Before I begin, let me make clear that I am not a contrarian. Contrarianism for its own sake, of the sort regularly practiced by Slate, puts in fits of apoplectic rage.
But we as a progressive community could use a little bit of contrarianism on the healthcare debate, and a little bit of perspective. When it comes to high stakes issues like actually passing a healthcare bill, we need to set the idealism aside and get a dose of heavyhanded realism. We need to understand the motivations of those involved, and where the pressure points are. The time for overton windows is passed, as is the time for impotent rants. This is brass tacks time if we actually want to see this legislation passed.
I am not going to wade here into the details of the various programs being considered in the House and Senate, or the particulars of the bills coming out of each committee. And I am NOT going to attempt to defend the stalling tactics of various Blue Dog members in the House designed to derail reform and allow the conservatives to attempt to ratchet up negative messaging in an attempt to artificially drive down poll numbers in support of reform. Insofar as that goes, the pressure being levied against the Blue Dogs in the House is spot on.
I am speaking here merely about the Senate, and the votes that will be required for passage through the Senate. Whatever the House may do, the bill that comes through the Senate will be worse. And as much as we may be focusing on the House today, the outrage in the offing over the final version of the bill in the Senate is going to be enormous.
A while back I wrote a diary affirming the necessity of passing the public option, even if it required the use of the reconciliation process to do so with 51 votes. Unfortunately, I was wrong. The ugly truth is that any decent healthcare bill to come out of the Senate is going to require 60 votes, largely due to the Byrd Rule which would bar much of the most useful parts of reform from being considered in reconciliation.
60 votes.
But that shouldn't be a problem, right, so long as the Democratic caucus holds together? One would think so. Unfortunately, Senate centrists like Baucus (D-MT), Nelson (D-NE) and Lieberman (Asshole-CT) have little incentive to see it pass, and theoretically much to gain from its failure, as Steve Benen points out:
It occurs to me, then, that there's at least a possibility that "centrist" Democrats -- Blue Dogs, New Democrats, Lieberman, et al -- might not see failure as such a horrible option here. In other words, they may realize that coming up short on health care, letting this opportunity slip away, and hurting millions of Americans in the process may be devastating for the Democratic majority, but these same "centrist" Democrats may prefer a smaller majority, or perhaps even a GOP majority to "balance" the Democratic president. They may very well disagree with the party's leadership on most issues, and think the best course of action is taking away their power by undermining the party's agenda.
It seems odd that these "centrist" Democrats would forget the lessons of 1993 and 1994. But alternatively, are we sure they have forgotten those lessons, or have they learned those lessons all too well?
Benen may be overthinking things here, but not by much. Even if we ignore the obvious corruption and pay-to-play issues involved here, the fact remains that the claim to power and influence held by these people rests in their serving as a bridge of sorts between the parties. They have little incentive to pass a bill that reduces the influence of bipartisanship and comity, sham that those words may be in a climate where Republican Senators openly speak of breaking presidents at their own Waterloo. And nothing we do will change that.
Joe Lieberman has already been primaried, and doesn't care. Ben Nelson knows that threats of a primary challenge are empty, as any serious threat to him would probably result in GOP control of his seat. Dianne Feinstein has already made her utter contempt for the American people well-known, and won't be seriously touched in California until she chooses to retire--and she knows it.
So what do we do?
There are only two courses of action that seem promising:
First, pressure Harry Reid. As the Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid can choose to go down in history as the man who finally got healthcare done, or as the man who failed to get it done despite having a supermajority in his own caucus. His legacy is at stake, and he'll take the blame if it fails to happen. Whatever arm-twisting Reid can bring to bear on his centrist Democratic colleagues, must be done.
If that means the drastic step of removing committee chairmanships from certain people, so be it. If it means threatening to strongarm earmarks, military spending and other funding away from the states in question, so be it. If it means refusal to consider other bills that are priorities to those Senators, so be it. These centrist Democrats aren't responsive to the pressure of the people, and only care about their power within the Senate chamber. That power is directly under Reid's control. Tell Reid to make these Senators face the consequences where it really matters to them: within the halls of the Senate itself.
Second, pressure Republicans. I know that sounds almost laughable, but consider it. No less than five Republican Senators will be retiring in 2010: Kit Bond (R-MO), Sam Brownback (R-KS), Judd Gregg (R-NH), Mel Martinez (R-FL), and George Voinovich (R-OH). Except for Brownback who clearly has higher aspirations, these men do not represent the most extreme elements of the GOP Senate; they are not seeking further elected office. They have little to fear from the crazy GOP base, and theoretically much to gain from having crossed the aisle to help pass real healthcare reform. They might actually be more tractable than some of our conservative Democrats. And then, of course, there are the two Republican Senators from Maine, each of whom face an uncertain future in upcoming elections if they are seen as stonewalling President Obama's reform agenda.
It may be a longshot, but a dedicated campaign pressuring Reid and select Republicans may bear more fruit than a campaign against conservative Democrats who will doubtless wear their refusal to cater to "the left" as a badge of honor in the incestuous chambers of the Senate. We're going to need strongarming within the Senate, and we're going to need Republican votes.