"The War We Can't Win"
from the August 15 issue of Commonweal, reprinted in November Harper's
I know health care is grabbing all the headlines, but U.S. policy in Afghanistan is approaching a possible turning point, and if ever we needed clear thinking on it, the time is now. And Bacevich (author of several books including The Limits of Power) delivers.
He starts with a question: "What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked.…with few exceptions, Afghanistan's importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. Today, as then, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny."
Bacevich attacks the CW that 9/11 happened because we ignored Afghanistan:
…this widely accepted line of reasoning overlooks the primary reason the 9/11 conspiracy succeeded: federal, state, and local agencies responsible for basic security fell down on the job, failing to install even minimally adequate security measures at the nation's airports.…Averting a recurrence of that awful day does not require the semipermanent occupation and pacification of distant countries…Rather it requires that the United States erect and maintain robust defenses.
Next Bacevich demolishes the recent trend of holding up our "success" in Iraq as a template for pacifying Afghanistan. He finishes
Given the embarrassing yet indisputable fact that this was an utterly needless war…to describe Iraq as a success, and as a model for application elsewhere, is nothing short of obscene.
He then points out that, in terms of U.S. national interest, it would make far more sense for us to "fix", say, Mexico than Afghanistan. Yet anyone suggesting that would "have his license to pontificate revoked."
What should the United States do about Afghanistan?…A sense of realism and a sense of proportion should oblige us to take a minimalist approach. As with Uruguay or Fiji or Estonia or other countries where U.S. interests are limited, the United States should undertake to secure those interests at the lowest cost possible.
What might this mean in practice?…It would be much better to let local authorities do the heavy lifting. Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. As a backup, intensive surveillance complemented with precision punitive strikes…will suffice to disrupt Al Qaeda's plans.
Bacevich ends with two points: 1. What violent Islamists are offering—a rejection of modernity—doesn't sell; time is on our side, and 2. The U.S. ought to concentrate more on healing ourselves than "fixing" distant countries ("If the United States today has a saving mission, it is to save itself.")
Read the whole thing. It ought to be required for anybody with any influence on Afghanistan policy.
(Parenthetical note: Bacevich's own son was killed by an IED in Iraq.)