizing support for the September 11th attacks as well as providing support to those carrying out terrorist attacks in Israel or the occupied territories. Nonetheless the US was bound by customary international law in responding to these acts – specifically the principle of proportionality.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in the case Nicaragua vs. US there exists "a specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law."

The attack on Iraq by the US-led coalition could never be justified using the rationale that Saddam Hussein was supporting international terrorism. The US could show no direct injury from this support and even if it could its response would be constrained by the principle of proportionality, which is an established rule of customary international law. An invasion of Iraq using the rationale of Iraqi support for terrorism would also be illegal under international law.

Conclusion

This report has focused on the legal basis for and against the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003. The issue of the non-discovery of Iraq’s WMD program has deliberately been left out because that issue does not relate to illegality of the war, rather bad or forged intelligence on the part of the US and its allies. Whether Iraq was in possession of WMDs, which it was not, is inconsequential to the root issue of legality.

As stated previously – the US and its coalition did not posses the legal authority under the UN charter or relevant UN Security Council resolutions to invade Iraq. Nor could a persuasive and legally defensible case for invasion be made under customary international law – specifically self-defense or using the doctrine of imminent threat. A case for invading Iraq also does not exist under the threat of terrorism, pre or post 9/11.

In short – while defenders of the US invasion can muster imaginative and varied arguments to support their case they are, at the heart of every argument, incorrect. The Iraq war was not legal. Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions have authorized coalition forces in Iraq but that does in no way change the fact that the war as carried out by the US-led coalition was illegal under both treaty law (UN charter) and customary international law.

•  Tippies for the end of the semester! n/t

  by Shane Hensinger on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 01:47:00 PM PDT

•  The UN did not authorize the invasion

  End of argument.

  by penguinsong on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 01:53:09 PM PDT

•  excellent, well-researched diary

  I hope you get an A for your paper.

  by limpidglass on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 01:59:42 PM PDT

  •  Me too!

    I badly want an A in this class but she is a tough, tough grader. The hardest I've yet had at NYU.

    by Shane Hensinger on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:11:31 PM PDT

•  Interesting research paper.

  It's nice to know that most of us had the correct "gut" feeling all along that this was not only an illegal, but an immoral invasion.

  by moose67 on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:02:02 PM PDT

•  Excellent analysis, I have one question

  The issue of the non-discovery of Iraq’s WMD program has deliberately been left out because that issue does not relate to illegality of the war, rather bad or forged intelligence on the part of the US and its allies.

  I this to say that if even if Iraq had WMD, that it would not constitute cause under "interceptive self-defense"? Thanks.

  by The Wizard on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:06:37 PM PDT

  •  I don't believe so

    as the finding would have been reported to the Security Council and then the Council would have made the determination as to consequences.

    Unless the US knew Iraq was planning on using those WMDs against US citizens or soldiers and could show that there was a plan in action - otherwise the doctrine of preemption or "interceptive" self-defense does not apply.

    by Shane Hensinger on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:10:46 PM PDT

•  This needs to be reposted once the

  primaries are over. Important work. Well done.

  by Asinus Asinum Fricat on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:10:02 PM PDT

  •  I also endorse that this be re-posted...

    ...after the primaries are over.

    Plus please include an update of what the graders comments are.

    If you have not yet submitted this paper, then please check / correct the second sentence in the last paragraph.

    The Iraq was not legal.

    The invasion of Iraq was not legal.

    by swarf on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 03:41:35 PM PDT

    •  Oh thanks

      I turned it in and saw that error, which was repeated in one other spot, but I don't think she'll mark me down too far because of that.

      by Shane Hensinger on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 06:21:31 PM PDT

      •  Next time you should post on DKos first,

        ...and then submit the paper.

        Regarding re-posting this later then it might coincide with being able to include an update...

        From UN Resolution 1790 (18 Dec 2007) it would appear that prior to 15 Jun 2008, the presence of the multi-national force in Iraq will be reviewed. It will be interesting if they declare the multi-national force must leave by 31 Dec 2008.

