As early as 1965, then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara had doubts about the ability of the US to "win" the war in Viet Nam. A summary of his evaluation as reported in a memo to President Johnson stated:
We should be aware that deployments of the kind I have recommended will not guarantee success. US killed-in-action can be expected to reach 1000 a month, and the odds are even that we will be faced in early 1967 with a "no-decision" at an even higher level...
In January of 1966 in a memo prepared by Secretary McNaughton (assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs), he noted as a warning in the opening paragraph - "We have in Vietnam the ingredients of an enormous miscalculation..." further on he noted that "the reasons we went into Vietnam are varied but they are largely academic. Why we have not withdrawn from Vietnam is, by all odds, one reason - (to avoid humiliation).
"...The ARVN is tired, passive and accomodation-prone...the PAVN/VC are effectively matching our deployments...Pacification is stalled despite effort and hopes."
Please note that all quotes and blockquotes in this diary are from the Pentagon Papers, abridged edition, edited by George C. Herring, unless noted otherwise.
In 1971 Daniel Ellsberg who had earned a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard, graduated first out of a class of more than 1000 in the Marine Officers' Basic School at Quantico, served two years as a company commander in Viet Nam and after being discharged worked as an analyst at RAND Corporation, risked life in prison by releasing the "Pentagon Papers" to the public. The first installment was published by The New York Times in June of 1971.
The original Pentagon study consisted of a series of long analyses written by Department of Defense officials, each backed up by extensive supporting documents and each dealing with a particular chronological period or a specific topic such as pacification, the air war or the advisory effort in support of the South Vietnamese.
For those unfamiliar with this incident the information revealed from the files of the government itself a considerable amount of duplicity and repeated deception. Examples of such included the fact that, the US, during the Truman Administration, had aided the French efforts to suppress the Viet Minh insurgency, details of the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subversion of the 1954 Geneva Accords.
Daniel Ellsberg had once been a firm supporter of the war but since had concluded that it was immoral. The Pentagon Papers revealed what he had come to suspect, that the war had been waged by lies and deception.
We have seen comments here on DKos on both sides of the argument as to the similarities, or lack of same, between the situations in Afghanistan today and Viet Nam during the mid-1960's.
Daniel Ellsberg has spoken out recently.
Like Vietnam, Ellsberg said "no victory lies ahead [for the US] in Afghanistan" and President Barack Obama knows it.
Still, Ellsberg believes Obama will "go against his own instincts as to what's best for the country and do what's best for him and his administration and his party in the short run facing elections, which is to avoid a military revolt."
That means the president will likely authorize a sizable increase of US forces in the region, Ellsberg said, because Obama fears that top US military commanders will stage a revolt if he rejects their requests for additional soldiers.
Ellsberg predicted that Obama will cave in to Gen. Stanley McCrystal's request for as many as 40,000 US troops in order to, "prevent his military from making a political case to his public and to the Congress that he has been weak, unmanly, indecisive, and weak on terrorism, and has endangered American troops."
Sari Gelzer for truthout
Before becoming too touchy about the "military revolt" comment please view the video below, a recent interview with Ellsberg by The Real News senior editor, Paul Jay.
The video is 18 minutes long. The heart of what Ellsberg has to say regarding Afghanistan can be seen in the first 7 or 8 minutes of the video, however it's worth watching the entire video. He makes many very important points regarding the Afghanistan - Viet Nam comparison. His discussion of avoiding a "military revolt" appears near the end of the video.
The most important point he makes, IMHO and from personal ground-level experience in what was then called "pacification", now COIN, (which Ellsberg refers to as "horse shit" - and I agree with him), is that in the end we will not be able to continue to persuade the people of a foreign country to fight against their own countrymen on behalf of, what they perceive to be a foreign power. As Ellsberg accurately points out it is difficult for many Americans to see themselves in this light.
President Obama is considering whether or not to send additional troops as requested by General McChrystal. Obama now is faced with a situation, similar to that which troubled LBJ in 1965. LBJ would commit to an open-ended escalation in Viet Nam. It appears that President Obama will agree to a similar escalation. It will be much more difficult to get out than it was to get in.
Unfortunately many will die in our continuing these efforts to avoid yet another humiliation.