Nomination Reform: SuperDelegates Must Go
Fri May 09, 2008 at 06:17:37 AM PDT
This is the first in a series of diaries I'm hoping will turn into a discussion of reform of the presidential nomination process.
But I'll post the series anyway, even if the discussion does not ensue.
The starting point for any serious discussion about the nomination process has to begin with the understanding that the elements that are currently in place are all there for a reason. I go into those reasons in detail at a blog post here.
You may not like some of the provisions, and you may not like some of the reasons for their existence. But they all reflect reality, and reform has to respect reality.
In this diary I'll just enumerate what I see as the
objectives of the selection process.
Below the fold.
Suggestions for other objectives welcome.
You need a nominating process that, among other things:
- Picks a candidate who reasonably represents the party rank and file
- Provides an opportunity for low name recognition/low initial money candidates to compete
- Picks a candidate who has a reasonable chance of winning the general election
- Provides enough time to assess the relative strengths of candidates, to engage in on-the-job national campaign training and for dirty laundry to be aired.
- Picks a candidate the party can embrace as a whole, including party leaders and key voting blocs
- Has reasonably balanced regional appeal
- Picks a clear winner
- Grows and strengthens the party
Now, these overlap, and there may be others, but I'll take this as a starting point, and welcome contributions for how to make the list more precise and more complete. When you look at this list, you should see that the objectives often conflict--the rank and file choice (1) may not have a reasonable chance to win (3), for example. The reason the process is so complicated is because it reflects these conflicting objectives. An attempt to reform the process that is thoughtful has to recognize these conflicts, and deal with them. Apparently simple solutions, like a single national primary, are pretty clearly bad ideas, because they don't address enough of the selection process objectives.
Today's topic is the SuperDelegates. Why do they exist?
In terms of this list, they exist for reasons 3, 5. 6 and 8. The SuperDelegates are there to make sure that the nominee can win--that the rank and file haven't picked a DFH who can't win. That the selection will strengthen and not weaken the party, and that regionalism hasn't messed up the race.
However, in practical hardnosed political terms, we've learned something about the role of the SuperDelegates in this cycle.
The idea, in less abstract terms, is that they would stop the bleeding in a close contest that has an inevitable result but would be divisive to play out. In particular, they would stop a repeat of Kennedy-Carter in 1980, a conflict that went to the convention. They did play this role in 1984, cutting off Hart's challenge to Mondale.
However, in this cycle, we've discovered that they'll only play this role when the inevitable nominee is the establishment candidate. When the inevitable nominee is an insurgent, the SuperDelegates are paralyzed. Even now in this campaign, they're afraid to come clean with their position. These are supposed to be the courageous wiser heads. But instead they are just scared of getting into trouble, waiting for everyone else to get on board.
As I said at the outset, every element of the nomination process--early open primary in a small state like NH, a mix of closed and open primaries, caucuses and primaries both, a long sequence of contests etc all are in place for a reason. The SuperDelegates are also there for a reason. Stopping the bleeding.
But in this cycle, they've failed to do so. Instead, they've added an anti-coagulant. Without the SuperDelegates, Obama's insuperable lead would have led to an earlier Clinton concession. But WITH SuperDelegates unwilling to endorse an insurgent, we've seen that they can actually undermine the process. The presence of SuperDelegates provides a path to the nomination outside pledged delegate selection by the rank and file. Clinton has introduced the notion that popular vote, an impossible metric to calculate in a process that includes open primaries and caucuses, should be a measure to consider. She has also introduced a throwback to the smoke-filled room process that selected Humphrey in 1968, where party insiders would override the popular selection for reasons of either electabilty, or more to the point, preservation of the status quo among power brokers. This was fatal to the party in 1968, giving power to Southern Democrats not committed to rank and file Democratic viewpoints which were broadly popular*.
In 1968, and before (I'm reading the incomparable Nixonland) by Rick Perlstein) the delegates to the convention WERE SuperDelegates. The reforms following the 1968 debacle of unseated delegations selected by primary votes, not to mention fistfights on the floor, led to the much more open 1972 process, a process that picked an unelectable candidate.
It's arguable that this would be a good thing--that Gary Hart's exploitation of the new rules in 1972 to get McGovern the nomination hurt the party by picking an unelectable candidate, and that the inability to shut down the Kennedy insurgency cost Carter the election.
But picking Mondale didn't give him the win. And the SuperDelegates have hurt the process in this cycle. So the two times they have come into play, they haven't helped. And this time they have actively done damage, extending the contest needlessly, and delaying focus on McCain. It looks like we'd be better off in a close contest like this one letting it go to the Convention without one candidate professing that the process is illegitimate.
It seems clear to me that if there is a need for SuperDelegates, there certainly isn't a need for so many of them. If the right number is not zero, it is certainly not 535 out of 2400. While I'd favor zero, there's an argument for some smaller number, like two or three per state delegation, headed by the senior elected official, governor, Senator or Congressman with most seniority, or, in AK, the mayor of the most populous city. (But not for long. Go Begich.)
I'd rather get rid of them entirely. The risk then is that a candidate running a distant 3rd, like Edwards in this cycle, would stay in the race longer, and play powerbroker. (As I keep saying, the rules that are in place exist for good reasons. The SuperDelegates discourage favorite sons and distant 3rd place candidates staying in the race.) And then the convention would have meaning, and have meaning late. In a split of constituencies, as we're seeing in this race, that could be divisive.
But we've seen more damage from the delegitimizing of Obama's delegates than we've seen benefit from the SuperDelegates' ability to stop the bleeding. In my view, it's not worth the anti-rank and file cost if they are not going to be able to step in, every time, when the winner is clear
Next up, small state primaries at the outset--Markos's hated NH and IA.
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*As Perlstein makes clear, Dems may not have won running an antiwar DFH candidate like McCarthy. But they had much less of a chance of winning running a lukewarm Humphrey. Only Wallace made HHH competitive. Nixon recognized that his greatest risk was an October surprise peace agreement, so, of course, he treasonously set up a back channel to prevent Paris talks from succeeding, by making unkeepable promises to the South Vietnamese negotiators.
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