        By this time next year you might be able to submit another paper on the illegal overstaying of the multi-national force in Iraq. i.e. Not only do they enter Iraq illegally, they leave illegally as well ;-)

        by swarf on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 08:33:06 PM PDT

•  As regards Lord Goldsmith's opinion

  in referring to this you seem to conflate (or fail insufficiently to distinguish) between his written Parliamentary answer of 17 March 2003 and his
  earlier advisory opinion of 7 March 2003. The latter came first in time, but was not revealed until a few years later. The doubts expressed in the the earlier opinion had disappeared/were not mentioned in th parliamentary answer. http://news.bbc.co.uk/...

  In reading your paper the reader will wonder how it is that Lord Goldsmith manages both to make the revival argument and contradict it in the same paper....he did not of course..he simply changed his mind...because...well......let's not speculate on that. At any rate the earlier opinion is a serously, detailed piece of legal reasoning, the parliamentary answer was brief 9 paragraph opinion.

  Those in UK legal circles will be a little surprised by  the fact that you say that the US arguments echoed Goldsmith's 17 March answer....since it is largely understood here that the argument as there set out was a US argument urged on the British AG by Mr Bushes lawyers. There is a story told in UK legal circles that when the the US heard that Tony Blair was having problems because his lawyer [i.e. the AG] was saying that an invasion would be illegal without a further SC res, the US response was that they failed to see why this was a problem, all he needs to do is to get a new lawyer.

  by diranuk on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:22:43 PM PDT

  •  Indeed

    I would expect a "private" "secret" opinion to express doubts, any good attorney would do so when advising their client - which in this case would be Blair.

    by Shane Hensinger on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:25:40 PM PDT

    •  The Parliamentary answer

      held itself out as his legal opinion at that time...and he says now that that was legal opinion. So it is not just a case that the earlier opinion was secret and contained significant doubts about legality, which were left out of the public version...but rather that he had changed his opinion....a very senior and respected foreign office lawyer resigned over the change of opinion on the substantive legal issue on his part. It has never really been adequately explained why his opinion changed in the interim, though one can make a good guess. http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/...

      by diranuk on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 02:37:04 PM PDT

      •  My experiences

        with the field implementation has taught me to closely examine the various time lines involved and seek consistencies where there should be none or the opposite.
        Excellent supposition none the less.  

        by paul94611 on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 08:54:40 PM PDT

•  Great

  diary Shane Hensinger.
  As one of those "line in the sand" foot soldiers from the 82d Airborne that spent much of August 1990 looking at 20 Iraqi armored divisions I observe that your research is spot on from my  period of direct knowledge.
  I can also reflect upon the terms & conditions of the cease fire of 1991 and the subsequent issues revolving around the Iraqi use of rotary wing aircraft in our vicinity as we observed the Shiite uprising and its brutal suppression in March 1991 in the vicinity of An Nassiriyah and had to make an on the spot determination as to compliance or non compliance.
  After my experiences I remain convinced that wars of aggression are seldom waged for the reasons indicated.  In most cases I believe a well grounded argument can be made that wars of aggression are seldom viewed as rational acts under international law.
  In this regard there are some lingering questions as to current or potential future liability under international law for our failure to intervene in a situation that well may have been in violation of the cease fire and international law with regard to classification of genocide, ethnic cleansing and /or mass murder by an armed national force acting against mostly unarmed civilians.
  An example from history of "just following orders" that happens to apply to us in this instance.  i cannot but help think that there may be some sort of quid pro quo with the Shiites in this regard.    

  by paul94611 on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 08:48:18 PM PDT

  •  That's excellent insight Paul

    The long-term reverberations from what happened to the Shiites in southern Iraq when the US encouraged a rebellion and then did nothing to assist that rebellion are only now being felt.

