Hurray for Iowa's Supreme Court! I'm sure you have all read about their recent ruling for gay marriage. But, have you read the opinion? Its a masterpiece for marriage equality. It logically and methodically destroys every argument against gay marriage.
My favorite excerpts below the fold:
The Court addressing the county's argument the statute does not discriminate against gay men and women.
It is true the marriage statute does not expressly prohibit gay and
lesbian persons from marrying; it does, however, require that if they marry,
it must be to someone of the opposite sex. Viewed in the complete context of
marriage, including intimacy, civil marriage with a person of the opposite sex
is as unappealing to a gay or lesbian person as civil marriage with a person
of the same sex is to a heterosexual. Thus, the right of a gay or lesbian
person under the marriage statute to enter into a civil marriage only with a
person of the opposite sex is no right at all.
The Court finds the statute discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.
By purposefully placing civil marriage outside the realistic reach of gay
and lesbian individuals, the ban on same-sex civil marriages differentiates
implicitly on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Court then asks what level of judicial scrutiny should be applied. Judicial scrutiny is a complicated subject. I think it was at least a week of lectures in law school, so read the opinion for more on that.
The Court concludes,
Because we conclude Iowa’s same-sex marriage statute cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny,we need not decide whether classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to a higher level of scrutiny. Thus, we turn to a discussion of the intermediate scrutiny standard.
What does that mean?
- Intermediate scrutiny standard. "To withstand intermediate
scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective." Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108
S. Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465, 472 (1988).
The Governmental Objectives,
The County has proffered a number of
objectives supporting the marriage statute. These objectives include support
for the "traditional" institution of marriage, the optimal procreation and
rearing of children, and financial considerations.
The Court then analyzes each objective and finds it wanting.
- Protecting Traditional Marriage
When a certain tradition is used
as both the governmental objective and the classification to further that
objective, the equal protection analysis is transformed into the circular
question of whether the classification accomplishes the governmental
objective, which objective is to maintain the classification. In other words,
the equal protection clause is converted into a " ‘barren form of words’ "
when " ‘discrimination . . . is made an end in itself.’
This precise situation is presented by the County’s claim that the
statute in this case exists to preserve the traditional understanding of
marriage. The governmental objective identified by the County—to maintain
the traditional understanding of marriage—is simply another way of saying
the governmental objective is to limit civil marriage to opposite-sex couples.
Thus, the use of traditional marriage as both the governmental
objective and the classification of the statute transforms the equal protection
analysis into the question of whether restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples accomplishes the governmental objective of maintaining opposite-sex
marriage.
This approach is, of course, an empty analysis. It permits a
classification to be maintained " ‘for its own sake.’ " Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at
478 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, 116 S. Ct. at 1629, 134 L. Ed. 2d at
868). Moreover, it can allow discrimination to become acceptable as
tradition and helps to explain how discrimination can exist for such a long
time. If a simple showing that discrimination is traditional satisfies equal
protection, previous successful equal protection challenges of invidious
racial and gender classifications would have failed. Consequently, equal
protection demands that " ‘the classification ([that is], the exclusion of gay
[persons] from civil marriage) must advance a state interest that is separate
from the classification itself.’ "
Because the County offers no particular
governmental reason underlying the tradition of limiting civil marriage to
heterosexual couples, we press forward to consider other plausible reasons
for the legislative classification.
So what other reasons does the county offer? Won't somebody save the CHILDREN!
We begin with the County’s argument that the goal of the same-sex
marriage ban is to ensure children will be raised only in the optimal milieu.
In pursuit of this objective, the statutory exclusion of gay and lesbian people
is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. The civil marriage statute is
under-inclusive because it does not exclude from marriage other groups of
parents—such as child abusers, sexual predators, parents neglecting to
provide child support, and violent felons—that are undeniably less than
optimal parents. Such under-inclusion tends to demonstrate that the
sexual-orientation-based classification is grounded in prejudice or
"overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences" of gay and lesbian people, rather than having a substantial
relationship to some important objective. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, 116
S. Ct. at 2275, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 751 (rejecting use of overbroad
generalizations to classify). If the marriage statute was truly focused on
optimal parenting, many classifications of people would be excluded, not
merely gay and lesbian people.
Or lets try this
c. Promotion of procreation. The County also proposes that
government endorsement of traditional civil marriage will result in more
procreation. It points out that procreation is important to the continuation
of the human race, and opposite-sex couples accomplish this objective
because procreation occurs naturally within this group. In contrast, the
County points out, same-sex couples can procreate only through assisted
reproductive techniques, and some same-sex couples may choose not to
procreate. While heterosexual marriage does lead to procreation, the
argument by the County fails to address the real issue in our required
analysis of the objective: whether exclusion of gay and lesbian individuals
from the institution of civil marriage will result in more procreation? If
procreation is the true objective, then the proffered classification must work
to achieve that objective.
BAM!
Conceptually, the promotion of procreation as an objective of marriage
is compatible with the inclusion of gays and lesbians within the definition of
marriage. Gay and lesbian persons are capable of procreation. Thus, the
sole conceivable avenue by which exclusion of gay and lesbian people from
civil marriage could promote more procreation is if the unavailability of civil
marriage for same-sex partners caused homosexual individuals to "become"
heterosexual in order to procreate within the present traditional institution
of civil marriage. The briefs, the record, our research, and common sense do
not suggest such an outcome.
The Court Concludes
- Conclusion. Having examined each proffered governmental
objective through the appropriate lens of intermediate scrutiny, we conclude
the sexual-orientation-based classification under the marriage statute does
not substantially further any of the objectives. While the objectives asserted
may be important (and many undoubtedly are important), none are
furthered in a substantial way by the exclusion of same-sex couples from
civil marriage. Our equal protection clause requires more than has been
offered to justify the continued existence of the same-sex marriage ban
under the statute.
But then has one more thing to say
Religious Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage. Now that we have
addressed and rejected each specific interest advanced by the County to
justify the classification drawn under the statute, we consider the reason for
the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage left unspoken by
the County: religious opposition to same-sex marriage. The County’s silence
reflects, we believe, its understanding this reason cannot, under our Iowa
Constitution, be used to justify a ban on same-sex marriage.
As a result, civil marriage must be judged under our constitutional
standards of equal protection and not under religious doctrines or the
religious views of individuals. This approach does not disrespect or
denigrate the religious views of many Iowans who may strongly believe in
marriage as a dual-gender union, but considers, as we must, only the
constitutional rights of all people, as expressed by the promise of equal
protection for all. We are not permitted to do less and would damage our
constitution immeasurably by trying to do more.
In the final analysis, we give respect to the views of all Iowans on the
issue of same-sex marriage—religious or otherwise—by giving respect to our
constitutional principles. These principles require that the state recognize
both opposite-sex and same-sex civil marriage. Religious doctrine and views
contrary to this principle of law are unaffected, and people can continue to
associate with the religion that best reflects their views. A religious
denomination can still define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman, and a marriage ceremony performed by a minister, priest, rabbi, or
other person ordained or designated as a leader of the person’s religious faith does not lose its meaning as a sacrament or other religious institution.
The sanctity of all religious marriages celebrated in the future will have the
same meaning as those celebrated in the past. The only difference is civil
marriage will now take on a new meaning that reflects a more complete
understanding of equal protection of the law. This result is what our
constitution requires.
Hear Hear! Let's hope the California court and all state court are listening.
The bolding in the quotes has been added for emphasis, not in the original text.