Central Asia is the place where ambitions go to die.
For President Obama this means that his historically ambitious first term agenda (domestic, foreign, political, economic, diplomatic, stategic, et al) could be dashed to bits on the sharp ridges of the Hindu Kush and in the dust filled plains of Kandahar.
This administration may suceed, fail, or stumble into mediocrity based on the efficacy of the principles and the legitimacy of the political/military doctrine known as COIN (counterinsurgency).
Obama, and along with him we as a nation, have bet our bottom and top dollars on the successful implementation and execution of the COIN doctrine in Central Asia.
Nothing more clearly illustrates this than the recent elevation of General Stanley McChrystal, to top commander in Afghanistan.
In order to understand the risk and the potential for success in Afghanistan it is important to have a working knowledge of the principles of the modern COIN doctrine as understood by (some) US military and diplomatic leaders today.
For a longer read you should try Janine Davidson's Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and Debate to start.
In this diary I have condensed her white paper into bullet points that provide a high level flavor of the doctrine:
- COIN is a long term political strategy focused on creating a sustainable stability through building and/or enhancing government effectiveness and legitimacy.
- COIN must create an intergrated civilian-military effort based on a common assessment of the situation sychronized with development, governance and security that supports the political strategy.
- COIN must force a genuine partnership with the "host nation" to build self-reliant, independently fucntioning institutions over time.
- COIN must institute a population centric security regime that is founded on the presence of forces (military and/or police), local community partnerships, self-defending populations, and small unit operations to keep the "enemy" off balance and make the people feel safe.
- COIN must have continuity and commitment of key personnel with sufficient authority and resources (and time) to do the job as described.
- COIN must place a special emphasis on building effective and legitimate local security forces balanced by the ability to provide direct security (i.e. engaging in direct conmbat with the "enemy" where needed) to the population while the local forces are being built.
- COIN must take a region wide approach that disrupts safe haves, controls borders, frontier regions, and undermines insurgent infrastructures in neighboring countries.
- COIN must be able to work with a "host national government" that has a basic level of legitimacy among the population and is willing to adjust and address root causes of the insurgency.
A successful COIN implementation anywhere (and especially in Afghanistan) is a VERY TALL ORDER and usually takes 5-10 years or more to take hold. But what is striking about it is how much it makes sense given the insane blather of the past 8 years.
In light of the Rumsfled, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Bush fantasies I do appreciate the fact that modern COIN approaches the problem from a holistic perspective. Giving great weight (perhaps 80% or more) to culture, economics, civilian security, communications, governance in concert with killing (20% or less) the enemy.
To be clear I am not conclusively stating that this war, or better yet counterinsurgency, will be decisively won. This is especially so given America's notorious impatience and a political timeline which will likely require measureable progress within 2 years.
However, given the circumstances and our greater strategic objectives I see no other way to "succeed" in Afghanistan. So for me the formula boils down to this ... to achieve and extend the progressive programs of an Obama presidency, not to mention the fate of progressive politics and for years to come, we need something that can reasonably called "success" in Afghanistan. Which means that for now at least I am throwing my support behind this effort. This is not an easy thing to say or swallow given my active oppostiion against the phony neocons wars of the recent past. But there you have it. I am with my President on this for now.
We could of course withdraw quickly and there are several strong and compelling cases to be made for an early exit. But, a quick departure would leave loose ends, unmet objectives (Al Quaeda, Taliban, women's rights, opium, etc.) and potentially damaging longterm political consequences in the US. The Republican Party would demogogue and use the "retreat" from Afghanistan to rebuild itself (the old playbook) by branding Liberals/Democrats wimps, losers, and defeatists.
As noted above I will support the Obama/COIN strategy in Afghanistan and am prepared to give the new strategy 24-36 months to show progress.
However, I certainly reserve the right to reassess if (as many think) there is only a dead end and graveyard at the end of road.