In an 8 to 1 decision the Supreme Court held that the strip search of Arizona teen, Savana Redding, violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search, but held that school district officials were not personally liable. This comes from an AP article, which will not be quoted here. The Court did direct the lower court to determine if the school district could be held liable.
The decision said that there was no evidence of risk to other students that would warrant the search nor that she had the drugs in he underwear. The text of the opinion is not yet available, but will be posted as soon as it is.
UPDATE. Here is the Slip Opinion.
This is the standard the Court used:
(a) For school searches, “the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause.” T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 341. Under the resulting rea-
sonable suspicion standard, a school search “will be permissible . . .
when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex
of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id., at 342. The re-
quired knowledge component of reasonable suspicion for a school ad-
ministrator’s evidence search is that it raise a moderate chance of
finding evidence of wrongdoing. Pp. 3–5.
This is the rationale:
c) Because the suspected facts pointing to Savana did not indi-
cate that the drugs presented a danger to students or were concealed
in her underwear, Wilson did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant
extending the search to the point of making Savana pull out her un-
derwear. Romero and Schwallier said that they did not see anything
when Savana pulled out her underwear, but a strip search and its
Fourth Amendment consequences are not defined by who was looking
and how much was seen. Savana’s actions in their presence neces-
sarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and both
subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy
support the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, re-
quiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school authori-
ties for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings. Sa-
vana’s subjective expectation of privacy is inherent in her account of
it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating. The reasonable-
ness of her expectation is indicated by the common reaction of other
young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability in-
tensifies the exposure’s patent intrusiveness. Its indignity does not
outlaw the search, but it does implicate the rule that “the search [be]
‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.’ ” T. L. O., supra, at 341. Here, the
content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion. Be-
cause Wilson knew that the pills were common pain relievers, he
must have known of their nature and limited threat and had no rea-
son to suspect that large amounts were being passed around or that
individual students had great quantities. Nor could he have sus-
pected that Savana was hiding common painkillers in her underwear.
When suspected facts must support the categorically extreme intru-
siveness of a search down to an adolescent’s body, petitioners’ general
belief that students hide contraband in their clothing falls short; a
reasonable search that extensive calls for suspicion that it will suc-
ceed. Nondangerous school contraband does not conjure up the spec-
ter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no evidence of such be-
havior at the school; neither Jordan nor Marissa suggested that
Savana was doing that, and the search of Marissa yielded nothing.
Wilson also never determined when Marissa had received the pills
from Savana; had it been a few days before, that would weigh heavily
against any reasonable conclusion that Savana presently had the
pills on her person, much less in her underwear. Pp. 8–11.
All Justices, except Thomas, concurred that there was a Fourth Amendment violation.
Here is Thomas' concern:
The majority
imposes a vague and amorphous standard on school ad-
ministrators. It also grants judges sweeping authority to
second-guess the measures that these officials take to
maintain discipline in their schools and ensure the health
and safety of the students in their charge. This deep
intrusion into the administration of public schools exem-
plifies why the Court should return to the common-law
doctrine of in loco parentis under which “the judiciary was
reluctant to interfere in the routine business of school
administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and
enforce rules and to maintain order.”
Dare I say he misses the point. There was no health or safety risk and the doctrine of "in loco parentis" does not extend exposing minors to the embarrassment of strip searches in the presence of others in the absence of any compelling reason