    I really appreciate your feedback, especially as you were on the ground during the first war.

    by Shane Hensinger on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 09:01:46 PM PDT

    •  Did nothing

      except allow rotary winged aircraft to fly unobstructed on the north side of the river.
      We will discuss the sarin & cyclo sarin transfer & use against Iranian Shiites & Kurds at a later date.  Most likely another quid pro quoin there as well.

      by paul94611 on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 09:20:52 PM PDT

•  Well Done Sir

  The game was most certainly worth the candle!

  by greenskeeper on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 09:06:40 PM PDT

•  And there's Indictment 2

  of the Nuremburg trials of Nazi war criminals: Plotting and waging and aggressive war. We hung von Ribbentrop mainly on the strength of this indictment. Although we were the driving force behind the Nuremburg trials,  it's true that we never formally stipulated that the principles applied to us as well as other countries.
  However, there's a precedent that a country that enters into a moral compact doesn't have the right to withdraw whenever they feel like it. That's the Civil War. Whatever the part slavery played in the rationales of both sides, the legal justification for the war was the southern states had entered into a union and they didn't have the right to secede. From this I take  it that other countries have the right to force us to comply with the Nuremburg principles, however difficult that might be in practice.

  by rflowers on Thu Apr 24, 2008 at 09:11:10 PM PDT

•  Bravo Sir; Commendable work.

  Tipped, recc'd and hotlisted.

  by notquitedelilah on Fri Apr 25, 2008 at 02:46:18 AM PDT

•  Pithy and On Point...Noted with Sadness...

  Shane, you did an excellent job summarizing the relevant law and application in a short space, which is no small task.  As Ben Franklin once said, "If I had more time, I would have written a shorter letter."

  I am glad to see this diary was rescued, but I wish it had gotten more attention during the first and second rounds.  It is this type of condensed insights that make blogs like this really useful.

  It is so easy for those of us with an interest in unpacking the mistakes of the past and setting things right going forward to get caught up in the election horse race and forget how important it is to assemble tight missives like this one.  Progressives need to have these types of condensed analyses at the ready going forward.  I hope you will not be discouraged about the level and responses.  Sally forth.

  by bluedoglaika on Fri Apr 25, 2008 at 04:30:25 AM PDT

•  Excellent diary! I agree with your

  conclusion, but I think that you were a little too conclusory regarding the case for the war based on the relevant UNSC resolution.  It is a debateable case that the declaration of material breech in 1441 constituted a return to the prior authorization.  I, like Lord Goldsmith, would, as an advocate, have preferred to be making the opposite argument before a court.  But it is not lacking totally in merit.

  Do not rely too much on the "remains seized" paragraph in 1441.  This is boilerplate in most SC resolutions.  Under Article 12 of the Charter, matters with which the Council is seized are their province only and may not come before the General Assembly.  As a result, the Council uses the "remains seized" language as a matter of course, to ensure that these matters do not become embroiled in the politics of the General Assembly.

  Don't get me wrong.  I think you have written an excellent paper.  If you decide to expand it out for a law review article, however, you might want to consider the above in refining the paper.

  by Its the Supreme Court Stupid on Fri Apr 25, 2008 at 04:49:03 AM PDT

•  For your next paper

  I'd love your analysis of what happens on January 1 when our soldiers and contractors lose immunity for crimes they commit in Iraq.

  Will lawyers for the Pentagon and the contractors tell their bosses to take their people out of Iraq?

  http://www.democrats.com/...

  by bob fertik on Fri Apr 25, 2008 at 05:29:43 AM PDT

  •  A friend of mine from Yale Law School

    wrote an excellent paper on that very issue if you're interested.

    by Shane Hensinger on Fri Apr 25, 2008 at 11:08:34 AM PDT

•  Inconsequential to the root issue ..

  The following is inconsequential to the root issue of legality ..

  Bush knew his actions were illegal, he knew he was committing war crimes.  

  Some say he was after the oil, but legally he couldn't keep it.  While the Middle East is an important source of oil for Europe, strategically important even, this is not true of the United States (at one time it was true of the United States, but it is no longer true; it hasn't been true for some time; we've made changes) .

  He knew there were no WMD's, no Al Qaeda and no uranium.

  So, why did the President invade Iraq and how did he plan to get away with it?

  by apostrophe on Fri Apr 25, 2008 at 07:51:20 AM PDT