DISCLAIMER: I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I do have a fascination and interest in the Constitution and so I started reading the Federalist Papers and posting my interpretation on my own blog. I thought it might be of some interest here. Your interpretations and thoughts are greatly appreciated in the comments!
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
Federalist No. 14 and links to previous Federalist Papers entries below the fold and previously posted at LiveJournal
Federalist No. 1 here
Federalist No. 2 here
Federalist No. 3 here
Federalist No. 4 here
Federalist No. 5 here
Federalist No. 6 here
Federalist No. 7 here
Federalist No. 8 here
Federalist No. 9 here
Federalist No. 10 here
Federalist No. 11 here
Federalist No. 12 here
Federalist No. 13 here
Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
From the New York Packet.
Friday, November 30, 1787.
Federalist No. 14 is an important paper addressing the notions of size of the nation, the necessary size of the government, and the power entrusted to the government. These are issues that are still argued 220+ years later.
Hamilton opens by summarizing all of the points previously argued in these papers:
WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own.
He then says that some are disingenuously using the size of a Republic as an argument against the stronger Union and attempts to poke holes in those arguments. Madison states that the confusion most likely arises from the definitions of a republic and a democracy.
The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.
And this argument was made in a previous paper - democracy by nature must be small and is inappropriate on a national scale. This confusion of republic vs. democracy had been perpetuated by respected writers of the time owing to their own biases of one form over the other. Madison notes that most governments of antiquity were democracies and that Europe enlisted representation on some scale. However, he notes that Europe certainly hadn't perfected the representative government and that the United States should not be deprived of the opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the form of government proposed by the Constitution.
Madison then refutes the size argument as it relates to the necessity of the participants to congregate for the purpose of carrying out government functions. In essence, the argument is that the size of the nation is related to the distance that representatives (or all the people in the case of a democracy) are required to travel. Some argued that the US was too big for the elected representatives to gather and effectively govern the country. However, Madison notes that for the 13 years the United States was in existence prior, representatives of the states were almost continuously gathered for the purpose of fighting England and establishing the new nation.
It will not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been almost continually assembled, and that the members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.
Madison then goes on to compare the actual dimensions of the United States to European nations and comes to the conclusion that distance should not be a barrier to participation in the government.
Next comes the big paragraph talking about the limits of government power.
In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.
Madison rightly points out that the Constitution LIMITS the power of the federal government and that all other powers are delegated to the subordinate (state) governments. Opponents to the Constitution were arguing that the document gave too much authority to the federal government. Sound familiar?
Next, he states that another objective of the Constitution is to secure the union of the 13 states. However, it is noted that adding to the union is also a goal as it becomes necessary.
The next argument is that interactions between the states will be improved. This is a topic that was covered in regards to commerce, but here Madison is concerned mainly with infrastructure, roads, waterways, etc.
Then Madison makes perhaps the most important argument - back to security, in this case in regards to the states on the frontier of the new nation. Being far in distance from the seat of government may provide disadvantages to these frontier states, but they will gain added security from the strong federal union and so a balance of needs is created.
It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout.
He closes with an appeal to folks to use their good judgment and reject the voices of opposition.
Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire.
[snip]
Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide.
Because we're Americans, and we kick butt!!!