As the Roxana Saberi case draws to a close, allow me the opportunity to make a few observations about what this case reveals about the functioning of Iranian politics and society. There are a few themes to reflect on as we try to interpret the course of events and the results in this case. Here are some ideas to ponder: 1) In trying to understand Iranian political society think of the US during McCarthyism, and the following decade. 2) Despite appearances, power in Iran is de-centralized and convoluted. 3) Iranian actions and statements for some time will appear contradictory.
McCarthyism Then and Now
If you go back to US in the 1950s, McCarthyism, even though it was eventually defeated, dramatically affected domestic political attitudes. Many people bought into the idea that there were communists or more importantly "communist sympathizers," in and around government, and in groups that appeared to want to change the status quo. The net result was that even though there was a real communist threat in the world, US reaction to it became distinctly militaristic and contained a tendency to overreact to perceived threats. Domestically, conformity became a virtue, and change became suspect. Moreover, conservative elements managed to use the accusation of "communist sympathizer" or "outside agitator" to use fear to derail many progressive reforms, i.e. Civil Rights.
In Iran in the late 19th Century and for most of the 20th Century foreign powers manipulated domestic politics. From Russia and Great Britain, to US intervention with the Shah in 1953, foreign powers meddled in Iranian politics to redirect their national wealth to corrupt internal and foreign sources. This back story leads to the current political climate in Iran where there remains a deep distrust of foreigners, particularly Americans. In Iran, the accusation "foreign agent" or "influenced by foreign agents," carries the same weight and fear that "communist sympathizer" did for us. It will stop a political career, or it will cause an American/Iranian citizen to be arrested for buying a bottle of wine because maybe she looked at a local fanatic the wrong way.
Keep in mind, the Bush administration did not help this situation as they constantly rattled the saber and called for the overthrow of the government--virtually following the script the Hardliners in Iran wanted to see. Moreover, just as the Soviets did put spies in the US, the US is trying to spy within Iran. Roxana Saberi, however, is not one of them, but as the saying goes, "just because you're paranoid does not mean someone is not out to get you."
Decentralized and Convoluted Authority
We all know the basics of the story, how she was arrested and the original sentence. At this point it is important to know that she was sentenced by a lower level court. First she was arrested for buying a bottle of wine, and then later charged with espionage. This created a messy situation for the Political elites. On the one hand they generally do not like to interfere with lower courts and processes, but at the same time, the international embarrassment made them look bad. Eventually, forces behind the scenes intervened and opened the way for another hearing, and a suspended sentence. If Iranian power were truly centralized this result would have happened more quickly. Moreover, the fact that it happened in the first place speaks to the decentralized nature of Iranian institutions. It remains doubtful that some high government official tailed Saberi and insured her arrest in an attempt to strike a blow to the Great Satan. In addition, realize that the people who arrested and initially sentenced Saberi most likely will vote for Ahmadinejad in June,they are his base. Her release does not necessarily help his cause politically. Whether he was in fact the one who intervened or not, there remain a number of low-information conservative types who won't like this result, and it is difficult to predict who they will blame. Roxana Saberi touches many nerves for them--she's a woman, and an American. (The subject of the upcoming elections in June is a topic for another diary, however.) During the Cold War, many US analysts projected a methodical and uniform strategy to Soviet leaders, as though they frequently referenced the master plan in the Kremlin, moved pushpins on a map and laughed diabolically as their master plan advanced. It would be a mistake for the US to not recognize different elements within the Iranian ruling elite as well. There is no "master plan" of Islamic Expansion to take over the world.
In the end, this event alone provides one of the major reasons for establishing diplomatic relations--you cannot know who you are dealing with if you don't have regular interactions with them. Moreover, if we had a diplomatic mission in Iran, this Saberi case could most likely have been resolved with a few phone calls.
Future Contradictions
Here are some basic facts about Iran that point to a different future. A) Over 50% of the population was born after the 1979 Revolution. B) 65% of university students are women. C) Economic opportunity is more important than ever, and Afghan refugees and unemployment have put strain on Iranian society. The ruling elites want to hold on to power, and they want to maintain the Islamic Republic of Iran. They are not, however, of one mind. There will still be many statements about US interventionist policy in the Middle East. There will still be criticisms of the Obama administration--remember the McCarthy mindset--they are not going to turn on a dime, nor are they going to suddenly get friendly with "the agents of Imperialism." The political goal for us should be Detentè. Any group of leaders in Iran will have to be careful to maintain an almost Militant independence and give all the appearances of listening to no foreign power, especially the US.
Khatami may not be running in June, but he is not the only reformist in the country. Mousavi is now currently campaigning with his wife--this is a first, and it shows that he is gambling on high voter turnout among women, and their general dissatisfaction with things in the last five years. See Massoumeh Torfeh's article in The Guardian HERE. With all this, however, even if Ahmadinejad loses, the hardliners will not just go away, and if we want to see them become like the Republican party here, we need to make sure the economy and the international political situation improves under moderate rule. In addition, the Anti-American/Anti-Imperialist/Anti-Israel will not go away overnight either. Remember how long it took us to moderate our foreign policy after McCarthy's anti-communist hysteria--oops I forgot we're still working on it--just take a look at our defense budget.