Schiphol International Airport in Amsterdam.
I was teaching for Hitachi Data Systems in Espoo, Finland, from 7-Dec to 14-Dec. I was scheduled to fly home on 15-Dec, HEL-AMS, AMS-ATL, ATL-MSY, but flight cancellations put me on DL253 on 16-Dec. I fly through Schiphol International Airport in Amsterdam (AMS) frequently, so I thought I'd share some thoughts on yesterday's DL253 incident.
(more after the jump)
Schiphol International in Amsterdam is one of the big hub airports of Europe, like Heahrow, Charles de Gaulle in Paris, and Frankfurt. It's a major gateway to Africa and the Middle East. Most travellers' first impression of AMS is that it's less airport and more shopping mall. There are two main sections of AMS. One side is for flights that stay within the European Union. There's a passport control checkpoint mid-way through the main concourse/shopping mall, and all flights arriving from and departing to non-EU destinations are on the other side.
Security checks at AMS vary depending on which side of the airport you're on. When arriving on a flight from outside the EU, passengers go through security check immediately after clearing passport control. This is similar to what one finds at most US airports: clear ICE, pass through TSA, and you're a domestic passenger. International (outside-the-EU) flights at AMS handle security at the gate, however.
The Dutch approach to passenger screening is quite different from the US approach. They still look each passenger boarding an international flight in the eye. THEN they check your bags. A gate for a flight to the US opens 90 minutes prior to departure. At that time, 3-5 security agents will set up laptops with wireless connections at the gatehouse entrance. Those agents take people in from the gatehouse queue one at a time (more if it's a couple or family traveling together). The agent examines passports and boarding passes, then proceeds to ask the questions US airlines used to ask, such as where you started your journey that day, did you accept packages from strangers, etc. The tone is always conversational, not a rote checklist of questions. (BTW, the Dutch by and large have VERY good English. They watch American television programs with subtitles rather than dubbing, so they pick up American English much faster than a lot of Europeans.) If the security agents were to encounter a passenger they considered suspicious or a threat, they've got the person in a much more controlled environment.
Side note #1 - Video surveillance at AMS isn't as obvious as at Heathrow or Gatwick; the British are very in-your-face with the notion that Big Brother is watching. The Dutch watch, too, they're just a bit more subtle. Well, truth be told, everyone using video surveillance is more subtle than the British.
The most recent reports are that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had an explosive powder on his person. That and a pack of matches would get through anybody's metal detectors. Some airports (Boston's Logan comes to mind) have dallied with chemical "sniffer" devices, but they tend to slow down the security process too much.
Clearly Abdulmutallab got past the personal security screening at AMS as well as getting his powder through the metal detector. Given the reports that he badly burned himself and did not show any pain, my (non-medical professional) guess is he was on something that controlled the adrenalin increase that usually accompanies such an encounter. Given the large Muslim community in greater Detroit, he wouldn't trigger any overt or subliminal profiling. A lot of people start popping Ambien and other drugs to make it through these 8-9 hour flights from AMS to airports in the US, so someone groggy or tipsy wouldn't raise a red flag.
This is where the randomness of the world of in. Mechanical problems on the KLM A320 that was to bring me to AMS Tuesday morning (from Helsinki) forced me to have to re-book for DL259, the later of the two daily ex-Northwest flights to DTW. Mechanical difficulties with the Delta (ex-NWA) A330 I was supposed to take for DL259 forced the cancellation of that flight, putting me on DL253 on 16-Dec. The same sort of thing could easily happen to an aspiring terrorist, forcing said terrorist to pass multiple screening procedures.
Once on board, a would-be terrorist Abdulmutallab would have at least 5.5 hours to kill before taking action. Most of the flight is over water, and these guys seem to want to make an impact over American soil. The attacker has been sealed up on the plane for a while, with whatever drugs he took to stay calm and natural at AMS wearing off. Passengers notice hyper, nervous, wired people on planes these days. Given how little maneuver space any flier has on a modern passenger jet (including first class), some guy trying to set up any kind of bomb, then light it, would draw so much attention, he's more likely to be subdued and severely injured by his fellow passengers.
Side note 2 - I'm very disappointed with NPR for using Peter King (R-moon) as a source on a possible terrorist connection. He's a partisan wingnut who can't keep his mouth shut, and NPR citing him in their reporting only encourages him to keep talking, possibly derailing the FBI investigation.
The main lessons to be learned from this sort of stunt involve identifying not potential terrorists as potential psychos. Based on his statements post-attempt, Abdulmutallab is not the hard-core sort of terrorist we saw on 9/11 as much as a "lone wolf" nutcase. Airport security agents will have to be trained to recognize the crazies as well as the dedicated.