Throughout my study of history there are few historians out there I really admire, and find their insights very worthwhile. Gabriel Kolko is one such historian. His book, The Politics of War (1968) forms the cornerstone of my understanding and interpretation of World War II. Kolko, (Harvard, Phd) remains Professor Emeritus at York University in Toronto. He's known as being part of the "New Left" of American Historians, and his book on American Capitalism, The Triumph of Conservatism (1963) is iconic for many historians on the Left as well. I regularly Google his name, to see if he's written any articles. Yesterday I came across a piece published on counterpunch just a few weeks ago, you can see the piece here: September 23, 2009. The piece is titled "The United States in Afghanistan" and in just a few short paragraphs, he outlines some pretty specific reasons why we need to get out.
First and foremost--the Afghanistan conflict, and the problems the area faces, evade any military solution. From the article:
Afghanistan is a mess, complex beyond description, with mountainous terrain to match. Its principal problems are political, social, and cultural - in large part because Great Britain concocted it arbitrarily. There is no durable military solution to its many problems.
This conclusive bit occurs after the two introductory paragraphs of the article describe the ethnic diversity of Afghanistan (7 Major ethnic groups), porous borders, and the central role played by Pakistan.
Afghanistan presents a difficult arena to exert any kind of external influence. The sense of Afghanistan as a nation hardly exists in any 20th or even 19th Century Western understanding of the word. Power is de-centralized, and the problems (for the West), even under the Taliban resulted only from certain sections of the country. In any case, an indigenously based solution, in any set of circumstances will have to evolve from within. Historically in other areas of the world, Western Imperialist policies worked in areas where local elites maintained control over large sections of the population. This has never really been the case with Afghanistan. Central governments reached some form of control after negotiating multiple agreements with locally based powers--whether they where tribal Leaders, drug lords or foreign-backed entities (Al Qaeda). Moreover, Hamid Karzai will never really be more than the "Mayor of Kabul" and to the Pakistanis he is way too friendly to India for their liking.
On the issue of Pakistan, unfortunately they have more reason to trust the Taliban than the United States. Significant relations between the Pakistani military and the Taliban goes back to the days of Soviet occupation. This part cannot be emphasized enough. Pakistan's main security/military concern is India. Nothing is going to change that in the near future. As a result, Pakistan will seek friendly relations with whoever is in control in Afghanistan. The Bush administration threw a billions of dollars at Pakistan, and they received very little in return. Obama is likely to get the same result.
The issue of public opinion also contributes significantly. The most recent polls show a majority of Americans against the war. Kolko cites a figure of 58%. Kolko further speculates that in major coalition countries, Germany, UK etc. support is even lower. All of this underscores the Pakistani military conventional wisdom that it makes little sense in the long run to really make hardened enemies out of the Taliban--they may be the next effective government of Afghanistan.
The most unfortunate thing about US political considerations is the fact that our electorate can be counted on to care little about what other nations think. This is true even when US policies have major affect on the nations in question. This aspect is what makes Afghanistan policy so difficult for Obama. There is really no where to win. He campaigned on Afghanistan being the "sensible" war in comparison with Iraq. Elements of Afghanistan actually attacked us on 9/11. However, Afghanistan policy certainly presents a tar baby that Republicans would love to see Obama embrace. He should cut his losses. The facts, a Nobel Peace Prize, and the many thousand lives of Afghanis and Americans alike would benefit from a major turnaround on US policy. He would certainly "take his lumps" for dramatic action in the press for the short run, but in the long run it's the right policy, and isn't that what matters? Obama should take his hits now, so that by 2012, this will likely be a case study in prudence rather than a slow bleed that creates unpredictable sources of discontent in the US electorate. In 2012, Obama is likely to sustain damage from the Left and the Right over Afghanistan. Better to let the Right have their shot now, and build support on the Left. Obama, the Right is never going to support you.