Our values, our methods and our definition of victory in Afghanistan are fundamentally at odds in Afghanistan. In my previous post in this series, I talked about the mind-boggling numbers of troops needed, according to U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine, for a counterinsurgency strategy. In this post, I'll talk about what it means to "win" a counterinsurgency effort, and how our choice of allies severely undermines the rationale for an escalation.
Victory in Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency is fundamentally about picking the side of the host nation government and making sure it fends off the challenge of the insurgents. It's not us vs. them. It's them vs. them, and we help one of them. From the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual:
Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking responsibility of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as man causes of the insurgency as feasible." (p. 2) "Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government's legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency." (p. 6) "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. (p. 37)
Legitimacy of the host nation's government is referred to in manual as "a north star." But let's be clear: there is no legitimate host government in Afghanistan.
Corruption, War Crimes and the Rule of the Rapists
"The men and women of Afghanistan are building a nation that is free and proud and fighting terror -- and America is honored to be their friend." --President George W. Bush, 2004 State of the Union Address.
The New York Times' Dexter Filkins detailed the depth of corruption in the Kabul regime:
"Kept afloat by billions of dollars in American and other foreign aid, the government of Afghanistan is shot through with corruption and graft. From the lowliest traffic policeman to the family of President Hamid Karzai himself, the state built on the ruins of the Taliban government seven years ago now often seems to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who run it.
A raft of investigations has concluded that people at the highest levels of the Karzai administration, including President Karzai’s own brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, are cooperating in the country’s opium trade, now the world’s largest. In the streets and government offices, hardly a public transaction seems to unfold here that does not carry with it the requirement of a bribe, a gift, or, in case you are a beggar, "harchee" — whatever you have in your pocket.
The corruption, publicly acknowledged by President Karzai, is contributing to the collapse of public confidence in his government and to the resurgence of the Taliban, whose fighters have moved to the outskirts of Kabul, the capital.
But money-driven corruption is only the beginning of the moral depravities of some of our "allies" in Afghanistan.
"The United Front's failure to hold its commanders to account for atrocities committed in the past raises the prospect that they will revert to the same practices should they be given the opportunity to do so. "--Human Rights Watch, 2001 briefing on the human rights record of the United Front, also known as the Northern Alliance.
In 2001, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum and his men shoved about 2,000 people–"suspected al-Qaida and Taliban"–into metal cargo containers. Most suffocated; Dostum’s lackeys shot the others. The general’s men buried them in the desert. When word got out about the mass grave this year, they used bulldozers to exhume and remove corpses to hide the evidence. NATO forces and the U.S. Defense Department kept silent because Afghan warlord Dostum helped oust the Taliban.
This sort of behavior is not new among the factions that made up the Northern Alliance/United Front. For example, Human Rights Watch reported that in late 1999 - early 2000, refugees reported United Front forces carrying out summary executions, looting and burning down houses. Targets of violence were often killed in front of their families, and the targets were often Pashtuns. In late May 1997, around 3,000 suspected Taliban were executed by gunfire or by throwing them down wells and blowing them up with grenades. Sound familiar?
The United Front's respected the rights of women as much as they respected the obligation to treat their prisoners well. For example, in March 1995, the Jamiat-i Islami, one of the major factions of the alliance, captured a neighborhood in Kabul and "went on a rampage, systematically looting whole streets and raping women." One of Jamiat-i Islami's leaders in its struggle against the Soviets and during the Afghan civil war was Ahmad Zia Massoud, also known as the current vice president of Afghanistan. The fact that the new powerholders are no friends to women has not escaped the notice of the women of Afghanistan. Writing under a pseudonym, a member of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) termed the new Afghan regime "Rule of the Rapists," and said:
One international NGO worker told Amnesty International: 'During the Taliban era, if a woman went to market and showed an inch of flesh she would have been flogged; now she's raped.'
Escalation proponents often cite concerns for women's rights as a motivator for an escalation in Afghanistan, but they may want to check with the women of Afghanistan before they add more military support for the Rule of the Rapists. From a RAWA statement late last year:
"By the installation of the puppet government of Karzai, the US reused its creations and continued its deal with the Jehadi criminal warlords. From the very start, Mr. Karzai shunned the demands and trusts of the people and chose to compromise with the criminals of the "Northern Alliance" and placed the filthiest faces in the key posts of the government. In contradiction to the shameless claims of the ministers and other treacherous and corrupt officials, our people feel more ill-fated; the country has been turned to a mafia state and self-immolation, rape and abduction of women and children has no parallel in the history of Afghanistan."
If Not Legitimacy, Then What?
The Kabul regime is not a legitimate government. In addition to the above, it fails at least two of the tests that the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual establishes to measure legitimacy (p. 38):
- The ability to provide security for the populace (Kabul doesn't even protect its people from itself, especially with regard to women).
- A culturally acceptable level of corruption.
So, we're pushing an escalation with the purpose of shoring up a counterinsurgency strategy. But, we lack a "north star," a legitimate host government. Victory is described by counterinsurgency doctrine as the moment when the populace stops supporting or tolerating the insurgency and instead accepts the host nation government as legitimate. But in the case of Afghanistan, the noxious nature of the host government is actually a driver of the insurgency. In many cases, the Taliban is actually doing a better job providing basic services and the rule of law than the host government. So, if you're committed to a military solution to the problem, what's your alternative?
The counterinsurgency manual has an instructive bit of text on p. 37:
All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as "legitimate" rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as "illegitimate" tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. (p. 37)
The government of Afghanistan lacks legitimacy, so the U.S. forces will be placed in the role of the coercer.
How comfortable are you with the idea of more of our troops being ordered to Afghanistan to enforce the Rule of the Rapists?
This post is one of my contributions to Get Afghanistan Right Week, a week of coordinated blogging to push back against escalation in Afghanistan and to promote non-military solutions. If you want to get involved, it's easy: just write up a post and send the link to getafghanistanright AT gmail.com.