Winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan? Not so much, certainly not in Kandahar Province. Elsewhere?
Reconciliation is a popular concept in Kandahar Province. There is almost universal agreement that negotiation with the Taliban is preferable to continued fighting.
The desire for reconciliation is likely driven by the perception that the Taliban are part of Afghan society; a significant majority of respondents view the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers".
Kandahar Province Report - March 2010 - pg. 53
According to the top U.S. Intel Officer, Major General Michael Flynn, the Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely and they have the required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity. See Flynn's Power Point Presentation here from December 2009.
As for elsewhere ... Flynn's presentation reports that insurgents now have their own governors installed in 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and that this may be the gloomiest public assessment of the war yet. It states that the Taliban are becoming more effective and that shadow governance is increasing.
On the other side of the war, Richard Engel, a foreign correspondent for NBC, who appeared on the Rachael Maddow Show late last year told of a secret report for the Pentagon Brass.
The report, intended for military commanders and not for public distribution, concludes that Afghanistan's National Army is rife with corruption and incompetence, and that it will take far more than a year to rehabilitate the country's security forces.
Huffington Post
This is nothing new to anyone following events in Afghanistan. A fact that everyone involved in adventures as this one should keep in mind is that it is extremely difficult to motivate people to fight their own countrymen on behalf of what they see as a foreign invader and occupier propping up a non-legitimate government.
The presentation also cast doubt on some of the war’s stated central aims. The Obama administration has repeatedly said that additional troops are necessary to prevent a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan — which would then allow Al Qaeda the re-establigh its safe haven there. According to interviews with detainees, however, the insurgents "view Al Qaeda as a handicap – a view that is increasingly prevalent." The Taliban feel they have to "manage [the] relationship with AQ to avoid alienating Afghan population, but encourage support from [the] global jihad network."
Let's look at the Taliban's current plans as we see them to be (from the Power Point Presentation).
Don't have to beat ISAF militarily, just outlast international will to remain in Afghanistan
Continue population outreach and protection programs
Continue successful asymmetric operations
Emphasize increasing violence in RC North and RC West
Demonstrate reach and perceived control of all Afghanistan
Make the main enemy the United States
Prohibitions on the following:
mistreating population
forcibly taking personal weapons
taking children to conduct hihad
punishment by maiming
forcing eople to pay donations
searching homes
kidnaping people for money
Flynn’s presentation also, indirectly, warns that one of the central U.S. tactics in Pakistan — drone strikes against suspected militants — could backfire. "violations of Pakistan sovereignty may contribute to radicalizing the population and diminishes credibility of the GoP [Government of Pakistan]." Such violations "demonstrat[e] an inability of the government; perception they cannot protect their own; exacerbates anti-western sentiment."
I think it's fair to say that very un-COIN-like tactics such as drone strikes on suspected militants, errant bombing and artillery strikes and midnight raids breaking into peoples homes have already enraged people. Yes, once in a while we kill a Taliban leader but playing games of attrition in Afghanistan is a losers strategy. There will be blowback.
The report states "We have a key advantage – [the] Taliban is not a popular movement (yet)". Obviously they did not ask the people of Kandahar Province.
In concluding, beating the Taliban will "require operating thinking in a fundamentally new way."
Interesting possibilities. We can negotiate a settlement with the Taliban and leave or we can stay longer, sacrifice more money, more blood and then negotiate with the Taliban and leave.
There are other possibilities. Readers' thoughts are welcome.